Doe v Jindal

2-16-2012 Louisiana:

Doe v Jindal
Civil Action No. 11-554-BAJ-SCR.

The court said:
Plaintiffs, John Doe and James Doe, filed suit against Defendants, James D. Caldwell, Jr., James M. Leblanc, Hillar C. Moore, III, and John Phillip Haney, asserting that Louisiana Revised Statute 14:91.5 ("the Act") is unconstitutional, and they seek declaratory and injunctive relief against its enforcement.

The issues presently before the Court are: (1) whether the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Act; (2) whether the Act is overbroad and, therefore, violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights; (3) whether the Act is void and unenforceable because it is unconstitutionally vague; and (4) if the Court finds that the Act violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, whether the Act's constitutional deficiency is cured by the promulgation of a regulation intended to limit construction and applicability of the legislation (transcript; doc 48, pp. 1-2; doc. 49, p. 2).

CONCLUSION
Although the Act is intended to promote the legitimate and compelling state interest of protecting minors from internet predators, the near total ban on internet access imposed by the Act unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have become important to everyday life in today's world.

The sweeping restrictions on the use of the internet for purposes completely unrelated to the activities sought to be banned by the Act impose severe and unwarranted restraints on constitutionally protected speech. More focused restrictions that are narrowly tailored to address the specific conduct sought to be proscribed should be pursued.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Act is unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness, and judgment shall issue in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants, enjoining enforcement of the Act.

IT IS ORDERED that, within ten days of the issuance of this Opinion, the parties shall submit a joint proposed judgment that accords with this Opinion.

See Articles:
Judge Throws Out Louisiana Facebook Ban On Sex Offenders
Jindal will appeal ruling against sex offender bill
Governor Jindal Blasts Court For Siding With Sex Offenders

US v Stevenson

2-23-2012 Sixth Circuit:

US v Stevenson
(676 F.3d 557 (2012)

This is a BAD decision for some registrants, and will not affect most folks. This decision pertains to some Pre-SORNA cases ONLY. The essence of this is that, the effective date of retro-activity of SORNA was changed to a date older than it was prior to this decision. And as you can see below, at least these two cases will again face failure to register charges as a result.

The court said:
Carlos Flowers and Derick Stevenson were both convicted of state-law sex offenses requiring them to register before the enactment of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 120 Stat. 590, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III).

Both were indicted for traveling in interstate commerce in 2009 and knowingly failing to update their registrations. The district court dismissed each of their indictments, holding that SORNA had not yet been made retroactively applicable to defendants like Flowers and Stevenson.

The United States timely appealed, and their cases were consolidated. We reaffirm our analysis in United States v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2010), which was decided after the district court issued its opinions, and hold that SORNA became retroactively effective on August 1, 2008. We therefore REVERSE.

.....

For all these reasons, the SMART guidelines can and do have the force and effect of law, and they establish that SORNA became retroactive as of August 1, 2008. The Attorney General was properly delegated authority by Congress to enact the substantive rule regarding retroactivity and the authority to implement SORNA.

The SMART guidelines clearly set forth the rule on retroactivity and the authority to issue such a rule and were properly promulgated pursuant to all of the other notice-and-comment requirements in the APA.8 They became final on August 1, 2008, thirty days after they were published. See Utesch, 596 F.3d at 310-11; Trent, 654 F.3d at 582-83.

Having found no compelling argument to the contrary, we hold today what we first concluded in Utesch: SORNA became retroactive to pre-enactment offenders on August 1, 2008. The district court therefore erred in dismissing the indictments of Flowers and Stevenson, who traveled after the SMART guidelines became final.

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's dismissal of the indictments against Flowers and Stevenson.

State v Hanson

2-21-2012 Minnesota:

State v Hanson -AND-
Gunderson v Hvass

Note: Normally this case would not appear in this Court Decisions blog because the appellate court lacked sufficient evidence to render a decision and remanded the case back to the lower court. However, this case is included because of a "Subtle Odd Law Fact" about registration in Minnesota. If a person is charged with a sex crime in Minnesota, the requirement to register is based on the "Charged Offense" not the offense they are convicted of. see below:

The court said: I. The record is inadequate to determine whether appellant is required to register as a predatory offender.

Appellant argues that he is not required to register as a predatory offender because he was not convicted in California of an offense enumerated in Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a). The state contends that registration is required because appellant's California conviction arises out of the same set of circumstances as the rape alleged in the California complaint. Resolution of this issue turns on the language of the registration statute.

A person with a Minnesota conviction must register if:

(1) the person was charged with or petitioned for a felony violation of or attempt to violate, or aiding, abetting, or conspiracy to commit, any of the following, and convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances:
[list of laws prohibiting certain offenses] [or]

(2) the person was charged with or petitioned for a violation of, or attempt to violate, or aiding, abetting, or conspiring to commit [list of laws prohibiting certain offenses], and convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances . . . .

A few years back I had read a news item "Man Loses Fight to Avoid Listing on Sex Offenders' Registry" and had not fully understood it then. (Appellate court case: Gunderson v Hvass) Today's case explains how that can happen.

And as crazy as this sounds, Minnesota is a civil commitment state, and looking down the road I guess someone not convicted of a sex offense could possibly be civilly committed. Weird.

eAdvocate

Nelson v State

2-2-2012 Ohio:

Nelson v State

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant the state of Ohio appeals from the trial court order that granted summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee Anthony Nelson on his petition for relief from the application of "S.B. 10," commonly referred to as Ohio's version of the "Adam Walsh Act" (the "AWA").

{¶ 2} The state presents two assignments of error. The state argues that, as applied to Nelson, whose original conviction occurred out-of-state, the AWA is constitutional and does not violate either the separation of powers doctrine or the Ohio Constitution's Retroactivity Clause. The state concedes as to the first argument that this court has determined otherwise. Moreover, the state's second argument is rejected on the authority of State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. Consequently, the state's assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court's order is affirmed.

{¶ 3} The record reflects Nelson filed his petition seeking relief from the application of the AWA in January 2008. He alleged that in 1977, he was convicted in North Carolina of an offense that the Ohio Attorney General ("OAG") "determined to be substantially equivalent to [the offense of] Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02."

.................

{¶ 16} The foregoing language leaves no doubt that the AWA, as applied to

{¶ 17} Nelson, violates the Ohio Constitution's Retroactivity Clause. While this court recognized in Goggans that its view on this issue was in conflict with the First and Twelfth Districts (see Sewell v. State, 181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, 908 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), and Boswell v. State, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-01-006, 2010-Ohio-3134, 2010 WL 2653379, ¶ 6), this court still decided that this district "continues to hold that it is the correct interpretation" on the issue. Goggans, 8th Dist. Nos. 96857-96862, 2011-Ohio-5932, 2011 WL 5825915, at ¶ 13.

{¶ 18} Accordingly, the state's second assignment of error also is overruled. {¶ 19} The trial court's order is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.

The Ohio Supreme Court said in State v. Williams that AWA cannot be applied to anyone who committed his/her offense before January 1, 2008. And, that the regular Ohio Megan's Law may still be applicable. See a local Ohio lawyer for a CLEAR interpretation to your case. Further, take notice of what THIS APPELLATE court says, there is conflict between certain districts, that means where one lives in Ohio. And that this is a appeals court, not the Ohio Supreme court. eAdvocate