In the Matter of Care and Treatment of Edwards v State Law Enforcement Division

12-28-2011 South Carolina:

In the Matter of Care and Treatment of Edwards v State Law Enforcement Division
(395 S.C. 571 (2011)

State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) (Appellant), appeals the circuit court order relieving Jeremy Lane Edwards (Respondent) from the sex offender registration requirements of section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of "Peeping Tom," pursuant to section 16-17-470 of the South Carolina Code.1 Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions with the Horry, Greenville, and Florence County solicitors requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Horry and Greenville County solicitors did not object to the petition. The Florence County solicitor could not respond to the petition, due to a conflict, and referred the case to the South Carolina Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to section 23-3-430 were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of section 23-3-430, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively.

ISSUES
The parties raise three issues on appeal:

I. Whether the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent of the registration requirements of section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code.

II. Whether the amendments to section 23-3-430 clarified rather than changed the law requiring pardoned sex offenders to comply with the statute's registration requirements.

III. Whether the amendments to section 23-3-430 are procedural or remedial in nature, and therefore, apply retroactively.

CONCLUSION
Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction for the foregoing reasons. The General Assembly's 2005 and 2008 amendments to section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code cannot be applied retroactively to Respondent's case. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of the requirement to register as a sex offender. AFFIRMED.

How to apply for a Pardon

USA v Kevin Daniel Murphy

Utah has not enacted SORNA, yet court held SORNA still applied!

12-23-2011 Utah:

USA v Kevin Daniel Murphy

This case shows folks the extent to which a court will go when construing laws, this is outer-space. There is no way the average person would be able to come to the court's construction when reading the law in question. Mr. Murphy's construction -in this writer's opinion- is the correct one, in spite of the machinations the court went through to convict him. But, its the court's holding that wins, unfortunately. PS: Yes, there were parole issues too (i.e., he violated parole by leaving w/o notice), but they were not raised as part of this case.eAdvocate

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–29, requires a sex offender to register and keep the registration current in each state where he resides, works, or studies. Sex offenders who change their name, residence, employment, or student status, must appear in person in at least one “jurisdiction involved” to inform the state’s authorities of the change.

In this appeal we must determine whether a sex offender violates SORNA by abandoning his residence and moving to a foreign country without notifying the authorities of the home state. We conclude he does. For SORNA purposes, a sex offender continues to reside in a state after a change in residence or employment, both of which trigger reporting obligations, even if the offender eventually leaves the state.

Therefore, even if an offender abandons his current residence and job with the intention of moving out of the country, he must update his registration to reflect his new status. We therefore AFFIRM.

Kevin Daniel Murphy is registered as a sex offender in Utah, having been convicted by Utah state courts of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Several times since his conviction, he has signed forms acknowledging his duty to notify the authorities upon any change of residence.

In 2007, he was paroled from state prison to the Bonneville Community Correction Center in Salt Lake City. While residing at Bonneville, Murphy was allowed to work in the community on the condition of restrictive movement, meaning correctional officers transported him to and from his workplace each day.

Despite these precautions, Murphy fled Bonneville a few months after his arrival. Instead of reporting to his employer, he boarded a bus to California and then took a taxi into Mexico. He ended up in Belize, believing he could escape extradition under that country’s laws. After living in Belize for six months under the name Dan Murray, Murphy was arrested for lacking proper documentation. Belize deported Murphy to the United States, where he was returned to Utah.

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

4-19-1995:

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
Docket: 93-986
Citation: 514 U.S. 334 (1995)

Facts of the Case
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

Question
Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion
Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Oral Argument
There are exceptions to the anonymous free speech, but you must read the Oral Arguments to know what they are, in essence, anything that is not true, libel, slander, fraud, etc and a few others. Folks must be responsible for what they say, print, and do with respect to exercising their First Amendment rights. So, read and understand the concepts of what the Justices are saying.

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Assuming no wrongful conduct, the court said:
"“Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees them to express critical, minority views . . . Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society.”" The Electronic Frontier Foundation citing the above case.
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See also: A Victory for Anonymous Online Free Speech

Williams v New Jersey Dept of Corrections

12-2-2011 New Jersey:

Williams v New Jersey Dept of Corrections

Charles Williams, an inmate at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center (ADTC), appeals the denial of his administrative action challenging the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to transfer inmates from the general prison population to the ADTC. We reverse.

In summary, we hold that the Commissioner does not have the authority or discretion to assign inmates to the ADTC who are not eligible for such an assignment under the SOA. We do not hold that he cannot transfer ADTC-eligible inmates from other facilities to the ADTC earlier than five years prior to the end of their sentence if they can be accommodated there. We reject Williams's argument to the contrary. We also do not hold that he cannot provide treatment to sex offenders who are not ADTC-eligible at another facility, or even through a distinct program in a separate section of the ADTC if that is feasible.We hold only that the SOA, as it currently exists, precludes the Commissioner from assigning ADTC-ineligible sex-offender inmates to the ADTC for treatment and housing with ADTC-eligible inmates.
Reversed.