Maine v Reynolds

5-7-15 Maine:

Maine v Reynolds

Ronnie L. Reynolds appeals from a judgment of conviction entered by the Superior Court (Washington County, R. Murray, J.) after a jury found Reynolds guilty of his second offense of failing to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (Class C), 34-A M.R.S. § 11227(2) (2014).

Reynolds is, by law, a lifetime registrant; however, he asserts that he was led to believe that a 2004 amendment to SORNA changed his classification from a lifetime registrant to a ten-year registrant.

He contends that the court erred in excluding relevant evidence of a letter from the Department of Public Safety, State Bureau of Identification that caused him to believe that he was no longer required to register. See 34-A M.R.S. § 11227(6) (2014).

We agree that the court erred in excluding the letter. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

... ... ...

In short, had the letter been admitted in evidence and had Reynolds offered testimony about the letter, it would have been for a jury to determine the reasonableness of (1) Reynolds’s belief that the letter reclassified him as a ten-year registrant and (2) his belief that the ten-year registration period had expired, thus amounting to just cause for failing to register.

To the extent that the court determined that Reynolds’s purported reliance on the letter was not believable, the court made a credibility determination that should have been made by the jury. See Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447. The court’s exclusion of the letter as irrelevant was clearly erroneous.

Sex offender's conviction sent back to Scott County court

4-11-2014 Iowa:

The Iowa Supreme Court on Friday ordered more proceedings for a Davenport sex offender who was convicted of violating restrictions on where he could be.

Darrell Allen Showens, 51, was arrested May 11, 2012, after sitting on a bench facing the front door of the downtown Davenport Public Library.

The bench was 72 feet from the entrance, and Showens admitted he sat there about 45 minutes in the middle of the day.

Scott County Sheriff's Detective Peter Bawden, who recognized Showens as a registered sex offender, first observed him sitting on the bench for about 10 minutes before asking him what he was doing.

After giving a few different stories, Showens ultimately said he was waiting for the bus. Bawden pointed out the bench was not at a bus stop.

At the end of the conversation, Bawden arrested Showens. As a registered sex offender, he is not allowed to loiter within 300 feet of a public library, or the length of a football field.

State court tosses out sex offender's conviction

3-1-2014 Massachusetts:

The state's highest court this week reversed the conviction of a Level 3 sex offender for failing to register as a sex offender after the justices ruled there was insufficient evidence to prove he was living at his aunt's home in Lowell and not in the homeless shelter.

In a decision issued on Thursday, the state Supreme Judicial Court overturned a judge's 2011 ruling that Jose Armando Arce was guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. The judge had sentenced Arce to one year in a house of correction and lifetime community parole.

While the jail sentence may have been completed, the lifetime parole is vacated.

Laurie Myers, of the Chelmsford-based Community Voices advocacy group, said, "It has always been difficult to prove a homeless offender failed to register, but it looks like the SJC made it a little more difficult. Yet another way for sex offenders to manipulate the system."

Arce, 44, who lists his address at 260 Middlesex St., was convicted in 2006 of indecent assault and battery on a child under 14. He was convicted in 2012 of indecent assault and battery on a person 14 or older.

He was arrested by Lowell police on July 20, 2010 and charged with failing to notify police of a change of address as required under the sex offender law.

State supreme court rules for woman fighting sex offender status

12-11-2013 Massachusetts:

John DOE, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 205614 v Sex Offender Registry Board. (Must read actual court decision, well worth your time)

The state supreme court has ordered the Sex Offender Registry Board to reconsider whether a woman convicted on federal charges of sex trafficking of a child should be classified as a sex offender.

The woman, a former prostitute whose name was not released, ran an escort service from 2000 to 2002. Three years after she closed down the service, she was arrested on sex charges.

The woman testified that she started the business after serious physical assaults by pimps. She employed four minors, one of them a 14-year-old with an ID showing that she was 19. After she saw the girl's photo on a National Center for Missing and Exploited Children poster and learned her actual age, she had another employee inform the center where to find the girl.

She pleaded guilty to charges in connection with the 14-year-old and served 17 months in jail.

After her release, she was classified as a level 1 offender, the lowest of three categories. The hearing examiner who made that decision acknowledged the low danger posed by the woman and the low probability that she would commit further offenses.

Dahl v State

5-15-2007 Delaware:

Dahl v State
926 A.2d 1077 (2007)

Defendant-Appellant William S. Dahl appeals his Superior Court conviction of Loitering by a Sex Offender within 500 Feet of a School,1 specifically a dance academy. Dahl was convicted at a bench trial. Dahl raises three arguments on appeal.

• First, Dahl contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to amend the indictment on the day of trial to expand by one month the date parameters of the alleged offense.
• Second, Dahl contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was within 500 feet of a "school."
• Third, Dahl contends that the dance academy described at trial is not a "school" as defined in 11 Del. C. § 1112 and, therefore, his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

We do not find merit to Dahl's first and second arguments. We do find, however, that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to prove an essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; that the dance academy was a "school" as that term has been defined by the General Assembly. Because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Delaware law require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of an offense, we must reverse and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal in this case.