Santobello v. New York

1971 U.S. Supreme Court:

Santobello v. New York
404 U.S. 257 (1971)

After negotiations with the prosecutor, petitioner withdrew his previous not-guilty plea to two felony counts and pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, the prosecutor having agreed to make no recommendation as to sentence. At petitioner's appearance for sentencing many months later, a new prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence, which the judge (who stated that he was uninfluenced by that recommendation) imposed. Petitioner attempted unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty plea, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.

Held: The interests of justice and proper recognition of the prosecution's duties in relation to promises made in connection with "plea bargaining" require that the judgment be vacated and that the case be remanded to the state courts for further consideration as to whether the circumstances require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea (in which case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge), or petitioner should be afforded the relief he seeks of withdrawing his guilty plea.

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The essence of this case is, anyone who entered into a plea with the state, that plea cannot b broken it is sacrosanct. Plea bargains are special and reduced to writing, whatever that says cannot be broken and the defendant can rely on that. If one who has entered into a WRITTEN plea bargain feels the state has violated that can assert this case to force the state to abide by the WRITTEN plea bargain.

Google Scholar: Santabello v NY and Plea Bargains

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United States v Rojas

Make absolutely certain EVERTHING is written into a plea agreement before giving up right to appeal!

3-11-2015 Puerto Rico:

United States v Rojas

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. The district court sentenced Defendant to one year in prison.

The court also sentenced Defendant to ten years of supervised release and imposed several conditions of supervised release. Defendant appealed, challenging three of those conditions.

The First Circuit dismissed the appeal without reaching the substance of the appeal because Defendant agreed knowingly and voluntarily to accept the the “waiver of appeal” provision in his plea agreement, and this appeal fell within the scope of that waiver.

The sledgehammer justice of mandatory minimum sentences

12-26-2013 National:

Federal Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York says documents called “statements of reasons” are an optional way for a judge to express “views that might be of interest.” The one he issued two months ago is still reverberating.

It expresses his dismay that although his vocation is the administration of justice, his function frequently is the infliction of injustice. The policy of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses has empowered the government to effectively nullify the constitutional right to a trial. As Lulzim Kupa learned.

Born to Albanian immigrants, he was convicted in 1999 and 2007 of distributing marijuana. Released from prison in 2010, he again engaged in trafficking, this time with enough cocaine to earn him charges involving a sentence of 10 years to life. On March 5, 2013, prosecutors offered this: In exchange for a guilty plea, he would effectively be sentenced within the range of 110 months to 137 months — but the offer would expire the next day. Kupa rejected the offer, so on March 15 prosecutors filed a “prior felony information,” a.k.a. an 851 notice, citing the two marijuana convictions. So, 10 days after saying a sentence of perhaps less than eight years (assuming good time credits) would be appropriate, prosecutors were threatening a sentence of life without parole. This gave him no incentive to plead guilty.

Then, however, they immediately proposed another plea agreement involving about nine years’ imprisonment. Given a day to decide, he acted too slowly, so prosecutors again increased the recommended sentence. Finally, Kupa caved: “I want to plead guilty, your Honor, before things get worse.” If, after the 851 notice, he had insisted on a trial and been found guilty, he would have died in prison for a nonviolent drug offense. He is 37.

Doe v Harris

7-1-2013 California:

Doe v Harris
California Supreme court decision on "Certified Question from 9th Circuit".

Sometimes it is better to start at the end, accordingly here is the decision of the California Supreme court on certified question:

CONCLUSION

For the reasons we have explained, the general rule in California is that a plea agreement is "`deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. . . .'" (Gipson, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.)

It follows, also as a general rule, that requiring the parties' compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement, nor does the failure of a plea agreement to reference the possibility the law might change translate into an implied promise the defendant will be unaffected by a change in the statutory consequences attending his or her conviction.

To that extent, then, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law.

To see what transpired before this decision, see Doe v Harris 1-13-2013.

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Effectively, in California, plea bargains are only good if the state -through future enactment of laws- does not change the terms of earlier plea bargain. Isn't great, the state is always in control.

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People v Velasquez

8-9-2011 California:

People v. Velasquez

This is an appeal by the People, after the trial court dismissed a prosecution against defendant and respondent Robert Velasquez for violation of the sex offender registration laws. Rather, the trial court granted specific enforcement of a 1990 plea agreement, finding that the agreement did not require defendant to register as a sex offender.

The People argue that the evidence supporting the trial court's findings was flawed or insufficient, and that its enforcement of the 1990 plea agreement in this proceeding was erroneous. The People further argue that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the instant charge pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.1

We conclude that the trial court's factual finding, that non-registration was an essential term of defendant's 1990 plea agreement, was supported by substantial evidence. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the instant charge. Accordingly, we affirm.