Santobello v. New York

1971 U.S. Supreme Court:

Santobello v. New York
404 U.S. 257 (1971)

After negotiations with the prosecutor, petitioner withdrew his previous not-guilty plea to two felony counts and pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, the prosecutor having agreed to make no recommendation as to sentence. At petitioner's appearance for sentencing many months later, a new prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence, which the judge (who stated that he was uninfluenced by that recommendation) imposed. Petitioner attempted unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty plea, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.

Held: The interests of justice and proper recognition of the prosecution's duties in relation to promises made in connection with "plea bargaining" require that the judgment be vacated and that the case be remanded to the state courts for further consideration as to whether the circumstances require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea (in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge), or petitioner should be afforded the relief he seeks of withdrawing his guilty plea.

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The essence of this case is, anyone who entered into a plea with the state, that plea cannot b broken it is sacrosanct. Plea bargains are special and reduced to writing, whatever that says cannot be broken and the defendant can rely on that. If one who has entered into a WRITTEN plea bargain feels the state has violated that can assert this case to force the state to abide by the WRITTEN plea bargain.

Google Scholar: Santabello v NY and Plea Bargains

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In re Oliver

3-8-1948 Michigan:

In re Oliver

A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner to jail for contempt of court. We must determine whether he was denied the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In obedience to a subpoena the petitioner appeared as a witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was then conducting, in accordance with Michigan law, a "one-man grand jury" investigation into alleged gambling and official corruption. The investigation presumably took place in the judge's chambers, though that is not certain.

Two other circuit judges were present in an advisory capacity.1 A prosecutor may have been present. A stenographer was most likely there. The record does not show what other members, if any, of the judge's investigatorial staff participated in the proceedings. It is certain, however, that the public was excluded — the questioning was secret in accordance with the traditional grand jury method.

After petitioner had given certain testimony, the judge-grand jury, still in secret session, told petitioner that neither he nor his advisors believed petitioner's story — that it did not "jell." This belief of the judge-grand jury was not based entirely on what the petitioner had testified. As will later be seen, it rested in part on beliefs or suspicions of the judge-jury derived from the testimony of at least one other witness who had previously given evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when that witness testified and so far as appears was not even aware that he had testified. Based on its beliefs thus formed — that petitioner's story did not "jell" — the judge-grand jury immediately charged him with contempt, immediately convicted him, and immediately sentenced him to sixty days in jail. Under these circumstances of haste and secrecy, petitioner, of course, had no chance to enjoy the benefits of counsel, no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity either to cross-examine the other grand jury witness or to summon witnesses to refute the charge against him.

Three days later a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf in the Michigan Supreme Court the petition for habeas corpus now under consideration. It alleged among other things that the petitioner's attorney had not been allowed to confer with him and that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, the petitioner was not held in jail under any judgment, decree or execution, and was "not confined by virtue of any legal commitment directed to the sheriff as required by law." An order was then entered signed by the circuit judge that he had while "sitting as a One-Man Grand Jury" convicted the petitioner of contempt of court because petitioner had testified "evasively" and had given "contradictory answers" to questions. The order directed that petitioner "be confined in the County Jail . . . for a period of sixty (60) days or until such time as he . . . shall appear and answer the questions heretofore propounded to him by this Court. . . ."

The Supreme Court of Michigan, on grounds detailed in the companion case of In re Hartley, 317 Mich. 441, 27 N.W.2d 48,2 rejected petitioner's contention that the summary manner in which he had been sentenced to jail in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had deprived him of his liberty without affording him the kind of notice, opportunity to defend himself, and trial which the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires.3 In re Oliver, 318 Mich. 7, 27 N.W.2d 323. We granted certiorari to consider these procedural due process questions.

... ... ...

It is "the law of the land" that no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-237. The petitioner was convicted without that kind of trial.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is reversed and the cause is remanded to it for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion. Case is reversed and remanded.

Doe v Virginia

4-12-2013 Virginia:

Doe v Virginia
713 F.3d 745 (2013)
(See text amendment)
(U.S. Sup court denied the appeal filed of this decision. see story below.)

Jane Doe brought a challenge to Va. Code sections 9.1-900 et seq. and 18.2-370.5, which, together, classify her as a sexually violent offender and prevent her from entering the grounds of a school or daycare without first gaining permission from a Virginia circuit court and the school board or the owner of the daycare. She also challenged the policy of the Spotsylvania County School Board (the "Board"), which she alleges does not allow her to petition anonymously for entry onto school property.

The district court dismissed all but one of her claims on the grounds that they were unripe and that she lacked standing. It determined that her remaining claim failed to allege grounds upon which relief could be granted, and dismissed it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Doe's complaint includes four counts:

• she alleges that the defendants have violated her substantive due process,
• procedural due process,
• associational, and
• free exercise rights.

The injuries she alleges with respect to the first, third, and fourth of these counts stem from impediments the Virginia statute and the Board policy place on her ability to access school and church property.

However, because she has not yet attempted to undertake the requisite steps to access these properties, she cannot demonstrate that these claims are justiciable at this juncture.

One component of her second count, her challenge to the law stemming from an alleged denial of procedural due process, on the other hand, is justiciable.

However, she fails to state a procedural due process claim upon which relief may be granted.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of her claims.

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US Supreme Court Declines to Hear Sex Registry Case

3-24-2014 Washington DC, Virginia:

The Supreme Court has declined to take up the case of a Virginia woman who claims the state's sex offender registry law is unconstitutional.

The woman was reclassified as a violent sex offender 15 years after being convicted of unlawful sex with minor in a case that did not involve any violence. The reclassification subjects her to a ban on entering her children's schools without first seeking permission from state courts and the local school board.

The woman was identified only as Jane Doe in court records. She says the process unfairly risks revealing her children's identity and could take years to resolve.

Lower courts had rejected her case on procedural grounds, saying she failed to first exhaust state remedies. ..Source.. by ABC News

Can an individual be forced to carry the Government's message?

Washington DC:

Wooley v Maynard
430 U.S. 705 (1997)
Google Scholar (How the --concept-- of Wooley has been used in other cases)

The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the motto "Live Free or Die" on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.

Since 1969 New Hampshire has required that noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, "Live Free or Die."1 N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975). Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor "knowingly [to obscure] . . . the figures or letters on any number plate." N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975). The term "letters" in this section has been interpreted by the State's highest court to include the state motto. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972).

Appellees George Maynard and his wife Maxine are followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith. The Maynards consider the New Hampshire State motto to be repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs,2 and therefore assert it objectionable to disseminate this message by displaying it on their automobiles.3 Pursuant to these beliefs, the Maynards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their license plates.4

On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation for violating § 262:27-c. On December 6, 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon, N. H., District Court to answer the charge. After waiving his right to counsel, he entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to explain his religious objections to the motto. The state trial judge expressed sympathy for Mr. Maynard's situation, but considered himself bound by the authority of State v. Hoskin, supra, to hold Maynard guilty. A $25 fine was imposed, but execution was suspended during "good behavior."

On December 28, 1974, Mr. Maynard was again charged with violating § 262:27-c. He appeared in court on January 31, 1975, and again chose to represent himself; he was found guilty, fined $50, and sentenced to six months in the Grafton County House of Corrections. The court suspended this jail sentence but ordered Mr. Maynard to also pay the $25 fine for the first offense. Maynard informed the court that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two fines. The court thereupon sentenced him to jail for a period of 15 days. He has served the full sentence.

Prior to trial on the second offense Mr. Maynard was charged with yet a third violation of § 262:27-c on January 3, 1975. He appeared on this complaint on the same day as for the second offense, and was, again, found guilty. This conviction was "continued for sentence" so that Maynard received no punishment in addition to the 15 days.

... ... ... ... ...

The State's second claimed interest is not ideologically neutral. The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism. Of course, the State may legitimately pursue such interests in any number of ways. However, where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.14

We conclude that the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Affirmed.

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See North Carolina: Fourth Circuit Declares North Carolina's "Choose Life" License Plate Offering Unconstitutional

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Paper: Is it constitutional to FORCE sex offender registrants to carry the governments message?

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See Also: Board of Education v Barnette West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)

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Food for Thought:
When RSOs go in to register they provide information to the registry personnel. Then the registry displays certain of that information on a public registry; all state action. i.e., registrant -to state- state to public.

However, driver's licenses and license plates are vastly different. How you ask? Well, who is actually carrying (i.e., displaying) the state's message, the RSO, that is not like the state displaying information on the Internet.

So there are some who think that distinction is crazy? In the U.S. Supreme court, the case of Smith v. Doe (Sex offender registration), during Oral Argument the following discussion took place between Mr. Olson (then Solicitor General for the U.S.) and U.S. Supreme court Justice Kennedy:

Justice Kennedy QUESTION: Could -- could the State require a special mark on your license plate?

MR. OLSON: No, I -- well, I don't know, Justice Kennedy, but I would say that would be considerably different than what's here because that would --

QUESTION: I don't think it's very different.

MR. OLSON: Pardon me?

QUESTION: I don't think it's very different.

MR. OLSON: I -- I respectfully submit that it's a great deal different. That mark on your license plate, or mark on your forehead would go wherever you would go. It would require you to carry the government's message rather than the government supplying the message.

QUESTION: Well, this statute requires you to make the government's message four times a year.

MR. OLSON: It only -- it doesn't require you to make the government's message four times a year. The government's message, I respectfully submit, is made when a citizen submits an inquiry to the State through the Internet listing. All -- it is required four times a year is to advise the government of a current location or current information so that the information on the registry is accurate and -- and up-to-date.

So, who is carrying the message? It is the RSO when it is on his driver's license or license plate. That distinction, following the sentencing where it was not part of the sentence, could very well be construed as further punishment. i.e., a ex post facto violation.

Apparently, there is something in law about, who carries the message to the public, and lawyers know about this. Now to find those lawyers to fight the issue all the way to the U.S. Supreme court. That may be easier said than done.

United States v Kebodeaux

6-24-2013 Texas:

United States v Kebodeaux

SCOTUS Blog explains it best:

Holding: As applied to respondent Anthony Kebodeaux, the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act fall within the scope of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. (i.e., he was required to register)

Judgment: Reversed, 7-2, in an opinion by Justice Breyer on June 24, 2013. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Scalia joined as to parts I, II, and III-B.

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eAdvocate Research

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Did "Congressional Gremlins" play a part in the US v Kebodeaux decision?

6-25-2013 Washington DC:

There is no doubt that in Kebodeaux the US Supreme court solidified, with a healthy amount of verbiage, that Congress is using their "Necessary and Proper" reasoning to extend its powers over the land (Necessary and Proper is now the Congressional "catch-all reasoning."). This follows their use of Necessary and Proper use in the Comstock decision as well. Personally, this writer does not agree with the court and believes it will be years into the future before another set of Justices sets the record straight. How many other denials will be based on this "catch-all reasoning" in the meantime?

But that is not the portion of Kebodeaux I wish to address today. This is the portion that is relevant:

In today’s opinion, however, Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, tactfully sidestepped the “Hotel California” theory by holding that Kebodeaux had never actually checked out of federal jurisdiction, thus repudiating that Fifth Circuit’s characterization of Kebodeaux’s release as “unconditional.” The Court accepted the Solicitor General’s argument that, “through a complex set of statutory cross-references,” Kebodeaux was subject to another registration requirement, the Wetterling Act, at the time of his release. SORNA was merely a modification of the registration requirements of the Wetterling Act.

Within the decision it says, Kebodeaux was released in 2004, registered then moved, and after the second move failed to register that move. In 2006 AWA was enacted, and applied retroactively to all convicted of sex offenses.

Now when the court said Wettering was still effective when Kebodeaux was released, I thought, thats impossible, AWA when it was enacted, REPEALED all prior laws, and since it was applied retroactively Kebodeaux would be correct, he didn't have to register.

So I went back to AWA to see if my memory was failing, using the Thomas Congressional website, here is what it says about the AWA law approved by Congress in 2006 (see "Text of Legislation" Version 5):

SEC. 128. REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES.

The Attorney General, ... ... ....

SEC. 129. REPEAL OF PREDECESSOR SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM.

(a) Repeal- Sections 170101 (42 U.S.C. 14071) and 170102 (42 U.S.C. 14072) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and section 8 of the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 14073), are repealed.

(b) Effective Date- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, this section shall take effect on the date of the deadline determined in accordance with section 124(a).

SEC. 130. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY FOR THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN.

So where did Sec. 129 disappear to? Congress approved that section, but it is not in current AWA law. Congressional Gremlins are at work again! In the beginning of AWA it shows the sections that are supposed to be in AWA:

Subtitle A--Sex Offender Registration and Notification

Sec. 111. Relevant definitions, including Amie Zyla expansion of sex offender definition and expanded inclusion of child predators.

... ... ....

Sec. 128. Registration of sex offenders entering the United States.

Sec. 129. Repeal of predecessor sex offender program.

... ... ....

Sec. 131. Immunity for good faith conduct.

What it shows is that, Section 129 was eliminated from the final law, and Section 131 was made Section 129. Who in Washington DC has the authority to override what Congress Approves?

The Office of Legislative Counsel in both the House and the Senate are responsible for drafting of, proposed laws and amendments, for Lawmakers to present to their respective House, but only the House Office of Legislative Counsel appears to be responsible for the final codification of laws presented to the President.

So we leave this issue with, is that where the Congressional Gremlins are that ignored AWA Section 129 approved by Congress in 2006, missing today, and which ultimately played a part in today's Kebodeaux decision?

For now have a great day and a better tomorrow.
eAdvocate...

Calder v Bull

The backbone case behind ex post facto laws

August 1798:

Calder v Bull
3 U.S. 386

The decision of one question determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case, than I think necessary to the consideration of that question only.

The Legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the court of Probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March, 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison (the grandson) made the 21st of August, 1779, and refused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said Court of Probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution, or law, before the said Court of Probate, who, on the 27th of July, 1795, approved the said will, and ordered it to be recorded. At August, 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hartford, who at February term, 1796, affirmed the decree of the Court of Probate. Appeal was had to the Supreme Court of errors of Connecticut, who in June, 1796, adjudged, that there were no errors. More than 18 months elapsed from the decree of the Court of Probate (on the 1st of March, 1793,) and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right [p387] of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that State whereby a new hearing, or trial, before the said court of Probate might be obtained. Calder and wife claim the premises in question, in right of his wife, as heiress of N. Morrison, a physician; Bull and wife claim under the will of N. Morrison, the grandson.

The Counsel for the Plaintiffs in error, contend, that the said resolution or law of the Legislature of Connecticut, granting a new hearing, in the above case, is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the Constitution of the United States; that any law of the Federal government, or of the State governments, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void; and that this court possesses the power to declare such law void.

... ... ...

I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition.

• 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.


• 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was, when committed.


• 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.


• 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. [p391]

All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws, and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: The former, only, are prohibited.

Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or of pardon.

They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning, and after, the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create, or aggregate, the crime; or encrease the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction.

Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like; is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions "ex post facto laws," are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.

The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government.

... ... ...

Lambert v California

WARNING: There is no better case than this to be acquitted of FTR, BUT BUT BUT, as folks know the opposition usually presents the forms signed somewhere to show actual knowledge of duty to register. Use case only if there is absolutely no way for the opposition to prove one had knowledge.

12-16-1957 California:

Lambert v California
355 U.S. 225 (1957)

Section 52.38 (a) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code defines "convicted person" as follows:

"Any person who, subsequent to January 1, 1921, has been or hereafter is convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in the State of California, or who has been or who is hereafter convicted of any offense in any place other than the State of California, which offense, if committed in the State of California, would have been punishable as a felony."

Section 52.39 provides that it shall be unlawful for "any convicted person" to be or remain in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without registering; it requires any person having a place of abode outside the city to register if he comes into the city on five occasions or more during a 30-day period; and it prescribes the information to be furnished the Chief of Police on registering.

Section 52.43 (b) makes the failure to register a continuing offense, each day's failure constituting a separate offense.

Appellant, arrested on suspicion of another offense, was charged with a violation of this registration law.* The evidence showed that she had been at the time of her arrest a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years. Within that period she had been convicted in Los Angeles of the crime of forgery, an offense which California punishes as a felony. Though convicted of a crime punishable as a felony, she had not at the time of her arrest registered under the Municipal Code. At the trial, appellant asserted that § 52.39 of the Code denies her due process of law and other rights under the Federal Constitution, unnecessary to enumerate. The trial court denied this objection. The case was tried to a jury which found appellant guilty. The court fined her $250 and placed her on probation for three years. Appellant, renewing her constitutional objection, moved for arrest of judgment and a new trial. This motion was denied. On appeal the constitutionality of the Code was again challenged. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment, holding there was no merit to the claim that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We noted probable jurisdiction, 352 U.S. 914, and designated amicus curiae to appear in support of appellant. The case having been argued and reargued, we now hold that the registration provisions of the Code as sought to be applied here violate the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The registration provision, carrying criminal penalties, applies if a person has been convicted "of an offense punishable as a felony in the State of California" or, in case he has been convicted in another State, if the offense "would have been punishable as a felony" had it been committed in California. No element of willfulness is by terms included in the ordinance nor read into it by the California court as a condition necessary for a conviction.

We must assume that appellant had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register under this ordinance, as she offered proof of this defense which was refused. The question is whether a registration act of this character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.

... ... ...

Registration laws are common and their range is wide. Cf. Bryant v. Zimmerman,278 U.S. 63; United States v. Harriss,347 U.S. 612; United States v. Kahriger,345 U.S. 22. Many such laws are akin to licensing statutes in that they pertain to the regulation of business activities. But the present ordinance is entirely different. Violation of its provisions is unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere presence in the city being the test. Moreover, circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking. At most the ordinance is but a law enforcement technique designed for the convenience of law enforcement agencies through which a list of the names and addresses of felons then residing in a given community is compiled.

The disclosure is merely a compilation of former convictions already publicly recorded in the jurisdiction where obtained. Nevertheless, this appellant on first becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent. She could but suffer the consequences of the ordinance, namely, conviction with the imposition of heavy criminal penalties thereunder. We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand. As Holmes wrote in The Common Law, "A law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear." Id., at 50. Its severity lies in the absence of an opportunity either to avoid the consequences of the law or to defend any prosecution brought under it. Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.

Reversed.

Informational Post

4-17-2013 UPDATED: Washington DC:

The -United States v. Kebodeaux- is in the U.S. Supreme court and we are awaiting a decision on the questions raised:

See the following Blog Posts for detailed information:

4-17-2013 Oral Argument Transcript

Argument preview: Can Congress punish a former sex offender for failure to register?

Cato Challenges the U.S. Supreme Court to Decide that Congress Doesn’t Have Unlimited Jurisdiction Over Everyone

United States v. Kebodeaux

Sex Offender Rules Will Go Before Supreme Court

Kebodeaux -v- US: USSC 12-418 cert granted (That decision [ 687 F.3d 232 (2012) ] on Leagle is found HERE if folks want to read the full decision)

Supreme Court to review sex offender registration law

From time to time we will update this post.
For now, have a great day and a better tomorrow.
eAdvocate

Stogner v California

6-26-2003 California:

Stogner v California
539 U.S. 607 (2003)

California has brought a criminal prosecution after expiration of the time periods set forth in previously applicable statutes of limitations. California has done so under the authority of a new law that (1) permits resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and (2) was itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had expired. We conclude that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, bars application of this new law to the present case.

I
In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations governing sex-related child abuse crimes. The new statute permits prosecution for those crimes where "[t]he limitation period specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has expired"—provided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to the police, (2) "there is independent evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the victim's allegation," and (3) the prosecution is begun within one year of the victim's report. 1993 Cal. Stats. ch. 390, § 1 (codified as amended at Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 803(g) (West Supp. 2003)). A related provision, added to the statute in 1996, makes clear that a prosecution satisfying these three conditions "shall revive any cause of action barred by [prior statutes of limitations]." 1996 Cal. Stats. ch. 130, § 1 (codified at Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 803(g)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2003)). The statute thus authorizes prosecution for criminal acts committed many years beforehand—and where the original limitations period has expired—as long as prosecution begins within a year of a victim's first complaint to the police.

In 1998, a California grand jury indicted Marion Stogner, the petitioner, charging him with sex-related child abuse committed decades earlier—between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. The statute of limitations governing prosecutions at the time the crimes were allegedly committed had set forth a 3-year limitations period. And that period had run 22 years or more before the present prosecution was brought.

Stogner moved for the complaint's dismissal. He argued that the Federal Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed that such a revival is unconstitutional. But the California Court of Appeal reversed, citing a recent, contrary decision by the California Supreme Court, People v. Frazer,21 Cal.4th 737, 982 P.2d 180 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000). Stogner then moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that his prosecution is unconstitutional under both the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause, Amdt. 14, § 1. The trial court denied Stogner's motion, and the Court of Appeal upheld that denial. Stogner v. Superior Court,93 Cal.App.4th 1229, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 37 (2001). We granted certiorari to consider Stogner's constitutional claims. 537 U.S. 1043 (2002).

... ... ...

In sum, California's law subjects an individual such as Stogner to prosecution long after the State has, in effect, granted an amnesty, telling him that he is "at liberty to return to his country... and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence," Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice § 316, at 210. See also Moore, 43 N. J. L., at 223-224. It retroactively withdraws a complete defense to prosecution after it has already attached, and it does so in a manner that allows the State to withdraw this defense at will and with respect to individuals already identified. See supra, at 611. "Unfair" seems to us a fair characterization.

IV
The statute before us is unfairly retroactive as applied to Stogner. A long line of judicial authority supports characterization of this law as ex post facto. For the reasons stated, we believe the law falls within Justice Chase's second category of ex post facto laws.

We conclude that a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. The California court's judgment to the contrary is Reversed.

US v Juvenile Male

US Sup ct held case was moot. Decisions within blog: SCOTUS Blog Holding: The Ninth Circuit lacked authority to hold that the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violate the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act before SORNA's enactment. At the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision, respondent's challenge was moot because the district court's order of juvenile supervision had expired, and respondent was no longer subject to the sex-offender-registration provisions that he challenged on appeal. Holding: The Ninth Circuit lacked authority to hold that the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violate the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to a juvenile who was adjudicated delinquent under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act before SORNA's enactment. At the time of the Ninth Circuit's decision, respondent's challenge was moot because the district court's order of juvenile supervision had expired, and respondent was no longer subject to the sex-offender-registration provisions that he challenged on appeal.

9-10-2009 Montana:

US v Juvenile Male
581 F.3d 977 (2009)

See Amended 1-5-2010
US v Juvenile Male
590 F.3d 924 (2010)

As a society, we generally refuse to punish our nation's youth as harshly as we do our fellow adults, or to hold them to the same level of culpability as people who are older, wiser, and more mature. The avowed priority of our juvenile justice system (in theory if not always in practice) has, historically, been rehabilitation rather than retribution. Juvenile proceedings by and large take place away from the public eye, and delinquency adjudications do not become part of a young person's permanent criminal record. Rather, young offenders, except those whose conduct a court deems deserving of treatment as adults, are classified as juvenile delinquents and placed in juvenile detention centers. Historically, an essential aspect of the juvenile justice system has been to maintain the privacy of the young offender and, contrary to our criminal law system, to shield him from the "dissemination of truthful information" and "[t]ransparency" that characterizes the punitive system in which we try adults. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 5038(e) ("[N]either the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding.") with Smith v. Doe,538 U.S. 84, 99, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) ("[O]ur criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence.").

In a surge of national concern, however, over the commission of sex offenses, particularly those against children, Congress in 2006 enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA" or "the Act") and applied its registration and reporting requirements not only to adults but also to juveniles who commit certain serious sex offenses at the age of fourteen years or older. The Attorney General, exercising authority delegated by Congress, determined that SORNA would apply retroactively to all sex offenders convicted of qualifying offenses before its enactment, including juvenile delinquents. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007).

The retroactive application of SORNA's juvenile registration provision affects people of all ages—not only juveniles. As we are still close in time to SORNA's passage, some, like S.E., were adjudicated delinquent relatively recently and are still minors or young adults. The vast majority of persons affected, however, were adjudicated delinquent years or even decades before SORNA's enactment and quite obviously are no longer juveniles. Indeed, the brunt of SORNA's retroactive application to juvenile offenders is felt mainly by adults who committed offenses long ago as teenagers—many of whom have built families, homes, and careers notwithstanding their history of juvenile delinquency, which before SORNA's enactment was not a matter of public record. For these adults, sex offender registration and reporting threatens to disrupt the stability of their lives and to ostracize them from their communities by drawing attention to decades-old sex offenses committed as juveniles that have, until now, remained sealed. Although from this point forward no new individuals will be affected by the retroactivity provision, its effects will be felt by numerous individuals for the rest of their adult lives.1

We must decide as a matter of first impression—in our court and in any other circuit court—whether the retroactive application of SORNA's provision covering individuals who were adjudicated juvenile delinquents because of the commission of certain sex offenses before SORNA's passage violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. In light of the pervasive and severe new and additional disadvantages that result from the mandatory registration of former juvenile offenders and from the requirement that such former offenders report in person to law enforcement authorities every 90 days for 25 years, and in light of the confidentiality that has historically attached to juvenile proceedings, we conclude that the retroactive application of SORNA's provisions to former juvenile offenders is punitive and, therefore, unconstitutional.2

Reynolds v US

11-2-2009 Pennsylvania:

Reynolds v US
132 S.Ct. 975 (2012)
181 L. Ed. 2d 935

Third Circuit Decision Appealed From:
US v Reynolds

On Remand from the US Sup court see below where it says ON REMAND:

The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Act), 120 Stat. 590, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III), requires those convicted of certain sex crimes to provide state governments with (and to update) information, such as names and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender registries. §§ 16912(a), 16913-16914, 16919(a) (2006 ed.). The Act makes it a crime for a person who is "required to register" under the Act and who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce" knowingly to "fai[l] to register or update a registration...." 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The question before us concerns the date on which this federal registration requirement took effect with respect to sex offenders convicted before the Act became law.

The Act defines the term "sex offender" as including these pre-Act offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1); see Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2235-2236, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). It says that "[a] sex offender shall register." § 16913(a). And it further says that "[t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the [registration] requirements ... to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter...." § 16913(d) (emphasis added). In our view, these provisions, read together, mean that the Act's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General specifies that they do apply. We reverse a Court of Appeals determination that, in effect, holds the contrary.

... ... ...

Finally, we note that some lower courts have read the Attorney General's specification authority as applying only to those pre-Act sex offenders unable to comply with the statute's "initial registration" requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b). That, however, is not what the statute says. Rather, its Fourth Statement, § 16913(d), says that the Attorney General has the authority (1) to specify the applicability of the registration requirements to pre-Act (and preimplementation) offenders, "and" (2) to prescribe rules for their registration, "and" (3) to prescribe registration rules for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with the initial registration requirements. See supra, at 979. The word "and" means that the Attorney General's authority extends beyond those pre-Act "sex offenders who are unable to comply" with the initial registration requirements.

III
For these reasons, we conclude that the Act's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specifies. Whether the Attorney General's Interim Rule sets forth a valid specification consequently matters in the case before us. And we reverse the Third Circuit's judgment to the contrary.

We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

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From here down is on remand from the US Sup Court:
This case returns to us after the Supreme Court's review in Reynolds v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012). Remand requires that we reach the merits of Reynolds's claim that the regulatory rule upon which his indictment was based was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). This claim gives rise to three questions: (1) What is the appropriate standard of review of an agency's assertion of good cause in waiving the APA's notice and comment requirements? (2) Did the Attorney General have good cause to waive these requirements in promulgating a rule governing the retroactivity of the Sex Offender and Registration Notification Act's ("SORNA") registration requirements? (3) If the Attorney General lacked good cause to waive the requirements, was Reynolds prejudiced by the failure to comply with the APA's notice and comment requirements?

The courts of appeals are divided on each of these questions. On the first question, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the arbitrary and capricious standard is the appropriate standard for reviewing the Attorney General's actions, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have not stated a standard but appear to use de novo review, and the Ninth Circuit has explicitly avoided the question.1 On the second question, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Attorney General had good cause to waive notice and comment, while the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that he did not.2 On the final question, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Attorney General's lack of good cause does not prejudice defendants, while the Sixth Circuit has held that it is prejudicial.3

We conclude that we need not decide the appropriate standard of review today because the Attorney General's assertion of good cause cannot withstand review even under the most deferential standard available. We also conclude that the Attorney General's lack of good cause is prejudicial to Reynolds. Accordingly, we will vacate Reynolds' conviction.

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

4-19-1995:

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
Docket: 93-986
Citation: 514 U.S. 334 (1995)

Facts of the Case
On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

Question
Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion
Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Oral Argument
There are exceptions to the anonymous free speech, but you must read the Oral Arguments to know what they are, in essence, anything that is not true, libel, slander, fraud, etc and a few others. Folks must be responsible for what they say, print, and do with respect to exercising their First Amendment rights. So, read and understand the concepts of what the Justices are saying.

====================================
Assuming no wrongful conduct, the court said:
"“Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees them to express critical, minority views . . . Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society.”" The Electronic Frontier Foundation citing the above case.
====================================

See also: A Victory for Anonymous Online Free Speech

Carr v US

6-1-2010 Indiana:

Carr v. U.S.
No. 08-1301.

Since 1994, federal law has required States, as a condition for the receipt of certain law enforcement funds, to maintain federally compliant systems for sex-offender registration and community notification. In an effort to make these state schemes more comprehensive, uniform, and effective, Congress in 2006 enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA or Act) as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. 109-248, Tit. I, 120 Stat. 590. Among its provisions, the Act established a federal criminal offense covering, inter alia, any person who (1) "is required to register under [SORNA]," (2) "travels in interstate or foreign commerce," and (3) "knowingly fails to register or update a registration." 18 U. S. C. §2250(a).

At issue in this case is whether §2250 applies to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA's effective date and, if so, whether the statute runs afoul of the Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws. See Art. I, §9, cl. 3. Liability under §2250, we hold, cannot be predicated on pre-SORNA travel. We therefore do not address the ex post facto question.

Note: How does one say it is an ex post facto violation without actually saying that? Isn't law wonderful and creative?

Connecticut Dept Of Public Safety V Doe

3-5-2003 Connecticut:

Connecticut Dept. Of Public Safety V. Doe (Oral Argument)

Among other things, Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law” requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety (DPS) upon their release into the community, and requires DPS to post a sex offender registry containing registrants’ names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on an Internet Website and to make the registry available to the public in certain state offices.

Respondent, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on behalf of himself and similarly situated sex offenders, claiming that the law violates, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment, certified a class of individuals subject to the law, and permanently enjoined the law’s public disclosure provisions.

The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that such disclosure both deprived registered sex offenders of a “liberty interest,” and violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing to determine whether they are likely to be “currently dangerous.”

U.S. Supreme court Held: The Second Circuit’s judgment must be reversed because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693. But even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact–that he is not currently dangerous–that is not material under the statute. Cf., e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433.

Note: A review of both of these cases will show, that, in today's climate of dozens of laws affecting a person's reputation on both the federal and state levels, this is no longer a "mere injury to reputation," now it is equivalent to civil death in society. A second point is, in Paul v Davis there was an exception, it said, if it affects one's employment then it is no longer a "mere injury" and today we see sex offenders laws clearly preventing registrants from any gainful employment.

As the DPS Website explains, the law’s requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone–a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest. Unless respondent can show that the substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting with the Constitution), any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise. Respondent expressly disavows any reliance on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, and maintains that his challenge is strictly a procedural one. But States are not barred by principles of “procedural due process” from drawing such classifications. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (plurality opinion). Such claims “must ultimately be analyzed” in terms of substantive due process. Id., at 121. Because the question is not properly before the Court, it expresses no opinion as to whether the State’s law violates substantive due process principles. Pp. 4—6.

271 F.3d 38, reversed.

Smith v Doe

3-5-2003 Alaska:

Smith v. Doe (Oral Argument) (U.S. Supreme Court)

Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in the State must register with the Department of Corrections within 30 days before his release, providing his name, address, and other specified information. If the individual is at liberty, he must register with local law enforcement authorities within a working day of his conviction or of entering the State. If he was convicted of a single, nonaggravated sex crime, the offender must provide annual verification of the submitted information for 15 years.

If he was convicted of an aggravated sex offense or of two or more sex offenses, he must register for life and verify the information quarterly. The offender’s information is forwarded to the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. Some of the data, such as fingerprints, driver’s license number, anticipated change of address, and whether the offender has had medical treatment afterwards is kept confidential.

The offender’s name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, driver’s license number, motor vehicle identification numbers, place of employment, date of birth, crime, date and place of conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender is in compliance with the Act’s update requirements or cannot be located are, however, published on the Internet. Both the Act’s registration and notification requirements are retroactive.

Respondents were convicted of aggravated sex offenses. Both were released from prison and completed rehabilitative programs for sex offenders. Although convicted before the Act’s passage, respondents are covered by it. After the initial registration, they are required to submit quarterly verifications and notify the authorities of any changes. Both respondents, along with the wife of one of them, also a respondent here, brought this action under 42 U.S. C. §1983, seeking to declare the Act void as to them under, inter alia, the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 1.

The District Court granted petitioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit disagreed in relevant part, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

U.S. Supreme court Held: Because the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act is nonpunitive, its retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Pp. 4—18.

USA v Valverde

12-27-2010 California:

USA v Valverde

UPDATE: Valverde has been appealed to the US Sup ct and they have denied the appeal, therefore this is a good decision to rely on as to the effective date of SORNA

The Government appeals a decision of the district court dismissing the indictment of Mark Anthony Valverde (“Valverde”) under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., on the ground that the registration and penalty provisions of the statute under which Valverde was charged, 42 U.S.C. § 16913; 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B), are invalid exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. We stayed this matter pending a decision on that issue in United States v. George, ___ F.3d ___, No. 08-30339, 2010 WL 4291497 (9th Cir. 2010). Valverde contends in addition that no valid statute or properly promulgated rule made SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to him as of the time that he is charged with failing to register, specifically in January 2008.

We lift the stay issued pending the panel’s decision in George and reject Valverde’s Commerce Clause argument in light of that decision. We AFFIRM, however, the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. We do so on the separate ground that the Attorney General’s interim regulation of February 28, 2007 — applying SORNA’s registration requirements retroactively to sex offenders, such as Valverde, who were convicted before the statute’s enactment — did not comply with the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and did not qualify for the “good cause” exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3). As a result, the retroactivity provision did not become effective until August 1, 2008 —30 days after its publication in the final SMART guidelines along with the Attorney General’s response to related public comments. Article: Sex Offender Registration Act Not Fully Retroactive

Doe -v- Shurtleff

10-26-2010 Utah:

Doe -v- Shurtleff
No. 09-4162.

10-26-2010 ORDER -and- 12-1-2010 ORDER

District Ct Order 8-20-2009

District Ct Decision 9-25-2008

In this case John Doe, a registered sex offender living in the state of Utah, appeals the district court's decision to allow enforcement of a Utah statute requiring all sex offenders living in Utah to register their "internet identifiers" and the corresponding websites with the state. We now uphold that decision based on our conclusion that the statute does not violate the First or Fourth Amendments or the Ex-Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, made applicable to Utah through the Fourteenth Amendment.

BACKGROUND
Appellant, proceeding anonymously as Mr. John Doe, was convicted by the United States military court system of sex offenses involving a minor and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. After serving thirteen months of this sentence, Mr. Doe was released without being placed on probation or supervised release. However, as a resident of Utah and a convicted sex offender, Mr. Doe was still required to register with the Utah Department of Corrections, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (West 2008). Among its many provisions, this registry law required Mr. Doe to provide all "Internet identifiers1 and the addresses [he] uses for routing or self-identification in Internet communications or postings." Id. § 77-27-21.5(14)(i).2 The statute also required that Mr. Doe provide "all online identifiers and passwords used to access" websites where he was using an online identifier, with the exception of identifiers used for employment or financial accounts. Id. § 77-27-21.5(12)(j) & (29).

Believing that these requirements violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights as well as the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, Mr. Doe refused to provide the requested information and brought a lawsuit challenging the law. Upon Mr. Doe's motion for summary judgment, the district court invalidated the statute based on its conclusion that the statute, which provided "no restrictions on how the [State] c[ould] use or disseminate registrants' internet information," improperly infringed on Mr. Doe's First Amendment right to anonymous speech. (Appellant's App. at 208.) Shortly after this ruling, the Utah legislature amended the statute. First, the legislature removed any requirement that offenders disclose their passwords, and second, it placed some limits on how a state official can use identifiers provided by an offender. Specifically, the statute now3 provides that

... ... ... ...

( Doe v Shurtleff at. el., 2010 WL 4188248 (U.S. Dist Court, the District of Utah 2008) (C.A.10 (Dec. 1, 2010), decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS). SCOTUS denied the Pet. for Cert. on March 7, 2011.

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Article: The 10th Cir Court of Appeals issues decision on "Internet anonymous free speech" of Utah's sex offenders

UPDATE 3-10-2011: Many thanks to the reader for this important update: "The Doe v Shurtleff at. el., 2010 WL 4188248 (C.A.10 (Dec. 1, 2010), decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS). SCOTUS denied the Pet. for Cert. on March 7, 2011. This does not mean that SCOTUS did agreed with the Tenth Circuit, it just means they will not hear the case. They are well aware that the White v. Baker decision out of Georgia says it is unconstitutional. There is a preliminary injunction in Doe v. Nebraska as well on this issue. A new lawsuit was filed in Feb. 2011 against New York's E-STOP as well."

From Wikipedia: Doe v. Shurtleff

From Jonathan D. Frieden: Law Requiring Convicted Sex Offender to Disclose All Internet Identities is Constitutional (Excellent Explanation by Lawyer)

See Also: Six Myths Why We Can't Manage Sex Offender's Computer/Internet Use

Kentucky v Baker

11-2-2009 Kentucky:

Kentucky v Baker (U.S. Sup Court (Cert Denied))

The question of law to be answered is whether KRS 17.545, which restricts where registered sex offenders may live, may be applied to those who committed their offenses prior to July 12, 2006, the effective date of the statute. We hold that it may not. Even though the General Assembly did not intend the statute to be punitive, the residency restrictions are so punitive in effect as to negate any intention to deem them civil. Therefore, the retroactive application of KRS 17 .545 is an ex post facto punishment, which violates Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, and Section 19(1) of the Kentucky Constitution .

Article: State to appeal ruling limiting sex-offender law