NEW: (# Failure to Register Technicality
NEW: Failure to Register a Sex Offense???
CAUTION: SORNA EFFECTIVE even if state has not enacted it
Plea Bargains: Santabello v New York
Forced to Carry Gov't Message Issue: See HERE
Blog also contains "Unfavorable" and "Informational" decisions and relevant news articles. All can be useful in framing arguments for new court actions. (i.e., avoid pitfalls or inform courts.) Or refuting charges, check facts of cases v yours.
Leagle is our main court decision resource.
Find State decisions by the Federal Circuit a State is in.

CAUTION: Decisions are meant to be educational.
For "Personal Life Decisions" consult with a lawyer.

USA v Rudd

11-23-2011 California:

USA v Rudd
(662 F.3d 1257 (2011)
Note: This is the very first case where a Judge questioned residency laws, and has remanded the case ordering lower court to explain.
William Newton Rudd appeals the district court's imposition of a residency restriction as a special condition of supervised release, following his conviction and sentencing for one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), which prohibits U.S. citizens from traveling to a foreign country and engaging in illicit sexual conduct.

The special condition prohibits Rudd from residing "within 2,000 feet of school yards, parks, public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcade facilities, or other places primarily used by persons under the age of 18." We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

Because the district court did not provide any explanation for its imposition of the 2,000 foot residency restriction, and none is apparent from the record, the district court committed procedural error. Thus, we vacate the special condition and remand to the district court to explain or reconsider the 2,000 foot residency restriction.
COURT: [2] It is unclear, at least from this record, what residency restriction would be sufficient but "involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release." Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924; United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2003). Would a residency restriction of 1,000, 3,000, or even 5,000 feet each be appropriate without any further explanation solely because of the nature and circumstances of Rudd's conviction? In the absence of any explanation of how the chosen distance furthers the purposes of Rudd's supervised release, the choice of 2,000 feet appears arbitrary. We thus conclude that the district court was required to provide an explanation for choosing the 2,000 foot residency restriction.4
Article: Court to Study Why Pedophile Should Be Kept From Kids

USA v Paul Shenandoah

2-9-2010:

USA v Paul Shenandoah
(595 F.3d 151 (2010)

See also lower US Dist court case:
572 F.Supp.2d 566 (2008)

Paul Shenandoah (was on 10 most wanted list) was indicted in December of 2007 for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), [ 595 F.3d 154 ] 18 U.S.C. § 2250(1) and (2) and 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(1). He was also charged with two counts of knowingly and willfully providing false information to law enforcement officials regarding his federal sex offender registration offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1512(b)(3).

He pleaded not guilty and asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment, arguing that SORNA violated the Non-Delegation Doctrine, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment and his right to travel. The District Court denied the motion. United States v. Shenandoah, 572 F.Supp.2d 566 (M.D.Pa.2008). Shenandoah then pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, but reserved his right to appeal the order refusing to dismiss the indictment. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(a)(2); United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir.1975).
I.
The factual and procedural background of this appeal is straightforward and undisputed. An abbreviated recitation will suffice. Shenandoah, a New York resident, was convicted of third degree rape in February of 1996.1 He executed a New York state sexual offender registration form when he was paroled in February of 2002. This form requires, among other things, that he apprise New York of any changes in his home address and place of employment. Some time in August of 2007, Shenandoah's employment as an iron worker required that he travel to, and relocate in, York County, Pennsylvania. He failed, however, either to register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania, or to modify his New York registration to reflect his change of residence and employment, leading to his indictment.

KEY STATEMENT:
Furthermore, the directive found in 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) applies to sex offenders — not to states. When combined with SORNA’s enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), an independent and federally enforceable duty is placed on sex offenders to register. New York and Pennsylvania may never implement SORNA, choosing, for whatever reason, to forego a portion of their federal funding. This failure to implement a federal law, however, does not give sex offenders a reason to disregard their federal obligation to update their state registrations. When a sex offender travels in interstate commerce and disobeys the federal command to keep his or her registration current, as required by SORNA, he or she is subject to prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); see also May, 535 F.3d at 921.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.



Courts continually ignore that there is no way for folks to know about the federal requirements:

See: US v Heth 2-4-2010

State ex rel. Matz v. Brown

7-6-1988 Ohio:

State ex rel. Matz v. Brown
This case is the source of this argument: Argument: "felons have no reasonable right to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of legislation".
Both parties cite this definition. Relator argues that his felony was a past transaction or consideration to which R.C. 2743.60(E) attaches a new disability. Respondent urges that relator has no vested interest in an award. Respondent misses the point: the Story definition involves either impairing of a vested right or creating a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations. However, discounting respondent's argument does not enhance relator's.

In Lakengren v. Kosydar (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 73 O.O. 2d 502, 503, 339 N.E.2d 814, 815, we held that the state could not retroactively apply amendments to the corporate franchise tax to a taxpayer whose tax year had ended:

"`The General Assembly having the power to enact laws, and * * * having enacted laws within certain limitations, and persons having conformed their conduct and affairs to such state of the law, the General Assembly is prohibited, estopped, from passing new laws to reach back and create new burdens * * * not existing at the time.'" (Citing Miller v. Hixon [1901], 64 Ohio St. 39, 59 N.E. 749.)

From the foregoing it is clear that a later enactment will not burden or attach a new disability to a past transaction or consideration in the constitutional sense, unless the past transaction or consideration, if it did not create a vested right, created at least a reasonable expectation of finality. The completion of a tax year is such a transaction; the commission of a felony is not. Except with regard to constitutional protections against ex post facto laws, no claim of which is made here, felons have no reasonable right to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of legislation.

There are important public policy reasons for so holding. For example, if relator's theory were to prevail no person convicted of abusing children could be prevented from school employment by a later law excluding such persons from that employment.
eAdvocate Note: It is one thing to prevent a person from taking specific employment, and another to AGAIN control their personal actions as sex offender registration has done. Accordingly, I believe this argument is being misapplied to registrants today in 2011! Finality of a criminal conviction has to mean something, and this argument circumvents ex post facto prohibitions, a substantive right.

In re Connie Ann Rodden

6-29-2010 California:

In re Connie Ann Rodden
(See HERE for Updates)

In this habeas corpus proceeding, we address whether California‟s sex offender registration requirement may be imposed on the basis of facts gleaned from a probation report prepared after a guilty plea was entered in Kentucky state court.

Petitioner Connie Ann Rodden seeks to vacate her guilty plea to failure to register as a sex offender in California within five days of coming into, or changing residence within, a county. (Pen. Code, §§ 290, subd. (b), 290.005, subd. (a), 290.018, subd. (b).)1 She argues that the least adjudicated elements of her Kentucky conviction do not satisfy those of any California offense for which sex offender registration is required.

After reviewing the petition, informal opposition, and reply, as well as the appellate record in petitioner‟s direct appeal,2 we issued an order to show cause to be returned to this court. After considering the return and traverse, we shall issue the writ.

As we shall explain, an out-of-state conviction requires a defendant to register as a sex offender in California only when the least adjudicated elements of the offense satisfy all of the elements of a crime enumerated in subdivision (c) of section 290 or when the foreign jurisdiction required the defendant to register as a sex offender. Here, the least adjudicated elements of the offense for which petitioner was convicted in Kentucky do not meet all of the requirements for any registerable offense in California.

Consequently, petitioner did not unlawfully fail to register as a sex offender, and her guilty plea to the same must be vacated.

In the Matter of Mitchell Borden

11-1-2011 North Carolina:

In the Matter of Mitchell Borden

The State of North Carolina (“the State”) appeals from an order terminating Mitchell Borden’s (“Petitioner”) sex offender registration requirement pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.12A (2009). We must determine whether the term “initial county registration” as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.12A(a) means the date of initial county registration in North Carolina or in any jurisdiction. Because “initial county registration” means the date of initial county registration in North Carolina, and Petitioner has not been registered as a sex offender in North Carolina for at least ten years, we reverse the trial court’s order.

In this case, the trial court incorrectly interpreted “initial county registration” to mean “initial county registration in any jurisdiction.” While Petitioner had been registered as a sex offender in Kentucky for at least ten years, the record shows he was not registered in North Carolina for at least ten years.4 Thus, the trial court erred when it terminated Petitioner’s sex offender registration requirement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order. REVERSED. Judges GEER and STROUD concur.

Article: Raising Full Faith and Credit Clause question: Sex offenders and stun guns