Alaska Supreme Court overturns 2006 conviction

4-29-2014 Alaska:

The Alaska Supreme Court last week overturned the conviction of a 62-year-old Ketchikan man who had been found guilty in 2006 of failure to register as a sex offender.

In its April 25th opinion, the court writes that the original offense for which Byron Charles was convicted occurred in the 1980s, before the State of Alaska passed the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. That 1994 law required convicted sex offenders to register with the state, even if the offense took place before 1994.

In 2008, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in Doe v. State that the sex offender registration act cannot be applied retroactively. Charles had previously appealed his conviction on the failure to register charge, but had not argued against the retroactive clause in state law. After the court’s 2008 decision, though, Charles added that argument to his appeal.

Lower courts ruled that Charles had essentially waived his right to use that argument by not bringing it up earlier. But in its April 25th decision, the Supreme Court decided otherwise.

California's High court rejects appeal on sex-offender rules

4-23-2014 California:

The California Supreme Court on Wednesday declined to review a lower court's ruling striking down sex-offender restrictions in Orange County that were among the strictest in the state.

Lower court ruling was People v Godinez which the DA appealed but the high court has refused the appeal leaving Godinez controlling the issue.

The move means that local bans in dozens of California communities are trumped by state law, as the 4th District Court of Appeal found in January.

"We're obviously disappointed," Susan Kang Schroeder, chief of staff for Orange County's district attorney, told City News Service. "We put our heart and soul in every brief and every argument to protect the children of Orange County from dangerous sex offenders. ... We still believe it was the right thing to do."

Orange County's restrictions passed in 2011 barred offenders from parks and beaches unless they had written permission from the sheriff.

Carriere man gets life without parole in sex-offender registry case

4-17-2014 Mississippi:

Donald Caves prosecuted as habitual offender

A Carriere man has been sentenced to life without parole for conviction of failing to register as a sex offender, District Attorney Hal Kittrell said Tuesday.

Donald Allen Caves, 45, was found guilty April 9. Judge Anthony Mozingo deferred sentencing for a pre-sentence investigation.

Kittrell said a Pearl River County jury believed testimony that Caves changed his address and failed to notify authorities.

He was convicted of touching a child for lustful purposes in 1990, accessory after the fact to auto burglary in 1998 and felon in possession of a weapon in 2005.

His latest felony investigated by the Pearl River County Sheriff's Office and prosecuted by Assistant District Attorneys Kim Harlin and Lauren Harless.

"Repeat offenders such as Donald Caves pose a threat to the safety of our community and should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole," Kittrell said in a news release. ..Source.. by ROBIN FITZGERALD

Bleeke v State

4-11-2014 Indiana:

Bleeke v State (Supreme ct)

Bleeke v State (Court of Appeals)

In this case, a parolee convicted of a sex crime against an adult female challenges a number of his parole conditions, including several that prohibit him from having contact with children—even his own. He also challenges the constitutionality of a state treatment program for sex offenders that he must participate in as part of his parole, claiming that under the program he is required to provide self-incriminating statements about his underlying offense and sexual history without immunity and under the threat of being found in violation of his parole.

We conclude that some of his parole conditions are impermissible on several grounds, but find no fault with the remainder. We likewise find no constitutional flaw in the state treatment program.

... ... ...

Conditions 4, 5, 17, 19, and 20, which we have laid out above, are all broadly aimed at restricting Bleeke from being near, communicating with, or associating with, children (and, until the injunction became permanent, from being near, communicating with, or associating with, his own children). Bleeke argues that there is no evidence whatsoever that he poses a risk to any minor, and that these conditions therefore are not reasonably related to his successful reintegration into the community.

We agree with Bleeke. None of the evidence presented at his individualized hearing or designated before the trial court in support of—or in opposition to—his motion for summary judgment indicates that Bleeke is, was, or will be a threat to children—either his own or otherwise. In fact, the evidence uncontrovertibly shows the opposite: that Bleeke is affirmatively not a threat to children, nor is he likely to be. The Parole Board’s only evidence to the contrary apparently consisted of a general study of cross-over offenders. But we note, as the Court of Appeals did, that the study itself was not made part of the record on appeal. Bleeke, 982 N.E.2d at 1049. This makes it impossible to assess whether the study raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of Bleeke himself crossing over from an adult victim to a child victim.

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Parole Stipulation form 49108 ...

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS INC -v- BRODIE

2-27-2009 Maryland:

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS INC -v- BRODIE

In this case, we are called upon to decide whether a circuit court judge, in a defamation action, appropriately denied a motion to quash/motion for protective order regarding a subpoena requiring, Independent Newspapers, Inc., a company that commissioned an Internet forum (for which it required participants to register), to identify five Internet forum participants known only by their pseudonyms or usernames. Independent Newspapers appealed the denial of the motion, and we granted certiorari, Independent Newspapers v. Brodie, 405 Md. 505, 954 A.2d 467 (2008), prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals to address the following questions:

• 1. May a court breach the constitutional right to speak anonymously and order the identification of Internet speakers who are alleged to have violated the plaintiff's rights without a factual and legal showing that the plaintiff has a supportable claim on the merits?
• 2. Did plaintiff Brodie make the required showing in this case?

We shall conclude that the circuit court judge abused his discretion when ordering the identification of the five anonymous Internet forum participants, because the three participants sued, concededly, did not make the alleged defamatory statements, while the other two anonymous participants, who allegedly made the actionable remarks, were not sued by Brodie.

For guidance to the trial courts, we, nevertheless, will discuss the standard that should be applied to balance the First Amendment right to anonymous speech on the Internet with the opportunity on the part of the object of that speech to seek judicial redress for alleged defamation.

US v Cooper

4-10-2014 Delaware:

US v Cooper

Keith Allen Cooper (“Cooper”) is a sex offender who was convicted of rape in Oklahoma and paroled prior to the enactment of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA” or the “Act”), Pub.L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified primarily at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 & 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq .). After Congress enacted SORNA, Cooper was convicted of failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirements set forth in SORNA. In bringing this appeal, Cooper invokes the nondelegation doctrine, challenging the constitutionality of the provision of SORNA in which Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of the Act's registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders.

We conclude that SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Accordingly, we will affirm Cooper's conviction.

In 1999, Cooper was convicted in Oklahoma state court on three counts of rape in the first degree. Cooper was paroled in January 2006. As required by pre-SORNA law, he registered as a sex offender in Oklahoma on or around January 20, 2006.

In July 2006, Congress enacted SORNA, which requires sex offenders to comply with specific registration requirements and to update registration information in the event of a change of name, address, employment, or student status. Pursuant to the promulgation of an administrative rule on February 28, 2007, and subsequent issuance of a final rule, the Attorney General made SORNA's registration requirements applicable to individuals (such as Cooper) who were convicted of sex offenses prior to the enactment of SORNA.

In or around early 2011, Cooper moved from Oklahoma to Delaware. Although SORNA required Cooper to notify authorities of this change in residence, Cooper did not provide either Oklahoma or Delaware authorities with his updated residence information, nor did he separately register as a sex offender in Delaware after moving there.

In 2012, Cooper was arrested and charged with one count of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. On November 2, 2012, Cooper moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that, inter alia, SORNA's delegation of authority to the Attorney General to determine the applicability of the Act's registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders violates the nondelegation doctrine and thus is unconstitutional. The District Court denied Cooper's motion to dismiss.

... ... ...

Relevant to this appeal, SORNA makes it a federal crime for any person who is required to register, and who travels in interstate or foreign commerce, to knowingly fail to register or to update registration. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).1 Once a sex offender is subject to SORNA's registration requirements, that offender can be convicted under § 2250 if he thereafter engages in interstate or foreign travel and then fails to register. See Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 447, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010).

... ... ...

It may well be, as Justice Scalia has written, that in delegating this responsibility to the Attorney General, Congress “sail[ed] close to the wind with regard to the principle that legislative powers are nondelegable.” Reynolds v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 975, 986, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, we are puzzled as to why Congress decided to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of SORNA's registration requirements to pre-SORNA offenders. The decision to make SORNA's registration requirements applicable to pre-Act offenders is a weighty one—particularly for the class of pre-SORNA offenders affected by that decision. Although we find Congress' delegation of this important decision curious at best, we hold that it does not amount to an unconstitutional abdication.

Under controlling nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence, the hurdle for the government in this case is not high.6 Applying the precedential authority on the nondelegation doctrine, we conclude that SORNA's delegation to the Attorney General in 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Accordingly, we will affirm.

Sex offender's conviction sent back to Scott County court

4-11-2014 Iowa:

The Iowa Supreme Court on Friday ordered more proceedings for a Davenport sex offender who was convicted of violating restrictions on where he could be.

Darrell Allen Showens, 51, was arrested May 11, 2012, after sitting on a bench facing the front door of the downtown Davenport Public Library.

The bench was 72 feet from the entrance, and Showens admitted he sat there about 45 minutes in the middle of the day.

Scott County Sheriff's Detective Peter Bawden, who recognized Showens as a registered sex offender, first observed him sitting on the bench for about 10 minutes before asking him what he was doing.

After giving a few different stories, Showens ultimately said he was waiting for the bus. Bawden pointed out the bench was not at a bus stop.

At the end of the conversation, Bawden arrested Showens. As a registered sex offender, he is not allowed to loiter within 300 feet of a public library, or the length of a football field.

Miller v Commonwealth

2-21-2013 Kentucky:

Miller v Commonwealth

The Appellant Elmer David Miller was convicted of a misdemeanor and probated for the two-year statutory maximum on the condition that he attend counseling recommended by the Office of Probation and Parole. That office recommended that he enroll in the state's three-year sex offender treatment program required for felony sex offenders. At issue is whether his probation can be revoked for failing to do the impossible, that is, complete the program before his probation ended, and whether there are other options, such as extension of the probationary period, available. This Court concludes that Miller cannot be required to complete a program that extends beyond his period of probation, that he has completed his probation, and he is discharged from it as a matter of law.

... ... ...

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, but to the extent that the Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a determination of whether Miller's probation should be revoked, its judgment is reversed. This case is remanded to the Lincoln Circuit Court with directions that the Appellant Elmer David Miller be deemed discharged from probation.

State v William Dinkins Sr

The essence of this case is, a person cannot be released from prison unless they have an residence (address), but finding one when in-prison is impossible. The state's position is absurd, the inmate needs to be released to find a residence..

3-12-2012 Wisconsin:

State v. William Dinkins, Sr. (Supreme court)

1 The State seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed a judgment and order of the circuit court finding William Dinkins, Sr. guilty of knowingly failing to comply with the sex offender registration statute.[1] That statute required Dinkins to provide the Department of Corrections (DOC) with "the address at which [he] . . . will be residing" at least ten days prior to his release from prison.[2] The circuit court found that Dinkins attempted to comply with the registration requirements but was unable to find housing for himself prior to his release. Nevertheless, relying on the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing, the circuit court adjudged Dinkins guilty of a Class H felony.

2 The State asserts that the court of appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's judgment. It contends that homelessness is not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements and that Dinkins could have complied with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location as the place he would be residing.

3 We agree with the State that homeless registrants are not exempt from registration requirements and that homelessness is not a defense to failing to comply with the registration requirements. However, we disagree that Dinkins was capable of complying with the statute by listing a park bench or other on-the-street location.

... ... ...

US v Segura (Failure to Register is NOT a Sex Offense ?)

3-31-2014 5th Circuit:

US v Segura
No. 12-11262.

Defendant-Appellant Angel Segura ("Segura") appeals his sentence on the grounds that the district court's imposition of a 120-month term of incarceration was unreasonable. He also appeals the district court's imposition of a life-term of supervised release on the grounds that the district court erroneously treated his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender as a "sex offense." For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

... ... ...

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Note: Even though Segura lost this appeal, the court ruled something helpful to ALL sex offenders, hence why we list case.

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... ... ...

Therefore, we hold that footnote 3 in Tang is dictum and does not bind the court under the prior-panel rule. Accordingly, we are free to examine the question of whether failure to register qualifies as a sex offense without regard to the statement in the Tang opinion. For the reasons explained below, we hold that failure to register does not qualify as a sex offense for the purposes of § 5D1.2(b)(2).

The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Goodwin is instructive. 717 F.3d 511, 517-20 (7th Cir. 2013).3 In that case, the defendant, like Segura, pleaded guilty to failure to register and the district court sentenced him to a life-term of supervised release. Id. at 514. On appeal, Goodwin argued, inter alia, that the district court miscalculated the advisory Guidelines range for his term of supervised release, and thereby committed plain error. Id. at 516. More specifically, Goodwin posited that

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to his offense, that the [PSR] erroneously relied on this Guideline in recommending a life term of supervised release, and that the district court's sentencing him to a life term of supervised release under the incorrect assumption that this sentence was within the advisory Guidelines constitutes plain error.

Id. at 518. The Seventh Circuit agreed with Goodwin. In reaching its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit first considered whether failure to register should be classified as a sex offense. Id. at 518-19. The court disagreed with the Application Note's apparent suggestion that any failure to register under SORNA could be considered an offense perpetrated against a minor.4 See id at 519. The court noted that "[i]n Goodwin's case, there was no specific victim of his failure to register" and accordingly, "it seems incorrect to claim that Goodwin committed his failure to register `against a minor.'" Id. The court explained that applying the term `"perpetrated against a minor' to any failure to register stretches this term past its breaking point.'" Id. We agree. In Segura's case, there was no specific victim attributed to his failure to register. Therefore, the crime was not perpetrated against a minor and should not qualify as a sex offense.

... ... ...

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in finding that failure to register is a sex offense for the purposes of § 5D1.2(b)(2). However, we conclude that the error was not plain and reversal is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm.

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From case:

The statutory penalties for violating § 2250(a)—Segura's offense of conviction—include a term of supervised release of five years to life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). In addition to the statutory sentencing scheme, the Guidelines provide recommendations for imposing supervised release as part of a defendant's sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2. Section 5D1.2(b)(2) is a policy statement recommending that sentencing courts impose the statutory maximum term of supervised release if the offense of conviction is a sex offense. The commentary to § 5D1.2 states that a "sex offense," for the purposes of that Guideline, is an offense perpetrated against a minor under, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 109B. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2 cmt. n.1. The only offense listed in Chapter 109B is failure to register under 18 U.S.C. § 2250—Segura's offense of conviction. As a result of the interplay between 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2, the district court concluded that failure to register qualifies as a sex offense.

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