NEW: (# Failure to Register Technicality
NEW: Failure to Register a Sex Offense???
CAUTION: SORNA EFFECTIVE even if state has not enacted it
Plea Bargains: Santabello v New York
Forced to Carry Gov't Message Issue: See HERE
Blog also contains "Unfavorable" and "Informational" decisions and relevant news articles. All can be useful in framing arguments for new court actions. (i.e., avoid pitfalls or inform courts.) Or refuting charges, check facts of cases v yours.
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Serial rapist Kevin Coe demands he be freed

Civil Commitment

12-30-2013 Washington:

Locked up in McNeil Island sex predator center, ‘South Hill Rapist’ sues state

Notorious Spokane serial rapist Kevin Coe is attempting to sue his way out of a state center for sexual predators.

Acting as his own attorney, Coe, better known as the “South Hill Rapist” filed the lawsuit earlier this month in U.S. District Court. In it, he contends he doesn’t belong at the Special Commitment Center, a McNeil Island facility housing sex criminals who’ve completed their prison terms but are deemed likely to attack again due to mental illness.

Coe, a radio announcer turned serial rapist, was arrested in 1981 and ultimately convicted in three rapes in the Spokane area. He is widely believed to have attacked as many as 32 other women during the late 1970s through the early 1980s, when multiple rapes were committed against women walking alone at night.

Having served a 25-year sentence, Coe was scheduled for release when the state moved to commit him as a sexually violent predator. A jury agreed in 2008 and ordered Coe detained indefinitely.

Under Washington law, county prosecutors or the state Attorney General’s Office may file civil lawsuits asking that convicted sex offenders be confined indefinitely at a Department of Social and Health Services facility, the Special Commitment Center.

To prevail, prosecutors must show that an offender is likely to sexually assault again, and that the offender has a mental abnormality making him so. If a jury or judge agrees with prosecutors, an offender can be sent to the McNeil Island center.

The Special Commitment Center is home to about 300 men being held indefinitely. While several offenders have "graduated" from the program and more than a dozen others are living off the island, most remain at the facility. They make up about 1 percent of the sex offenders convicted in Washington courts.

Coe appealed the 2008 detention order. In 2012, the state Supreme Court found against him and upheld the jury verdict.

Now, Coe contends he should have been allowed during the 2008 trial to again interview the women he raped. The rapist was silent on what purpose such testimony would have served, though he contended the court’s failure to allow him to do so violated his rights.

“This case is a fiasco of justice,” Coe said in the lawsuit. “And when justice has not been occasioned in the trial court – or in the state review courts – the unjustice must be remedied upon federal review.”

Coe also contended that he does not have a “mental abnormality or personality disorder,” as the jury found, and that a recent revision to a widely circulated psychiatric guide removed rape from the list of behaviors of caused by mental illnesses. He faulted his attorney for not asking the court to define “personality disorder” for the jury.

The state has not yet responded to Coe’s lawsuit. He remains confined at the McNeil Island center. ..Source.. by Levi Pulkkinen

Nevada Supreme Court: Search warrant in child porn case faulty

12-26-2013 Nevada:

Nevada v Kincade

The Nevada Supreme Court has upheld a lower court judge who tossed out evidence in a child pornography case because of a faulty search warrant.

Michael Alan Kincade is serving a life sentence on other convictions of sexually abusing children.

But in a unanimous ruling Thursday, Nevada’s seven justices said prosecutors could not use as evidence more than 6,000 images of child pornography that were found on Kincade’s computer during the child molestation investigation.

The high court’s opinion said a 2011 warrant issued as part of that investigation did not include an affidavit or probable cause finding to seize and search the computer.

The court’s opinion upholds a previous ruling by Seventh Judicial District Judge Steve Dobrescu. ..Source.. by AP

Mistaken ID as 'sex offender' brings lawsuit

Andrew died before lawsuit was settled. See second story below.

12-27-2013 Florida:

Andrew Flaherty was divorced, alone, legally blind. By the end of 2011, he left his Louisiana home and let his brother drive him to Jacksonville.

He hoped he could spend time with his brother’s family. Meet a few people and go fishing. Have a chance at living among people he could trust.

Nearly 11 months later, on Halloween 2012, he went to a Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles office on Blanding Boulevard and asked for a state ID card.

The clerk faced a screen of yes-no options:

Organ Donor. Insulin Dependent. Florida Resident. Sexual Predator. Career Offender. Sexual Offender.

Yes, Flaherty is insulin dependent; it was the diabetes that blurred his eyesight, forcing him to forfeit a driver’s license. Yes, he’s now a Florida resident. And then, by some twisted, warped luck, the clerk said that yes, Andrew Stokes Flaherty was a sexual offender. Except that he wasn’t.

When it comes down to it, Andrew Flaherty is suing the Duval County Tax Collector’s Office because of seven numbers and what those numbers represent.

The sledgehammer justice of mandatory minimum sentences

12-26-2013 National:

Federal Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York says documents called “statements of reasons” are an optional way for a judge to express “views that might be of interest.” The one he issued two months ago is still reverberating.

It expresses his dismay that although his vocation is the administration of justice, his function frequently is the infliction of injustice. The policy of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses has empowered the government to effectively nullify the constitutional right to a trial. As Lulzim Kupa learned.

Born to Albanian immigrants, he was convicted in 1999 and 2007 of distributing marijuana. Released from prison in 2010, he again engaged in trafficking, this time with enough cocaine to earn him charges involving a sentence of 10 years to life. On March 5, 2013, prosecutors offered this: In exchange for a guilty plea, he would effectively be sentenced within the range of 110 months to 137 months — but the offer would expire the next day. Kupa rejected the offer, so on March 15 prosecutors filed a “prior felony information,” a.k.a. an 851 notice, citing the two marijuana convictions. So, 10 days after saying a sentence of perhaps less than eight years (assuming good time credits) would be appropriate, prosecutors were threatening a sentence of life without parole. This gave him no incentive to plead guilty.

Then, however, they immediately proposed another plea agreement involving about nine years’ imprisonment. Given a day to decide, he acted too slowly, so prosecutors again increased the recommended sentence. Finally, Kupa caved: “I want to plead guilty, your Honor, before things get worse.” If, after the 851 notice, he had insisted on a trial and been found guilty, he would have died in prison for a nonviolent drug offense. He is 37.

Conviction of man who admitted having child porn thrown out

12-24-2013 New Hampshire:

The state Supreme Judicial Court has overturned the guilty plea, conviction and 2-15 year prison sentence of a man who police said admitted possessing child pornography.

David Latagne agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of attempted possession of child pornography last year and was sentenced to 2-15 years in state prison.

But the plea deal came only after a judge refused to throw out Latagne's admission to police that he possessed child porn and the results of a search of his computer. The agreement allowed him to remain free while he appealed that ruling.

Salem police arrested Lantagne at Canobie Lake Park in July, 2013 on disorderly conduct charges after getting complaints that he was taking pictures of young girls' backsides as they emerged from a water ride.

In a unanimous decision, the justices said since the disorderly conduct charge did not meet the legal standard for that crime, the arrest was "unlawful" and prosecutors could not use statements made when he was questioned while police were holding him on that charge.

The court said Lantagne was arrested after a woman complained to a security guard that Lantagne made her "nervous," and the guard observed Lantagne positioning his cell phone on the side of his leg and aiming at young girls clad in swim suits.

The officer said Lantagne admitted taking the pictures and saying that he had an attraction to young girls, calling it "a problem.

He's Not a Sex Offender, Married Man Says

12-24-2013 California:

A man required to register as a sex offender for life for having consensual relations with his now-wife 24 years ago - when he was 19 and she was 17 - asked a state court to remove that obligation so he can get on with his life.

In 1989, police busted Lonny Leon Rivera, then 19, for having "consensual, voluntary relations" with his 17-year-old girlfriend. He pleaded guilty to a single count of oral copulation with a minor. That charge requires mandatory, lifetime registration as a sex offender in the state of California, according to Rivera's lawsuit in Tulare County Court.

Rivera and his girlfriend remained together and are now married.

Rivera registered, but acknowledges that he failed to update his information annually from 1991 through 2011. In 2012, California Attorney General Kamala Harris filed a criminal complaint for failure to register as a sex offender. Rivera was arraigned in October.

In his petition for writ of mandate, Rivera claims that the state's demand is unconstitutional.

"Rivera's inclusion in the sex offender registry under the mandatory provisions of the California Sex Offender Registration Act violates his right to equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution," Rivera says in the petition, citing a 2006 ruling by the California Supreme Court in People v. Hofsheier.

Missouri v Wade (and other consolidated cases)

12-24-2013 Missouri:

Missouri v Wade (and other consolidated cases)

eAdvocate Note: The essence of this decision is, that Art I Sec 13 of the Missouri Constitution applies only to criminal laws, which 566.150 (A proximity law) is. Apparently there is another decision -which this decision now overturns- which held the above constitutional section applies to BOTH, criminal and civil laws. Yes this is a bit confusing but reread this note.

In this appeal Michael Wade, Jason Reece Peterson, and Edwin Carey each argue that article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution, which prohibits the passage of any law "retrospective in its operation," applies to criminal laws and, therefore, their charges under § 566.150,1 are unconstitutional as applied to them. This Court recently held that the retrospective clause of article I, section 13 does not apply to criminal laws. These cases now require this Court to determine whether § 566.150 is a criminal law.

This Court concludes that § 566.150 is a criminal law. Therefore, the circuit courts erred in dismissing the charges against Peterson and Carey on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to them, but the circuit court correctly overruled Wade's motion to dismiss. The judgments entered against the State with respect to Peterson and Carey are reversed, and the cases are remanded. The judgment in Wade's case is affirmed.

... ... ...
State v. Wade
On November 25, 1996, Wade pleaded guilty to statutory sodomy in the first degree, § 566.062, child molestation in the second degree, § 566.068, and sexual abuse in the first degree, § 566.100. Wade was sentenced, pursuant to § 559.115, RSMo 1994, to participate in the Sexual Offender Assessment Unit program. Upon successful completion of the program, the circuit court suspended the remainder of Wade’s sentences and ordered him released on probation for a period of five years. Wade was a registered sex offender and in compliance with sex offender registration requirements.

On August 22, 2011, Wade was arrested at Castlewood State Park for violating § 566.150. Section 566.150 prohibits any individual who has pleaded guilty to, or been convicted of, or been found guilty of various sex offenses from "knowingly be[ing] present in or loiter[ing] within five hundred feet of any real property comprising any public park with playground equipment or a public swimming pool." Wade was charged with knowingly being present within 500 feet of a public park with playground equipment. Wade filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to him in violation of article I, section 13. The circuit court overruled the motion, and Wade waived his right to a jury trial. After a bench trial, Wade was convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The circuit court suspended execution of his sentence and placed Wade on probation for a period of five years. Wade appeals.

State v. Peterson
On January 20, 1998, Peterson was convicted of the offense of indecent behavior with a juvenile in Louisiana. Peterson resides in Missouri and is in compliance with all sex offender registration requirements. On June 17, 2011, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Peterson with the crime of loitering within 500 feet of a public park in violation of § 566.150.

Peterson filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him as unconstitutionally retrospective in violation of article I, section 13. The State responded by arguing the retrospective ban contained in the constitution applied only to civil rights and proceedings, not to criminal proceedings, relying on the holding in Ex parte Bethurum, 66 Mo. 545 (1877), to support its position. The State also argued that if the retrospective ban applied to criminal statutes, the statute did not tread on any of Peterson’s vested rights, nor did it confer any additional duty, obligation, or disability on Peterson to comply with the statute.

The circuit court sustained Peterson’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The circuit court assumed the ban contained in article I, section 13 was not limited to civil statutes and found § 566.150 was an unconstitutionally retrospective law as applied to Peterson. The State appeals.

State v. Carey
On May 7, 1997, Edwin Carey pleaded guilty to the offense of statutory rape in the second degree in violation of § 566.034, RSMo Supp. 1997. Carey is in compliance with all sex offender registration requirements.

In 2010, the State filed an information charging Carey with the offense of loitering within 500 feet of a public park in violation of § 566.150. Carey filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him, alleging that § 566.150 is unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to him because it imposed a new obligation that was not present at the time of his conviction in violation of article I, section 13. Carey's motion alleged that § 566.150 became effective 12 years after his May 1997 guilty plea.

The motion further alleged that laws similar to § 566.150 had been found unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to offenders convicted before the enactment of the law. The State responded to the motion by arguing that article I, section 13's prohibition against laws retrospective in their operation applied only to civil rights and remedies. After a hearing, the circuit court sustained Carey's motion and dismissed the information. The State appeals.

... ... ...

Conclusion
As recently reaffirmed in Honeycutt, the retrospective clause of article I, section 13 does not apply to criminal laws. Because § 566.150 is a criminal statute, the circuit court erred in dismissing the charges against Peterson and Carey on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to them, but correctly overruled Wade's motion to dismiss. The circuit courts' judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded with respect to Peterson and Carey. The judgment in Wade's case is affirmed.

Russell, C.J., and Breckenridge, J., concur;
Wilson, J., concurs in separate opinion filed;
Russell, C.J., and Breckenridge, J., concur in opinion of Wilson, J.;
Draper, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;
Stith and Teitelman, JJ., concur in opinion of Draper, J.



Missouri Supreme Court rules against sex offenders

Missouri's Supreme Court on Tuesday sided against three men previously convicted of a sex crime and facing a new criminal charge under a law making it illegal for them to be near certain parks.

The cases are the most recent to focus on a portion of the Missouri Constitution barring retrospective and ex post facto laws. The high court ruled last month the ban on retrospective laws does not apply to criminal statutes. A divided Missouri Supreme Court concluded Tuesday the parks restriction is a criminal law and the retrospective laws prohibition does not apply.

A 2009 Missouri law makes it illegal for those convicted of sexual offenses from knowingly being present or loitering within 500 feet of a public park with playground equipment or a public swimming pool. First-time violators can be charged with a felony and spend up to four years in prison, and repeat offenders could face up to seven years in prison.

In the cases before the high court, each defendant was convicted of a sex offense during the late 1990s. A circuit court dismissed the charge for being in a park against two of the men on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally retrospective when applied to them. The third was appealing his conviction. The high court upheld the conviction and remanded the two other cases.

Supreme Court Judge Zel Fischer wrote in the majority opinion that the park law is part of the criminal code, uses the language of a criminal provision and does not depend upon someone's registration as a sex offender. He said the law also carries a severe punishment.

"The General Assembly intended for this statute to punish felons, who had been convicted of committing specific, enumerated crimes, for engaging in future conduct that the General Assembly determined should be prohibited," Fischer wrote.

The Missouri Supreme Court has seven judges. Three agreed with Fischer's conclusions.

Judge George W. Draper III wrote a dissent joined by two other judges. Draper said he believes the statute against being near parks should be construed as a civil law and that he would find it retrospective as applied to the three sex offenders. Draper said the law is designed to protect the public from harm and derives from the requirement for sex offenders to register, which has been deemed nonpunitive and civil in nature. ..Source.. by CHRIS BLANK

Montgomery v Virginia

12-20-2013 Virginia:

Montgomery v Virginia

Johnathan Christopher Montgomery ("Montgomery") petitions this Court to grant a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-327.10 through 19.2-327.14. Montgomery seeks to vacate his 2009 convictions for forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and animate object sexual penetration.

In support of his petition, Montgomery proffers newly-discovered evidence—the recantation and subsequent perjury conviction of the complaining witness Elizabeth P. Coast ("Coast"). The Commonwealth agrees that Montgomery has satisfied the statutory requirements and joins Montgomery in asking this Court to grant his petition.

... ... ...

CONCLUSION

We hold that Montgomery has met his burden under Code § 19.2-327.11(A) of establishing that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Accordingly, pursuant to Code § 19.2-327.13 this Court grants Montgomery's petition and issues a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, thereby vacating his convictions for forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and animate object sexual penetration.

If there is no appeal from this judgment to the Supreme Court, the clerk shall forward a copy of this writ to the trial court, where an order of expungement shall be immediately entered regarding these offenses.

This order shall be published.




Johnathan Montgomery’s name taken off Florida sex offender registry

Norfolk, Va. (WTKR) – Just days after receiving his Writ of Actual Innocence from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Johnathan Montgomery is still fighting to fully clear his name.

On Friday, the court issued the writ, vacating the false sex crimes charges against him.

However, Montgomery remained listed as a registered sex offender online in the states of Florida and North Carolina.

In an e-mail to NewsChannel 3, his father David Montgomery wrote “My fear is that the non-state registries may not be as easy for John’s registration to be wiped out.”

Monday morning, NewsChannel 3′s Todd Corillo contacted the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and within hours the listing had been taken down.

A spokesman told NewsChannel 3 that once they received the Writ of Actual Innocence, Montgomery was removed from the Florida Registry website.

In North Carolina, a Public Information Officer from the Attorney General’s office provided NewsChannel 3 a copy of the “North Carolina Sex Offender & Public Protection Registration Programs” document.

In it, the document outlines that “the period of registration required by any provision of Article 27A shall be discontinued if, and only if, (1) the conviction requiring registration is reversed, vacated, or set aside.”

NewsChannel 3 is still awaiting a response on what more must be done in order to remove Montgomery’s name from the registry in North Carolina.


In an interview Friday, he expressed excitement to be able to move on with his life without the restrictions placed on him.

“To be able to ask my dad to borrow his vehicle and not have to worry about asking 3 or 4 other people and getting papers signed and registering in a state I’ve never been to,” Montgomery said “It’s just a long process to go somewhere where I could say ‘Hey Dad can I borrow the truck’ and I’m gone.” ..Source.. by Todd Corillo

US v DeJarnette Jr

11-18-2013 California:

US v Alexander DeJarnette, Jr.

Summary

The panel reversed a judgment of conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

The panel held that the Attorney General has not yet “validly specifie[d]” that 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)’s requirement of registration in the jurisdiction of the sex-offense conviction (if different from the jurisdiction of residence) applies to pre-Act offenders like the defendant who were, at the time of SORNA’s enactment and implementation, already subject to sex offender registration obligations.

The panel concluded that the district court’s jury instruction erroneously permitting the jury to convict solely on the basis of the defendant’s failure to register in the jurisdiction of his sex-offense conviction was not harmless.

Dissenting, Judge Graber wrote that the Attorney General’s regulations validly specify that SORNA’s registration requirements apply to all sex offenders, including pre-SORNA offenders; that the defendant was notified of his initial registration requirement in the jurisdiction of his sexoffense conviction; and that the jury was properly instructed.
Note: This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Alexander DeJarnette is a federal sex offender who failed to register as such and was convicted of violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et seq., 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006)).

On appeal, he challenges the district court’s interpretation of SORNA as imposing upon him an obligation to register in the jurisdiction of his sex-offense conviction, the Northern District of California, even though the evidence shows that he resided in a different jurisdiction (the State of Georgia) throughout the period charged in his indictment.

He contends that, because he had no legal duty to register in the Northern District of California, the district court’s contrary jury instruction was erroneous as a matter of law, venue was improper in the Northern District of California, and his nonregistration conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, for the following reasons, we reverse the conviction.



eAdvocate FYI Note: A little known AWA requirement which I've never seen enforced after-the-fact, until the decision above, is:

42 USC 16913
a) In general
A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence.

Sex Offender Residency Restriction Clarified

This is being posted for two reasons: 1) Obviously to remind folks in NC "how to interpret the NC law." AND< 2) To hopefully ALERT other advocates of EXCEPTIONS that SHOULD be in other states residency laws and possibly Advocates can push for these changes where appropriate.

10-13-2013 North Carolina:

A registered sex offender may not knowingly reside within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center. G.S. 14-208.16. That restriction was enacted in 2006, S.L. 2006-247, and applies to all registered sex offenders in North Carolina, regardless of their particular crime or date of offense. A violation of the law is a Class G felony.

The residency restriction law has two exceptions that exclude certain sex offenders from its coverage. Both exceptions, which operate as grandfather clauses that protect certain registrants’ property interests, were likely included in the in an effort to avoid some of the litigation that had arisen regarding other states’ residency restrictions around that time. See, e.g., Mann v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007) (holding that Georgia’s similar restriction violated the Takings Clause by forcing a sex offender to move out of his home, without compensation, when a child care center opened nearby).

The first exception is for changes in the ownership or use of property within 1,000 feet of a registrant’s address that occur after the registrant establishes residency. G.S. 14-208.16(d). In other words, if the sex offender was there first, he or she does not have to move away if a school or child care center opens up nearby. The statute provides three ways in which a residence can be “established” for purposes of applying the exception:
  • Purchasing or entering into a specifically enforceable contract to purchase the residence;
  • Entering into a written lease for the residence; and
  • Residing with an immediate family member “who established residence in accordance with this subsection [G.S. 14-208.16(d)].” Immediate family member is defined as a child or sibling who is at least 18 years old, or a parent, grandparent, legal guardian, or spouse of the registrant.

The second exception, broader than the first, is that the restriction does not apply at all to any registrant who established a residence before the law came into effect in 2006. Unlike the first exception, the second exception was not initially written into G.S. 14-208.16 itself. It was, rather, included in the effective date clause of the legislation that enacted that statute. S.L. 2006-247, § 11.(c) (“Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a person who has established a residence prior to the effective date of this subsection.”). The same methods of establishing residence applicable to the first exception (purchase, lease, or residing with an immediate family member) also apply to the second exception.

Not everyone interpreted the second exception the same way. First, because it was in the session law but not the codified statute, some people apparently were not aware of it at all. Second, there was some confusion about the triggering date of the exception, with some people reading the law to exclude registrants who established a residence before December 1, 2006 (the date mentioned in §11.(c) of S.L. 2006-247), and others thinking the residence had to have been established by August 16, 2006 (the day the governor signed the bill into law). Third (and perhaps most significantly), there were differences of opinion about the proper interpretation of the “reside with an immediate family member” method of establishing residence.

Some thought the exception applied only if the registrant actually moved in with the immediate family member before the law’s effective date, regardless of when the family member purchased or leased the residence. Others read that exception to relate back to the date the immediate family member established the residence, even if the registrant himself or herself didn’t live there until later. The latter reading had some support in the statute (the law refers to immediate family members who establish residence “in accordance with this subsection,” arguably bringing them within the law’s overall effective date fold), but people disagreed.


Legislation enacted this year, effective when it became law on April 16, 2013, attempted to address all three of those concerns. S.L. 2013-28. First, the legislation wrote the second exception into G.S. 14-208.16(a) itself, bringing it out of the shadows of the session laws. Second, the now-codified second exception makes clear that it applies as of August 16, 2006—not December 1 of that year.

Finally, the legislation attempted to clarify that the exception is measured by the date the registrant establishes residency, and does not relate back to the date the residence was established by an immediate family member. A pointed clause in the legislation’s preamble defined the problem the revised law was intended to address:

“Whereas, law enforcement officials mistakenly believe, based only upon the codified portion of the [2006] law . . . that a registered sex offender can legally reside within 1,000 feet of a school or day care center if the offender moves in with a family member who had established residence at the location prior to the effective date of the law, even though the offender did not establish residence at the location prior to August 16, 2006 . . . .”

That framing of the issue should make clear (to people who read session laws, at least) that revised G.S. 14-208.16(a) is intended to exclude only those registrants who themselves established a residence before August 16, 2006, and that the exclusion does not relate back to the date an immediate family member established residence. Any registrant who was residing with an immediate family member under a former interpretation of the law probably should have moved out after April 16, 2013. ..Source.. by Jamie Markham, North Carolina Criminal Law Blog

Fullmer v Michigan Dep't of State Police

This case bounced around Michigan courts, first declaring registration unconstitutional, then because of a US Supreme court decision ((Connecticut Dept Of Public Safety V Doe)) the 2002 Michigan decision below was overturned. Below is access to all relevant decision at each step.

2-25-2004 Michigan:

Fullmer v Michigan Dep't of State Police

This appeal arises from a successful challenge to the constitutionality of the public registry provision of Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.721-28.732 (2003), which was held to be invalid by the district court in a judgment that included an injunction against its immediate enforcement.

Because we conclude that the act creating the registry meets the due process standards for such programs recently announced by the Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), we reverse the district court's judgment and vacate the related injunction.



June 25, 2002:
Fullmer v Michigan Dep't of State Police

On June 3, 2002, the Court entered an order and Declaratory Judgment enjoining Defendants' further enforcement of Michigan State Police Sex Offenders Registration Act (the "SORA"), M.C.L. §§ 28.721 et seq, until they provide convicted sex offenders adequate procedural safeguards for their constitutionally protected interests.

[Doc. 18 and 19]. On June 10, 2002, Defendants filed a motion to stay this Court's judgment pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. [Doc. 21]. Plaintiff has responded [Doc. 25]. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the request for a stay, but MODIFIES its June 3, 2002 injunction and Declaratory Judgment.

Defendants will continue to be enjoined from enforcing the public notification sections of the SORA, M.C.L. § 28.728(2), M.C.L. § 28.730(2) and (3). However, the injunction on the other provisions of the SORA is modified.



June 3, 2002:
Fullmer v Michigan Dep't of State Police

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the latest challenge to the Michigan Sex Offenders Registration Act, MCLA § 28.721 et seq, ("SORA"). Plaintiff, an individual convicted of an offense that requires registration as a "sexual offender" pursuant to the SORA, argues that the statute violates constitutionally protected procedural due process.

Defendants are the Michigan State Police, the government entity charged with maintaining the registry, and Colonel Michael D. Robinson (the "Director"), in his official capacity as Director of the department.1 Defendants contend that Plaintiff's liberty interests are not implicated by the required registration and the public dissemination of registry information; therefore, no procedural due process safeguards are mandated. Further, Defendants assert that the issues raised by Plaintiff have all been considered and decided by other courts in this district and circuit, or that the outcome can reasonably be predicted against him based on these prior rulings.

While these prior decisions have upheld the notification provisions of the SORA against due process challenges, none addressed the specific argument made by Plaintiff here: namely, that the reputation damage resulting from registration as a sex offender, coupled with the ongoing legal obligations of registration and the attendant criminal penalties for failure to fulfill the obligations of registration, alter the registrant's legal status, and, therefore, the "stigma plus" test is met and his right to be free from government defamation entitles him to the procedural safeguards under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated a liberty interest recognized by the United States Constitution which is deserving of minimal due process protection, because of the damage to reputation as a labeled sex offender, coupled with the burden and duty of continuing registration obligations over a course of years. Because the SORA does not provide notice to registrants or an opportunity to be heard, it is struck down as an unconstitutional denial of due process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Butler v Jones

12-17-2013 Oklahoma:

Butler v Jones

On June 28, 2000, Petitioner/Appellee, Jerry Dale Butler (hereinafter "Butler") pled guilty to two counts of "Sexual Abuse of a Minor Child" pursuant to 10 O.S., § 7115 in Sequoyah County, Oklahoma and received two five-year deferred sentences which ran consecutively.1 Sometime thereafter, Butler began registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act, 57 O.S., § 581 et seq. (hereinafter "SORA").2

On April 1, 2010, the district court in Sequoyah County issued an order expunging Butler's plea from the record in accordance with 22 O.S., § 991c, thereby deleting all references to his name from the docket sheet, deleting the public index of the filing of the charge, and providing no information concerning the confidential file shall be revealed or released without order of a judge or district court.

On June 18, 2010, Butler filed a Petition for Injunction to permanently enjoin the Respondent/Appellant, Justin Jones ex rel., State of Oklahoma ex rel., Oklahoma Department of Corrections (hereinafter "Department") from requiring him to continue registering under SORA.

He argued requiring him to register violates his rights to equal protection of the laws and to due process of law "under the Constitutions of the United States, Amendments V and XIV, and of the State of Oklahoma, Art. 2, §§ 2 and 7, and Article 5, § 59."

His main and most developed argument is his equal protection challenge. He alleged 57 O.S., § 582 (E) violates his right to equal protection because it treats persons with expunged records in Oklahoma differently from persons whose records were expunged in other states. Subsection E of § 582 was added in 2009 and provided:
E. The provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act shall not apply to any such person who has received a criminal history records expungement for a conviction in another state for a crime or attempted crime which, if committed or attempted in this state, would be a crime or an attempt to commit a crime provided for in any said laws listed in subsection A of this section. 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 404, § 2 (eff. Nov. 1, 2009).
Butler also asserted § 582 (E) offended Article 5, § 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution which concerns special laws and he is being denied due process of the law available to persons whose criminal history records were expunged in other states. He asserted there is no legitimate state purpose for denying Oklahoma defendants in deferred sentence cases the same privilege as that accorded to citizens of Oklahoma whose criminal history records were expunged in any of the other states.

... ... ...

CONCLUSION

¶ 17 We find the district court gave deference to an unlawful expungement over valid law requiring Butler to register under SORA for his lifetime. The district court reached an erroneous conclusion that Butler's case presented an "unusual and narrow circumstance" which justified it ignoring valid and existing law.

We also find the provisions of 57 O.S., § 582 (E) do not deny Butler equal protection of the law. At the time of Butler's plea, the law required a person who received any probationary term for a crime provided for in 10 O.S., § 7115, if the offense involved sexual abuse, to be designated an "aggravated" sex offender and to register under SORA for life. Requiring Butler to register under SORA based upon the law in effect at the time of his plea is consistent with our recent holding in Cerniglia v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 81, ___ P.3d ___.

We reverse the district court's order granting a permanent injunction against the Department and require the district court to order Butler's registration under SORA be reinstated for his lifetime because of his "aggravated" sex offender status.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION

25 to life for failing to reregister as sex offender

12-18-2013 California:

Vance Rider was a 41-year-old man with a long criminal record and a low IQ when he left Oakland in late 1999 and bedded down at a homeless shelter in San Mateo. Police found him there in March 2000 and discovered he had failed to reregister as a sex offender as required by law — once a year, within five days of his birthday, and within five days of a change of address.

After a San Mateo County judge barred a psychologist from testifying about Rider’s low mental capacity, a jury convicted him of violating the registration law. With multiple felony convictions on his record — three robberies in 1978, and forcible oral copulation of a minor and attempted manslaughter in 1983 –he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison under California’s three-strikes law.

Rider has remained in prison during lengthy and unsuccessful appeals in the state courts, and on Wednesday he lost again, this time in the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

One defense argument was that the trial judge should have allowed the jury to hear a psychologist who said Rider had an IQ of 69 and that such people have difficulty with their memory and ability to make plans. The judge said the defense could offer evidence that Rider was unaware of his duty to register, or lacked the ability to comply, but that state law barred testimony that he suffered from a mental defect that affected his capacity to follow the law.

Sierra Madre Stops Enforcement of Sex Offender Ordinance

12-15-2013 California:

The City of Sierra Madre has agreed to stop enforcement of its sex offender ordinance, which prohibited all registered sex offenders, from residing in most of the city and from being present in child safety zones that included the city’s schools, parks and public library. The Sierra Madre City Council approved this action on December 10 after being sued in federal district court by one of the city’s four registered citizens. The legal challenge was based upon allegations that the city ordinance violated the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

“This is a significant victory for all registered citizens within the state of California,” stated attorney Janice Bellucci, who represented the registered citizen. “It restores the civil rights of registered citizens who live within the City of Sierra Madre as well as those who wish to visit that city.”

According to terms of the settlement agreement, the ultimate fate of the city ordinance will depend upon a future ruling by the California Supreme Court in the case In re Taylor, That case is expected to decide whether residency restrictions are constitutional and, if so, if their application is limited to registered citizens on parole. The Supreme Court granted review of this case in December 2012.

“This settlement agreement is a good model for other cities, who have enacted residency restrictions, to follow,” stated Bellucci. “It protects such cities from future lawsuits until the state Supreme Court decides this important matter.”

In addition to stopping enforcement of its ordinance, the City of Sierra Madre agreed to pay attorneys fees and costs in exchange for a dismissal of the case. ..Source.. by CARSOL blog

Pennsylvania Supreme Court throws out parts of Megan's Law

This problem may be short lived, but correcting the mess caused by this -Legislative Error-, will be a disaster. Some folks may have to be released from prison or probation after having certain convictions overturned. All Lawmakers need to read their State Constitutions. Now if folks remember, Pennsylvania recently became SORNA Compliant according to the SMART Office. Welcome to the world of Chaos.

UPDATE: Just so folks know, this decision did not say "Megan's Law" is invalid, it said, the way CERTAIN provisions of "Megan's Law" was enacted in Pennsylvania ONLY was incorrect. Their state constitution says "enact laws ___this way__" and they failed to follow that way; a procedural legislative error, nothing more. However, correcting anything that was done pursuant to the resulting law (i.e., FTR charges, and other things) will be a disaster undoing (correcting) them.


12-17-2013 Pennsylvania:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court threw out portions of the state's sex-offender registration law on Monday, telling lawmakers they violated the constitution's requirement that bills that become law must be confined to a single subject.

The justices ruled that a set of changes made to Megan's Law in 2004 was not constitutional, noting that the legislation also included such measures as a two-year statute of limitations on asbestos actions, the jurisdictional parameters of park police, and revisions to real estate law.
Pennsylvania's Constitution
Article III
Form of Bills
Section 3.
No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.
The court then put its decision on hold for three months to allow the Legislature to find a remedy.

"We will stay our decision, as we have done under similar circumstances, in order to provide a reasonable amount of time for the General Assembly to consider appropriate remedial remedies, and to allow for a smooth transition period," wrote Justice Debra Todd for the five-justice majority.

As revised in 2004, Megan's law created a searchable online database of offenders, set new punishments for offenders who did not register, and added luring and institutional sexual assault to the list of offenses that require 10-year registration.

It also set notification rules for out-of-state offenders who move to Pennsylvania, altered duties of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, and established community notification about sexually violent offenders.

Todd said the single-subject rule, which dates to 1864 and has recently been a factor in several high-profile cases, gives people confidence they can weigh in before a bill is passed, and helps lawmakers know what they are voting on ahead of time.

"When an act of the Legislature violates the single-subject rule, all of its provisions are equally repugnant to the constitution, and, thus, equally void," Todd said.

Chief Justice Ronald Castille
filed a lone dissent, saying it was a close question but that he would have upheld the law.

"Any law passing through the enactment process is the result of salutary legislative compromise and the single-subject rule is not intended to completely discourage such compromise," Castille wrote.

Steve Miskin, a spokesman for the House Republican caucus, noted that revisions to Megan's Law enacted two years ago that brought Pennsylvania into compliance with the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act were drafted with an eye toward the case the court just decided.

US v Roybal

12-10-2013 Oregon:

US v Roybal

Appellant Roger Allen Roybal ("Roybal") pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Based on its holding that Roybal's act of showing child pornography to an eleven-year-old victim qualified as "distribution," the district court
  • (1) applied a six-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(D), and
  • (2) declined to apply a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1).
On appeal, Roybal contends that his act of "showing" child pornography does not qualify as "distribution" under the sentencing guidelines. Without deciding whether an act of "showing" child pornography to a third party can itself constitute "distribution," we hold that additional findings made by the district court warrant the six-level enhancement.

At sentencing, the district court imposed a supervised-release condition requiring that Roybal participate in a sex-offender treatment program and "abide by the policies of the program, to include physiological testing." The district court made no specific mention of penile plethysmograph testing.

Roybal contends on appeal that penile plethysmograph testing may not be imposed as a requirement of his supervised release. As the district court did not make the requisite findings, we hold that penile plethysmograph testing may not be imposed.

Second Circuit To Feds: Don’t Touch His Junk

10-13-2013 Vermont:

US v McLaurin

You don’t often see federal courts striking down conditions of supervised release as violations of substantive due process. But you don’t often see the federal government wanting to hook up a device to a man’s penis, make the man watch pornography, and see what happens. It sounds a bit… 1984 (affiliate link).

I couldn’t help noticing this opinion, given its unusual nature and its focus on the peen. I’m sure you’re all dying to learn more about the procedure known as “penile plethysmography.” (The good news: it’s not as bad as a penile embolism or penile degloving.)

You know you want to see what those Second Circuit judges are hiding underneath their robes. Let’s dig a little deeper (into the opinion), shall we?

Having a sex-related offense on your record can really make your life unpleasant, for years after you’ve served your time in prison. It could, for example, cause you to lose your summer associate position at a top firm (even if your only “crime” was having a consensual relationship with a younger student while in high school).

Take the case of David McLaurin. He took topless photos of his teenage daughter, at his daughter’s request, to advance her modeling career. For this offense, he got sentenced to producing child pornography. He served his prison sentence (most of which was suspended).

Take the case of David McLaurin. He took topless photos of his teenage daughter, at his daughter’s request, to advance her modeling career. For this offense, he got sentenced to producing child pornography. He served his prison sentence (most of which was suspended).

Years later, he ran into problems complying with the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). After pleading guilty to a single count of violating SORNA, he got sentenced to fifteen months in prison and five years of supervised release. The sentencing judge imposed, over McLaurin’s objection, the condition that he participate in sex offender treatment that could include penile plethysmographic examinations.

What’s that? You can check out the surprisingly detailed Wikipedia article, or you can read the Second Circuit’s opinion (jointly authored by two out of the three judges on the panel, Judge Guido Calabresi and Judge Barrington Parker; I wonder why they didn’t just make this a per curiam) (citations omitted):
Penile plethysmography is a procedure that lasts two to three hours and “involves placing a pressure-sensitive device around a man’s penis, presenting him with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of sexual attraction by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses.” The Government disputes whether, as others have described, the test requires a subject to masturbate to establish a baseline for measurement.

Here at ATL, we have no problem with hand-to-wiener contact. Indeed, masturbation-defense law is a growing practice area, providing job opportunities for desperate law school graduates.

But masturbating while being hooked up to a machine and watched by others doesn’t sound like much fun. And it doesn’t have a great pedigree either:
The procedure was “developed by Czech psychiatrist Kurt Freund as a means to study sexual deviance,” and it was “at one time used by the Czechoslovakian government to identify and ‘cure’ homosexuals.”

And we all know how well those efforts go.

If you’re skeptical of penile plethysmography (anything that hard to spell has got to be sketchy), the Second Circuit agrees with you. Here’s the meat of the panel opinion:
  • “[T]he procedure inflicts the obviously substantial humiliation of having the size and rigidity of one’s penis measured and monitored by the government under the threat of reincarceration for a failure to fully cooperate. And even if the machine could accurately monitor and record the extent or intensity of a convict’s prurient interests (a proposition about which we have serious doubts), the goal of correctional treatment during supervised release is properly directed at conduct, not at daydreaming.”
  • “[W]e see no reasonable connection between fluctuating penis size and public protection — certainly none strong enough to survive the careful scrutiny that we give to unusual or severe conditions of supervised release.”
  • “[W]e also find it odd that, to deter a person from committing sexual crimes, the Government would use a procedure designed to arouse and excite a person with depictions of sexual conduct closely related to the sexual crime of conviction. In short, the Government offers no compelling justification for plethysmography in the name of deterring crime.”

Accordingly, the Second Circuit gave this dubious and degrading practice the shaft. Quoth the panel: “A person, even if convicted of a crime, retains his humanity.” ..Source.. by David Lat

HOA ban on sex offenders leads to lawsuit

9-27-2013 Texas:

A Texas homeowners association is facing a lawsuit that claims it improperly tried to oust a registered sex offender living there.

Theodore Whipple and his wife say in their lawsuit that he is a low-risk sex offender, convicted more than 20 years ago, KVUE reports. They claim a violation of the 14th Amendment’s right to due process, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the right to alienate property, according to a Courthouse News Service article published last November. Texas Lawyer’s Tex Parte Blog also published a story last year.

Whipple says the Valley View Village Condominium Homeowners Association in Austin informed him of a new rule last September that bars registered sex offenders from any condo property that is within 2,000 feet of any place where children congregate. The rule effectively bars him from the property, Whipple says.

Whipple got the notice on the day he was released from prison for failing to properly register his residence. He is represented on a pro bono basis by Akin Gump partner Fred Williams, and he remains in the condo while the lawsuit is pending.

According to the suit, state law no longer bars Whipple from coming within 500 feet of children because his parole has ended.“This is an effort by the homeowners association to take the law upon themselves and create their own little law for the neighborhood," Williams told KVUE. ..Source.. by Debra Cassens Weiss



HOA facing lawsuit after sex offender told to stay out

AUSTIN -- A homeowner's association is trying to keep sex offenders out. Now it's facing a lawsuit.

The Valley View Village Condominiums located behind Highway 71 in Southwest Austin is a quiet, small community of about 68 families.

"We watch out for one another," said community board member Eleanor Rotthoff.

Walking through the neighborhood with her granddaughter one day, Rotthoff met a new neighbor.

"He had an absolutely adorable border collie puppy, and we had to stop and play with the puppy and admire it," Rotthoff said.

She soon learned that man, Theodore Whipple, is a convicted sex offender.

"My blood ran cold quite frankly," she explained.

In 1991, a Williamson County court convicted Whipple of indecency with a child and sentenced him to eight years.

"When I did find out it involved a sexual assault on a 12-year-old, I realized my granddaughter at that point was 12. It was not a comfortable feeling," Rotthoff said.

He's also been charged with failure to register as a sex offender after he listed the wrong address. He served three more years for that. After his release last September, he moved back home to Valley View with his wife.

"Our position is, it's a violation of my client's constitutional rights and state law rights," said Fred Williams, a partner with the Akin Gump law firm who is representing Whipple and his wife. Williams says since Whipple's parole ended in November, his only requirement is to register with the state.

But the HOA says under its rules, no convicted sex offender can be within 2,000 feet of a place where children congregate -- like the pool or a nearby bus stop.

"This is an effort by the homeowners association to take the law upon themselves and create their own little law for the neighborhood," Williams said.

Akin Gump is taking on the case pro bono.

"I find it incomprehensible that they have decided to make a crusade on behalf of pedophiles," said Rotthoff. "We're just some ordinary, South Austin, middle class people trying to protect our children."

Originally, the HOA asked Whipple to leave or pay a $1,000-a-day fine. They have now agreed to let him stay for the duration of the lawsuit. ..Source.. by SHANNON MURRAY



See also: Can Associations Bar Sex Offenders From Residing in The Neighborhood?

See Also: Association Help Now

Whipple et al v. Valley View Village Condominium Homeowners Association
Texas Western Dist court 1:12-cv-01073
Judge Lee Yeakel

Man with sex offense on record must serve time despite change in law

The essence of this case is, that the man is being held illegally, and that calls for a Habeas corpus filing. We must remember that Starkey RELIEF was applied retroactively to remove certain folks (this man for one) from the registry. That should be argued by a qualified lawyer and appealed if necessary, which I doubt. It is clear the judge incorrectly decided this case and believe it will be overturned on appeal; will watch case.

12-13-2013 Oklahoma:

A district court judge has ruled a Comanche County man currently incarcerated for sex offender registry violations committed after his required registration period had expired will remain in jail for the remainder of his term.

Comanche County District Court Judge Mark Smith filed an order Tuesday denying Edward D. Turner's application for post-conviction relief, filed in October after he received a letter from the Department of Corrections stating he had been removed from the state's sex offender registry.

DOC reviews thousands of cases

DOC officials began reviewing every name on the list individually after the Supreme Court ruled in June some convicts in Oklahoma were being kept on the registry past their lapse dates when changes to registry laws were retroactively applied.

In October, when Turner filed his motion asking to withdraw his previous guilty plea, the DOC had reviewed just over 1,300 of the over 7,000 offenders on the state's registry and removed 679 offenders who were no longer subject to registry requirements. Turner was one of those offenders who was removed from the list in early October.

According to Turner, his registry period should have ended June 17, 2009, which was 10 years after his release from custody, following a 1997 indecent act with a child case in Kiowa County. The DOC kept him on the sex offender registry, so when he didn't notify police of a move in April 2012, LPD officers arrested him for failing to notify of an address change. Turner was arrested, charged, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 10 years with five suspended.

Argues charge not applicable

"I was illegally charged with a felony for not complying with Oklahoma Sex Offender Registration Act where none applied pursuant to new Oklahoma Supreme Court decision of Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections," he wrote in his motion. ..Continued.. by Malinda Rust

Com v Hainesworth

12-13-2013 Pennsylvania:

Com v Hainesworth

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from an order entered on December 19, 2012, by the Honorable John Blahovec of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.

That order states that Appellee, Deono Terrell Hainesworth, is not required to register as a sex offender under Act 111 of 2011, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10, et. seq., also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).

The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in determining that Hainesworth is not subject to the registration requirements of SORNA.

After careful review, we conclude that the court did not err when it ordered specific enforcement of the parties’ plea bargain. Accordingly, we affirm.

State supreme court rules for woman fighting sex offender status

12-11-2013 Massachusetts:

John DOE, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 205614 v Sex Offender Registry Board. (Must read actual court decision, well worth your time)

The state supreme court has ordered the Sex Offender Registry Board to reconsider whether a woman convicted on federal charges of sex trafficking of a child should be classified as a sex offender.

The woman, a former prostitute whose name was not released, ran an escort service from 2000 to 2002. Three years after she closed down the service, she was arrested on sex charges.

The woman testified that she started the business after serious physical assaults by pimps. She employed four minors, one of them a 14-year-old with an ID showing that she was 19. After she saw the girl's photo on a National Center for Missing and Exploited Children poster and learned her actual age, she had another employee inform the center where to find the girl.

She pleaded guilty to charges in connection with the 14-year-old and served 17 months in jail.

After her release, she was classified as a level 1 offender, the lowest of three categories. The hearing examiner who made that decision acknowledged the low danger posed by the woman and the low probability that she would commit further offenses.

The Range of Consequences of a Sex Offender Conviction

12-11-2013 North Carolina:

For a presentation I did recently on termination of sex offender registration requirements, I decided to see what requirements and restrictions a person is subject to under North Carolina law if convicted of an offense subject to sex offender registration. The results are too long for a single blog post, but you can find the entire list of consequences of a conviction here.

The list is not intended to provide detailed guidance on how the consequences are being interpreted and applied by the courts, probation, law enforcement, and other entities. Some of the consequences—for example, restrictions on use of social media websites and participation in religious activities when children are present—are the subject of legal challenges. The list may be useful, however, in understanding and advising people about the range of consequences that follow from conviction of an offense subject to registration.

The consequences of an offense subject to registration fall into four basic categories, described in more detail in the list:
  • enhanced criminal sentences and conditions;
  • registration requirements;
  • satellite-based monitoring; and
  • residence, premises, employment, and other restrictions.

Violation of these requirements and restrictions may result in prosecution for additional offenses. For example, failing to comply with registration requirements is usually a Class F felony, interfering with a satellite monitoring device is a Class E felony, and being on certain prohibited premises is a Class H felony.

Termination of registration extinguishes most of the consequences and accompanying penalties but not all of them. For example, the record of conviction is permanent; a person ordinarily may not expunge a conviction of an offense subject to sex offender registration, whether or not the person is still required to register. (A person may be eligible for an expunction of a misdemeanor conviction if the offense was committed before age 18.) ..Source.. by John Rubin

USA v Ronald Edward Gillette

12-6-2013 Virgin Islands:

USA v Ronald Edward Gillette
US Court of Appeals, 3rd Cir

At the heart of this appeal is whether the District Court of the Virgin Islands retains concurrent jurisdiction over local Virgin Islands crimes when the federal crimes giving rise to that jurisdiction are dismissed midtrial.

Ronald Edward Gillette was tried in the District Court for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of federal law, and for numerous counts of aggravated rape and unlawful sexual contact in violation of Virgin Islands law.

After the Government rested its case, the District Court dismissed the federal charges but proceeded to verdict on the local charges, with Gillette being found guilty of those charges. Gillette appeals his conviction, contending the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the local crimes.

We hold that, under these circumstances, the District Court retained concurrent jurisdiction over the local crimes notwithstanding its dismissal of the federal charges. Gillette also challenges several aspects of his trial and sentence. Finding no error, we will affirm.

JB et al v New Jersey State Parole Board

Does this decision violate a person's right to NOT CARRY the government's message?

To Commenter: Burglary data and parole data is not part of this discussion, nor do I even mention anything similar.


11-26-2013 New Jersey:

JB et al v New Jersey State Parole Board

Appellants J.B., L.A., B.M., and W.M. are individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses, have completed their respective prison terms, and are now being monitored by respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (the "Parole Board") as offenders who are subject to either parole supervision for life ("PSL") or its statutory predecessor, community supervision for life ("CSL"). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Represented by the same attorney, appellants challenge the constitutionality of certain terms of supervision the Parole Board has imposed upon them. Similar conditions have been imposed on other offenders subject to CSL or PSL, although appellants have not filed a class action.

The terms of supervision mainly being challenged in these related appeals1 are (1) the Parole Board's restrictions on appellants' access to social media or other comparable web sites on the Internet; and (2) the Parole Board's authority to compel them to submit to periodic polygraph examinations. One of the appellants, L.A. , also contests the Parole Board's imposition upon him of a Halloween curfew and an electronic monitoring condition.

For the reasons that follow, we reject appellants' facial challenges to the Internet access restrictions, subject to their right to bring future "as-applied" challenges should they avail themselves of the Parole Board's procedures for requesting specific permission for more expanded Internet access and are then denied such permission.

We do not decide at this time the merits of appellants' constitutional attack upon the polygraph requirements. Instead, we refer that subject matter to the trial court for supplemental proceedings, pursuant to Rule 2:5-5(b), for the development of an appropriate record, including scientific or other expert proofs, and for fact-finding. Such proofs and fact-finding shall focus upon the alleged therapeutic, rehabilitative, and risk management benefits of polygraph testing when it is conducted within the specific context of post-release oversight of sex offenders.