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Showing posts with label (# Search of Home Computers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label (# Search of Home Computers. Show all posts

US v Cote

3-8-2013 Military Court:

US v Cote
Crim. App. No. 37745


Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court. Contrary to his pleas, Airman Adam Cote was convicted by a general court-martial with members of one specification of possessing child pornography, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006). He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for twelve months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence except for the forfeitures. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the findings and the sentence. United States v. Cote, No. ACM 37745, 2012 CCA LEXIS 106, at *17, 2012 WL 1058985, at *6. (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2012).

While “technical” or “de minimis” violations of a search warrant’s terms do not warrant suppression of evidence, United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 955 (10th Cir. 2005), generally “the search and seizure conducted under a warrant must conform to the warrant or some well—recognized exception.” United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196-97 (1927)).

We granted review to determine whether a search conducted in violation of a search warrant’s post-seizure time limitation renders the search unreasonable.1 We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the Government’s violation of the warrant’s time limits for conducting an off-site search of the seized electronic device constituted more than a “de minimis” violation of the warrant and resulted in an unreasonable search.

We therefore reverse the decision of the CCA.



Other Armed Forces opinions

Doe v Nebraska

Nebraska Case:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 12-21-2012
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 0-17-2012
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

ORDER 7-23-2012
(No. 8:09CV456.)

ORDER 7-13-2012
(No. 8:09CV456.)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 6-29-2012
(No. 8:09CV456.)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 6-29-2012
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 6-1-2012
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 5-14-2012
Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005

ORDER 2-27-2012
No. 8:09CV456.

ORDER 1-10-2012
No. 8:09CV456.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 9-19-2011
Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 6-15-2011
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 6-20-2011
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

ORDER 4-25-2011
(No. 8:09CV456.)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 4-19-2011
Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 8-16-2010
734 F.Supp.2d 882 (2010)
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3004, 4:10CV3005.)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 1-27-2011
(Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:09CV3266, 4:10CV3005)

Doe v Nebraska 12-30-2009
(No. 8:09CV456.)

This is a very complicated case with many issues, read it if you wish. Accordingly I am posting only what is relevant in this 12-30-2009 decision:

The specific statutes that are challenged by Plaintiffs, and an abbreviated summary of the reasons for the challenge, are set forth below:

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001.01 through 4006, and 4009 through 40131 amount to the ex post facto imposition of punishment;

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4006 provides for unreasonable searches and seizures;

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4009 and 4013 unreasonably eliminate individual assessments to determine the level of community notification and unreasonably impose website notification for all registrants;

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01 employs vague definitions, making the laws susceptible to arbitrary enforcement and inadvertent noncompliance;

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05 2 creates a new crime and wrongly criminalizes certain types of speech and infringes upon the right of association; and

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-4001.01 through 4006, and 4009 through 4013 improperly and retroactively modify the terms and conditions of plea agreements and violate separation of powers doctrine.
(See Filing 1, Complaint at CM/ECF p. 4 n.1.)

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a preliminary injunction (filing 4) is denied except as provided below:

1. Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the following statutes against persons who have been convicted of sex offenses but who have completed their criminal sentences and who are not on probation, parole, or court-ordered supervision, to wit: (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4006(2) (West, Operative January 1, 2010) (requiring consent to search and installation of monitoring hardware and software) and (2) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05 (West, Operative January 1, 2010) (making it a crime to use Internet social networking sites accessible by minors by a person required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act).

However, Nebraska went much further and added a "consent to search" and "monitoring" requirement, to wit:
When the person provides any information under subdivision (1)(k) or (s) of this section, the registrant shall sign a consent form, provided by the law enforcement agency receiving this information, authorizing the:

(a) Search of all the computers or electronic communication devices possessed by the person; and

(b) Installation of hardware or software to monitor the person's Internet usage on all the computers or electronic communication devices possessed by the person.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4006(2) (West, Operative January 1, 2010).

In addition to the "consent to search" and "monitoring" requirement, Nebraska—and, again, unlike SORNA—has now made it a crime for certain offenders who must register to access certain Internet sites. That is:
(1) Any person required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act who is required to register because of a conviction for one or more of the following offenses, including any substantially equivalent offense committed in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, and who knowingly and intentionally uses a social networking web site, instant messaging, or chat room service that allows a person who is less than eighteen years of age to access or use its social networking web site, instant messaging, or chat room service, commits the offense of unlawful use of the Internet by a prohibited sex offender:

...(Crime codes omitted)...

(2) Unlawful use of the Internet by a prohibited sex offender is a Class I misdemeanor for a first offense. Any second or subsequent conviction under this section is a Class IIIA felony.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.05 (West, Operative January 1, 2010).
Thus, for offenders who must register, but who have served their sentences and are no longer on probation, parole, or court-ordered supervision at the time these new laws become effective, they face onerous new restrictions on their daily lives. They are burdened with the obligation to consent to the search of any computer they possess; they are required to allow the installation of software and hardware monitoring equipment on computers they possess; and many of them are prohibited, upon pain of an additional prison sentence, from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, or chat room service. When these restrictions are coupled with the fact that all registrants are also required to report in person, sometimes more frequently than once a year, it is likely that Nebraska's registration scheme, when applied retroactively to citizens who have completed their criminal sentences and who are no longer on probation, parole, or court-ordered supervision, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. SeeSmith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 101 (holding that Alaska registration scheme did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause because registrant was "free to . . . live . . . as other citizens, with no supervision") (emphasis added). Put more simply, Nebraska has now retroactively imposed a probation-like regimen that is nearly identical to the supervised release orders I enter on a daily basis for federal criminal defendants who have committed "kiddie porn" crimes. In either context, those restrictions are clearly "punishment."


... ... ...


Earlier Filings:



MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 12-22-2009
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 12-21-2009
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 12-18-2009
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 12-17-2009

There is more on this case HERE


PDF 12-30-2009

Doe v Prosecutor, Marion CountyDoe v Prosecutor, Marion County

6-24-2008 Indiana:

Doe v Prosecutor, Marion County
566 F.Supp.2d 862 (2008)

In 2008 the Indiana General Assembly enacted Public Law 119, which amended many of the requirements imposed upon those persons who must register with the state as sex offenders and violent offenders. This case presents a challenge to one of the new requirements as it would apply to those who have completed their sentences and are no longer on parole, probation, or any other form of court supervision. Under the new statute, set to take effect on July 1, 2008, all those who must register must also consent to the search of their personal computers or devices with internet capability at any time, and they must consent to installation on the same devices, at their expense, of hardware or software to monitor their internet use. Ind. P.L. 119-2008 § 6 (2008) (SEA 258), to be codified in Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(b) (effective July 1, 2008). Failure to “consent” to these measures is itself a felony.

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the court certified a plaintiff class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs are a class of “all persons, current and future, who are required to register as sex or violent offenders pursuant to Indiana law and who are not currently on parole or probation or court supervision.” Plaintiffs allege that the new law violates their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and requiring probable cause for issuance of a warrant. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the new consent-to-search requirements are unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement. The court heard argument on a stipulated factual record on May 30, 2008, and now states its findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rules 52 and 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Substance shall govern whether an item is deemed a finding of fact or conclusion of law.

Section 8(b), however well intentioned, seeks to achieve law enforcement goals with means that violate the Fourth Amendment, at least as applied to the plaintiff class, offenders who have completed their criminal sentences and who are no longer under any form of parole, probation, or other court supervision. These plaintiffs have rights under the Fourth Amendment. The State may not force them to waive those rights under threat of criminal prosecution for failing or refusing to do so. Final declaratory relief should be sufficient here, in a case brought as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action against all prosecuting attorneys in Indiana, to protect the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. The court does not see a need at this time for the somewhat more intrusive relief of a permanent injunction. See generally Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1991) (comparing declaratory and injunctive relief); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (authorizing further “necessary or proper relief” based on declaratory judgment); Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Jay County, 57 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of damages for plaintiff after original declaratory judgment had sufficed to prevent enforcement of invalid ordinance). The court will enter a final declaratory judgment stating that the newly enacted Indiana Code § 11-8-8-8(b) may not be applied to members of the plaintiff class.



Federal court sides with ACLU in sex offender consent-to-search case

6-24-2008 Indiana:

INDIANAPOLIS - A federal judge has ruled that a recently-passed state law to monitor the computer habits of sex offenders long after they have served their sentences is unconstitutional.

U.S. District Court Judge David Hamilton in Indianapolis ruled Tuesday in favor of the plaintiffs in the class-action lawsuit that was brought April 3 by the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana.

The ACLU had challenged as unconstitutional a law the Legislature passed this year, Senate Enrolled Act 258. It was supposed to take effect July 1 and would have required convicted sex offenders, who already have to sign the state's sex-offender registry, to also provide authorities with their email addresses and Internet usernames.

Offenders also would have had to sign a consent form allowing police to search their computers or other Web-ready devices at any time, and to install software that monitored such activity, the law said.

The ACLU sued on behalf of two convicted sex offenders, one in Marion County and one in Scott County. It named all 92 county prosecutors as defendants.

In a 52-page ruling issued late today, federal judge Hamilton ruled that the new statute, as written, is unconstitutional.

"The new law forces an unconstitutional choice upon these plaintiffs. They must choose now between committing a new crime by refusing to consent and giving up their Fourth Amendment rights to privacy and security in their homes, their 'papers,' and their effects," Hamilton wrote. "The unprecedented new law, however well-intentioned it may be, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class, who have completed their sentences and are no longer on probation, parole, or any other kind of court supervision."

Hamilton issued a declaratory judgment stating the consent to search requirements may not be applied to convicted sex offenders.

The state could appeal the ruling to the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. ...News Source... by Courier-Press Staff Reports


Attorney General Steve Carter says Appeal not Prudent
on a Law Recently Declared Unconstitutional by a Federal District Court

(INDIANAPOLIS, IN) - Attorney General Steve Carter will not appeal a federal district court’s ruling that a new law requiring registered sex offenders to consent to the unlimited search of their computers is unconstitutional.

"The court found the statute's authorization of unlimited searches of home computers without a warrant or probable cause to be unconstitutionally broad,” said Carter. “As we strive to create a safer online environment for our kids, we must identify more targeted investigative approaches and the attorney general’s office will work with legislators to do so in the session that convenes in November. We are all dedicated to protecting children from predators, but we must do so within the constitution.”

Additionally, Carter cites the need to balance the cost to taxpayers of an appeal. At this point in the controversy, taxpayers are responsible for thousands of dollars of attorney fees that will have to be paid to the American Civil Liberties Union.

“If we take the matter to the Court of Appeals and lose, that amount could approach $100,000 and the case would not be resolved when the legislature convenes in November. Legislators still would not have any further judicial guidance on how to modify the language that has been struck down” added Carter. “The better course is for the Attorney General’s Office to consult with legislators over the next few months to develop safeguards against predators that pass constitutional muster.”

Last month, United States District Court Judge David Hamilton issued an opinion stating that the new law, set to become effective July 1 was unconstitutional. In the Opinion he writes, “The unprecedented new law, however well-intentioned it may be, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class, who have completed their sentences and are no longer on probation, parole, or any other kind of court supervision.”

Carter praised the other provisions of the new law enacted by the legislature that remain in effect. Those include the requirement for registered sex offenders to provide email addresses and Internet usernames to the Registry. Another provision makes Indiana the first state in the nation to ban registered offenders from using the same social networking sites that children use. The new statute makes it a felony if an offender is found using such sites. ..Source.. By Indiana AG Office


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