Sex offender aquitted of failing to comply charge

Obviously the police, when checking registrants' homes, has no sort of message system "get back to me" and instead falsely charges registrants w/a crime.

6-22-2013 Arizona:

A registered sex offender was acquitted of charges in Circuit Court on Monday.

Chad Everette Brown, a level 3 sex offender, had been charged with failure to comply with sex offender reporting requirements.

Lt. Paul Rice of the Van Buren County sheriff’s office testified that he had received information that Brown no longer lived at the address provided to the sheriff’s office. He said he went to the home on Prim Rose Lane in the Burnt Ridge area several times in March 2012 to speak with Brown and was never able to find him home. A warrant for Brown’s arrest was issued March 29, 2012, according to court documents.

Brown’s sister and mother testified in the bench trial before Judge Charles E. Clawson that Brown worked long hours away from the home, but did in fact live there. Clawson acquitted Brown of the charge. ..Source.. by VB Democrat

US v Windless

6-12-2013 Mississippi:

US v Windless

A federal district court may not rely on "bare arrest records" when sentencing a defendant. The district court believed that it could rely on those records when crafting conditions of supervised release. We disagree.

... ... ...

We VACATE imposition of the mental-health treatment condition and REMAND for resentencing. We REVERSE imposition of the "no direct or indirect contact" condition, which the district court may not impose (as currently phrased) on remand.

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New sentence ordered for sex offender who failed to register after coming to Miss. from Minn.

JACKSON, Miss. — A convicted sex offender has won a new sentencing hearing for failing to register in Mississippi because a federal judge erred in putting conditions on his supervised release, a federal appeals court panel has ruled.

Calvin Windless pleaded guilty in 2011 to failing to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. He was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison plus 10 years of supervised release.

Windless did not challenge the lengths of the prison sentence and supervised release. He argued the conditions put on his supervised release were unreasonable.

A three-judge panel of the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals earlier this month agreed with Windless.

Court records show Windless was convicted in 1993 in Cook County, Ill. Windless, then 15, kidnapped a 7-year-old girl and twice forced her to perform oral sex. He was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. He was paroled in 1997 and, after a brief return to prison, was released finally in 1999.

At some point after his release, Windless moved to Minnesota, where he was convicted of failing to register in 2008. Court records show he maintained his registration until he failed to notify Minnesota authorities when he moved to Belzoni, Miss., in 2010.

Windless was arrested by U.S. marshals on a warrant from Minnesota and was indicted when he admitted he had not registered in Mississippi. He pleaded guilty in October of 2011 to failing to register and was sentenced in April 2012 in Aberdeen, Miss.

Windless argued failing to register was not a sex crime and conditions on supervised release for one convicted of a sex crime should not apply to him.

U.S. District Judge Sharion Aycock specified Windless could not have direct or indirect contact with anyone younger than 18 unless accompanied and supervised by an adult who has been approved in advance by his probation officer.

"In essence, Mr. Windless could not leave the confines of his home without violating the terms of his supervised release," his attorneys argued in court documents.

Aycock also ordered Windless to undergo mental health treatment. Windless' attorneys argued he would have to live in Mississippi forever because no other state would want to have to provide mental health treatment for him.

Prosecutors said when the judge considered Windless' crime, ongoing criminal history and failure to register, the special conditions on his release "were necessary and did not constitute an unnecessary deprivation of appellant's liberty."

The 5th Circuit panel, in a ruling written by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, threw out the prison term and conditions tied to supervised release.

Higginbotham said the restrictions were overly broad and, for example, would prohibit him from going to a grocery store unaccompanied.

"Circumstances may, of course, permit a sentencing court to limit an offender's access to places where children are likely to be unsupervised or poorly supervised. It may be reasonable to bar an offender from initiating unsupervised or poorly supervised contact with others' children and reasonable to require him to report contact that children initiate," Higginbotham wrote.

"But to forbid all 'indirect' contact works a serious restriction on liberty, making a trip to the grocery store or a place of worship a trip that may end in imprisonment via revocation sentence," the judge wrote. ..Source.. by JACK ELLIOTT JR

Child pornography victim loses restitution appeal

3-11-2013 Nebraska:

A child pornography victim seeking nearly $1 million in restitution from a Lincoln man caught with pictures of her on his computer in 2010 lost an appeal Monday of the judge's $3,333 award.

In November 2010, a search of Robert Fast's Lincoln address turned up 26 digital images and 23 videos on his computer after Lincoln police investigators discovered them using file-sharing software.

Among them were images of "Vicky," the pseudonym for a woman whose father sexually abused her and filmed the acts when she was a child.

Since then, she has documented $1.2 million in losses from the abuse and distribution of the images, has filed for restitution in more than 200 federal criminal cases across the country, and has collected nearly $272,000 so far, according to Monday's order.

In the Nebraska case, she sought the difference, $952,759.81.

The court ordered Fast to pay $19,863.84, after finding he didn't have to be the one who caused the loss to be liable for them.

But Fast appealed, and the Eighth Circuit found he did have to be the proximate cause and found him liable for Vicky's losses after June 25, 2010, when he began committing the crime.

When Fast's case came back to Lincoln for him to be re-sentenced, the judge reduced the restitution to $3,333 -- $2,500 for medical and psychiatric care and occupational therapy, plus $833 for legal fees and costs.

This time, Vicky appealed.

The government and the defense both argued that, because she wasn't a party to the case, she didn't have standing to appeal.

On Monday, in a split decision, a three-judge appellate court panel agreed and dismissed her appeal.

"Fast did not possess any images of her until June 25, 2010. But she suffered losses before then. … As the district court found, Fast could not have caused -- and thus could not be liable for -- losses before that date," wrote Eighth Circuit Judge Duane Benton of Missouri.

Judge Bobby E. Shepherd of Arkansas, who wrote the dissenting opinion, said he would have remanded the case for the district court to enter a restitution order that reflected the full amount of her losses.

He said each defendant who viewed the images was a cause to the harm because, if no one viewed them, the victim arguably would not have suffered the psychological problems that came with knowing they'd been seen by numerous unknown people.

To date, about 300 defendants have been convicted of possessing images of Vicky, according to a Sixth Circuit order Feb. 27. ..Source.. by LORI PILGER

Attorney Crouch Secures Reversal Of Client’s Failure To Register Conviction

6-13-2013 Massachusetts:

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Loring, 463 Mass. 1012 (2012), Attorney Crouch argued that a client’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender should be reversed and the Supreme Judicial Court agreed, reversing his client’s conviction.

In Loring, the defendant was classified by the Sex Offender Registry Board as a level two sex offender. Defendant subsequently registered with the police department. When the defendant failed to register again a few months later during the month of his birth, he was charged with a single count of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178F 1/2. Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and Attorney Crouch later filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on his client’s behalf.

His motion was denied by the trial court. Attorney Crouch appealed the case and the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) although the defendant admitted during the plea hearing that he did not register in his birth month, the statute did not require him to do so; and (2) being under no obligation to register in his birth month, the defendant could not be convicted of the offense of failure to register. ..Source.. by Attorney Crouch at (617) 441-5111

Audrey Doe v Bobby Jindal

3-29-2012 Louisiana:

Audrey Doe v Bobby Jindal
851 F.Supp.2d 995 (2012)

At issue in this case is a first and defining principle of our struggle as a nation that finally resolved in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution: Equal Protection before the Law. As two writers1 have observed:

The idea was to distinguish between legislation for the common benefit and legislation that benefitted or burdened the few.... It was an appeal to notions of reciprocity in governance: law's generality was important, not simply in a formal sense but because it forced lawmakers to stand in the shoes of those they represented. The principle of class legislation was terraced in both directions — it not only aimed to prevent class privilege but also invidious oppression.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment instructs that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

At the outset, it must be underscored that the issue presented in this case is not about approval or disapproval of sexual beliefs or mores. It is about the mandate of equality that is enshrined in the Constitution.

In Louisiana, the solicitation of oral or anal sex for compensation can be prosecuted under two different statutes: the solicitation for compensation provision of the Prostitution statute, and the Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute.2 Nine anonymous plaintiffs, all of whom were convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute based on their agreement to engage in oral sex for compensation prior to August 15, 2011, bring this civil rights suit. They challenge that statute's requirement that, as a result of their conviction, they must register as sex offenders under Louisiana's sex offender registry law. They complain that if, instead, they had been convicted of solicitation of sex for money under the state Prostitution law, they would not have been required to register as sex offenders.3 It is the State's more lenient treatment of those convicted under the solicitation provision of the Prostitution statute, they urge, compared to those convicted under the Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute, that anchors their civil rights claim in which they advance their constitutional challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They sue several State officials and one municipal official.

... ... ...

For all of these reasons, stripped of all political theater and with a concern solely to fidelity to the simple and clear injunction of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the record, taken as a whole, leads to no rational basis for what the state legislature has done.30 The record discloses no genuine dispute as to any material fact: the plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that they have been deprived of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The plaintiffs shall submit a proposed judgment within five days consistent with this Order and Reasons.

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Hundreds to be stricken from Louisiana sex offender registry after class-action suit's settlement

6-13-2013 Louisiana:


Hundreds of people who were convicted of soliciting oral or anal sex for money under Louisiana's "crime against nature by solicitation" law will have their names removed from the state's sex offender registry following the settlement of a class-action lawsuit.

U.S District Judge Martin Feldman on Tuesday approved the settlement agreement between the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights and Louisiana Attorney General James "Buddy" Caldwell's office.

Feldman ruled last year that nine plaintiffs who were convicted of the offense must be stricken from the registry. Plaintiffs' lawyers argued the ruling should be applied to roughly 700 others in the same position.

Alexis Agathocleous, one of the lead plaintiffs' lawyers on the case, said the registration requirement for people convicted of violating the law disproportionately punished black women and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.

"We are gratified that the state has agreed to vindicate the rights of hundreds of people who continued to be unconstitutionally registered as sex offenders," he said in a statement.

The settlement doesn't apply to people convicted of soliciting sex from a minor or anyone who was convicted of another sex offense subject to registration. State officials have up to 30 days to make an initial determination of who is entitled to be removed from the registry.

Feldman ruled last year that state lawmakers had no "rational basis" for requiring people to register as sex offenders if they were convicted of violating the law. The judge said the plaintiffs wouldn't have had to register if instead they had been convicted of soliciting sex for money under the state prostitution law.

The state Legislature amended the 200-year-old law in 2011 so that anyone convicted of a "crime against nature by solicitation" no longer will be required to register. But the legislative change didn't apply to hundreds who already were registered.

During a hearing in December 2012, a lawyer representing Caldwell's office argued that the recent change in state law leaves the potential class members without any valid claims. Feldman refused to dismiss the class-action suit, however, and expressed frustration at the pace of the process for deciding whether people already had a right to have their names removed from the registry

"I am incredulous and very concerned about why this process has been dragged out against the backdrop of politics for so long," the judge said. ..Source.. by MICHAEL KUNZELMAN

Calder v Bull

The backbone case behind ex post facto laws

August 1798:

Calder v Bull
3 U.S. 386

The decision of one question determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case, than I think necessary to the consideration of that question only.

The Legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the court of Probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March, 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison (the grandson) made the 21st of August, 1779, and refused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said Court of Probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution, or law, before the said Court of Probate, who, on the 27th of July, 1795, approved the said will, and ordered it to be recorded. At August, 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hartford, who at February term, 1796, affirmed the decree of the Court of Probate. Appeal was had to the Supreme Court of errors of Connecticut, who in June, 1796, adjudged, that there were no errors. More than 18 months elapsed from the decree of the Court of Probate (on the 1st of March, 1793,) and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right [p387] of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that State whereby a new hearing, or trial, before the said court of Probate might be obtained. Calder and wife claim the premises in question, in right of his wife, as heiress of N. Morrison, a physician; Bull and wife claim under the will of N. Morrison, the grandson.

The Counsel for the Plaintiffs in error, contend, that the said resolution or law of the Legislature of Connecticut, granting a new hearing, in the above case, is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the Constitution of the United States; that any law of the Federal government, or of the State governments, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void; and that this court possesses the power to declare such law void.

... ... ...

I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition.

• 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.


• 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was, when committed.


• 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.


• 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. [p391]

All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws, and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law: The former, only, are prohibited.

Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or of pardon.

They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning, and after, the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create, or aggregate, the crime; or encrease the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction.

Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like; is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions "ex post facto laws," are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.

The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government.

... ... ...

Goodman v State

6-10-2013 Florida:

Goodman v State

At issue is whether Bay County Sheriff Office’s policy of requiring registered sexual offenders, who are perpetually itinerant within the county, to report in person to its main office by 10 a.m. each Monday morning to specify where they intend to spend the next seven nights is consistent with the applicable sexual offender statute, section 943.0435(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2010).

John Luther Goodman III, a registered sex offender, claims the policy goes beyond what the statute required of him, and that his felony conviction for failing to comply with the policy is flawed. He challenges the policy and the special jury instruction that was given.

We disagree and affirm.

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Something in this decision is absolutely absurd:

" ... ... ... In theory, an itinerant offender could have seventy-three (365/5) permanent, temporary or transient residences in a calendar year or 365 itinerant ones (a possibility, given the Sheriff’s Office’s position at trial that a change of even five feet in the woods is a reportable change in location). Other patterns and permutations of permanent, temporary, transient and itinerant residencies are possible."

That comment alone should have invalidated the statute. No other registrant is held to such a restriction and neither should this type of registrant.

Commonwealth v Wilgus

Since this case the legislature has changed the law..

6-26-2009 Pennsylvania:

Commonwealth v Wilgus

¶ 1 We are called on to decide whether the Legislature, in requiring a Megan's Law offender to register his “residence,” included within the requirement the circumstances of this case in which the defendant is a homeless and transient person.

¶ 2 The defendant William Howard Wilgus (Wilgus) was released from prison and, after being turned away from various housing programs, lived on the streets of downtown Harrisburg for 30 days before being arrested for not registering his “residence” as required by Megan's Law.   He was convicted in a non-jury trial, but the trial judge set aside his conviction and dismissed the charges.   The trial judge concluded Wilgus did not have a “residence” to register and, therefore, had not violated Megan's Law.

¶ 3 We conclude the Legislature could have drafted the Megan's Law registration requirement to require a homeless and transient person to register, but it did not, and, consequently, we agree the conviction must be set aside.

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6-27-2009 Pennsylvania:

A state Superior Court panel ruled Friday that convicted sexual offenders cannot be held subject to Megan's Law registration requirements if they are homeless.

In upholding a Dauphin County judge, the state appellate court found that William H. Wilgus should not have been prosecuted for violating the requirements to register his address with state police since after being released from prison in 2007 on sexual assault charges, he could not find a home.

The court said Wilgus unsuccessfully tried to find housing at Bethesda Mission and several other shelters and ended up living in alleys around Second and Market streets near the county courthouse.

The court said the definition of residence in the law and its purpose to inform neighbors makes it clear that the law cannot apply to transients. The three-judge panel suggested the state Legislature could amend the law to address the situation. ..Source.. by PETE SHELLEM, Of The Patriot-News

People v Haynes

9-23-2008 Michigan:

People v Haynes
Docket No. 277185.

Defendant pleaded no contest to a charge of committing the “ abominable and detestable crime against nature” with a sheep.  MCL 750.158.   The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 30 to 240 months' imprisonment.   In addition, the trial court found that defendant's actions indicated sexual perversion, so the court ordered defendant to register under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28. 721 et seq.   This Court initially denied defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal,1 but our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded this case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted.   People v. Haynes, 477 Mich. 1067, 728 N.W.2d 868 (2007).   Defendant only appeals the propriety of the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender.   We vacate the part of the trial court's order requiring defendant to register as a sex offender because the SORA does not apply to the portion of MCL 750.158 that prohibits bestiality.

... ... ...

The prosecution also advances a policy argument in support of its contention that bestiality is within the catchall “listed offense” provisions of the SORA.   Specifically, the prosecution argues, “It is unlikely that many people would not find the defendant's behavior disturbing, to the extent that it could endanger the ‘health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state,’ ” quoting the Legislature's stated intent of the SORA in MCL 28.721a.   Our job, however, is to enforce the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute as written.  People v. Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 50, 59, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008);  Morey, supra at 330, 603 N.W.2d 250.   If the Legislature chooses to amend or revise MCL 28.722(e)(ii ) to require an individual to register as a sex offender for violating MCL 750.158 by sexually assaulting an animal, it may.   Gardner, supra at 59-60, 753 N.W.2d 78.   But this Court may not make the policy choice to require registration as a sex offender for the type of offense in the instant appeal.

We vacate that part of the trial court's order requiring defendant to register under the SORA.   We do not retain jurisdiction.

Horner v State

6-19-2008 New Hampshire:

Horner v State

The plaintiff, Philip S. Horner, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) denying his petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the State from enforcing RSA 651-B:11 (2007 & Supp. 2007), which mandates the collection of a sex offender registration fee. We affirm.

The plaintiff was convicted in 2000 of five counts of felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632-A:3 (2007). Every sex offender and offender against children is required to register with the New Hampshire Division of State Police (division) which maintains the sex offender registry. RSA 651-B:2, I (2007), :11, I (Supp. 2007). Upon release from prison, sex offenders must inform the division where they intend to reside and the division enters this information into the law enforcement name search system. RSA 651-B:3, I (Supp. 2007). When the division is notified by law enforcement that a sex offender has moved to New Hampshire, the division must locate the offender, serve notice of duty to register and enter the offender’s information in the system. RSA 651-B:3, II (Supp. 2007). On a semi-annual basis, the division is required to verify the offender’s address by sending a letter by certified mail to the offender. RSA 651-B:3, III (2007). Offenders must register in person on a semi-annual basis, be photographed and provide specific information about their appearance, employment and vehicles. Id.; RSA 651-B:4, I(a)(2)-(3) (2007).

Pursuant to the statute, sex offenders must pay “a fee of $17 semi-annually.” RSA 651-B:11, I. The plaintiff brought a petition for a writ of prohibition contending that the statute violates the prohibition against disproportionate taxation in Part I, Article 12 and Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, ruling that the plaintiff failed to establish that RSA 651-B:11 imposes a tax.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the sex offender registration fee “is in reality a disproportionate tax, being an enforced contribution to fund a public safety measure (the registry) which benefits all citizens, not just registrants.” The State argues that the charge is a fee because the statute serves a regulatory purpose and the fee helps to defray the cost of maintaining the registry.

... ... ...

We hold that the $17 semi-annual charge imposed upon sex offenders is not intended to raise additional revenue but, rather, is used solely to support a governmental regulatory activity made necessary by the actions of those who are required to pay the charge. As the trial court found, the sex offender registration fees “are applied directly to regulatory services that would not be necessary if there were no sex offenders.” There is no evidence that the fee does not “bear a relationship to and approximate the expense” of maintaining the sex offender registry, see D’Antoni, 153 N.H. at 658, nor is there evidence that the fee is not incidental to regulation but is rather “primarily for the purpose of producing revenue.” Appeal of Ass’n of N.H. Utilities, 122 N.H. 770, 773 (1982) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the $17 semi-annual charge is properly characterized as a fee and not a tax.

Doe v Tandeske

3-17-2004 Alaska:

Doe v Tandeske
No. 99-35845.

This is the second time this case has been before this court. See Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.2001), rev'd and remanded, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). The first time, we overturned the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State and held that Alaska's sex offender registration and notification statute, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause as to plaintiffs who were convicted of crimes before the enactment of the statute. Otte, 259 F.3d at 979. Our resolution of the Does' ex post facto claim made it unnecessary for us to decide at that time whether the Act violated plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. at 982. However, the subsequent reversal of Doe v. Otte by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe now requires us to address those claims. The facts and the discussion of the relevant statutory provisions are set forth in Doe v. Otte, and accordingly, we proceed directly to our analysis.

... ... ...

While fundamental liberty interests require that any state infringement of these rights be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest," state actions that implicate anything less than a fundamental right require only that the government demonstrate "a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (emphasis added). As the Court has already determined in Smith, the statute's provisions serve "a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of `public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Moreover, the Court held, the "broad categories" of offenses differentiated in the Act and the "corresponding length of the reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective." Id. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Thus, although the Does possess liberty interests that are indeed important, Smith precludes our granting them relief.
Because we do not believe that Glucksberg and Smith permit us to reach any other result in this case, we conclude that the Alaska law does not violate the Does' rights to substantive due process.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's entry of summary judgment for the State.

Doe v Otte

This case was ultimately overturned by the US Supreme court.

4-9-2001 Alaska:

Doe v Otte
No. 99-35845. (See Amended)

This case involves an extremely sensitive and difficult question, both from a social and legal standpoint. How may society deal with convicted sex offenders after they have been punished for their crimes? How can society protect itself against future offenses and at the same time safeguard the constitutional rights of persons who have fully paid the price imposed by law for their crimes? The issues treated in the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act we consider here differ only in degree from a host of other issues the citizens of this country regularly face in trying to resolve the inherent tensions between safety and freedom that exist in any democracy.

As it turns out, we can decide the case before us without having to resolve the most fundamental question posed by the Alaska statute: that is, in light of the fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, may rehabilitation, or a judicial determination of lack of future risk, be wholly ignored when imposing restrictive requirements and obligations on persons who have committed a sexual offense and been fully punished for 836*836 their crimes? Instead, we base our decision on a far narrower constitutional provision, the Ex Post Facto Clause.

... ... ...

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. We therefore REVERSE the district court's orders granting summary judgment for the state officials, and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Blakemore v State

4-16-2010 Indiana:

Blakemore v State
925 NE 2d 759 - Ind

The trial court found Oscar Blakemore guilty of failure to register as a sex offender, a Class D felony,[1] even though there was no such registration requirement when he committed the underlying offense or when he was convicted of it. That retroactive application of the sex offender registry requirement violated the Indiana constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, and we accordingly must reverse.

... ... ...

For all these reasons, we reject the State's assertion that a defendant's agreement to "comply with the statutory requirements in registering" as a sex offender, (Ex. 1 at 7), subjects him to subsequent punishment under laws not in existence when he entered into the agreement. We accordingly reverse Blakemore's conviction of failure to register as a sex offender.

Reversed.

Czyzewski v New Hampshire Department of Safety

6-7-2013 New Hampshire:

Czyzewski v New Hampshire Department of Safety (PDF Copy)

In Czyzewski v. New Hampshire Department of Safety, decided today, the Court provided a classic example – and a very defensible example – of how Courts will literally ignore the language of a statute in order to reach a desired result.

Czyzewski tried to induce a 13 year old who he met on the internet to engage in sexual activity with him – a serious sex crime. It is a serious crime, even though there was no 13 year old. The “child” was a police officer engaged in a sting operation, chatting away online and pretending he was a sexually-vulnerable 13 year old.

After conviction for the crime of attempted sexual assault, the State of New Hampshire ordered defendant to register as a sex offender. Czyzewski fought this Order in Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that he did not have to register because the registration statute required sex offender registration for the crime of sexual assault only “‘where the victim was under [the age of] 18 at the time of the offense.” Czyzewski argued that because there was no victim, but rather an adult police officer who was not under the age of 18, he should not have to register under the plain language of the statute.

The unanimous Court disagreed, essentially ignoring the language of the statute, based on the reasoning that the legislature could not possibly have meant what it said because the legislature also criminalized attempt crimes that do not involve any actual victim.

The Court, in my opinion, is right. Contrary to the view of Justice Scalia that Courts should limit themselves to so-called “textual” analysis… and contrary to the famous and simplistic claim of Chief Justice Roberts that Judges merely “call balls and strikes” … Courts have a difficult job. Courts must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting a law. Courts must use their judgment, not just mindlessly adhere to the “plain language” of a law, because legislative bodies cannot possibly anticipate every fact pattern that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court’s decision is sensible and without doubt adheres to the legislative intent in enacting the sex offender registry law, even if it strays from the literal language the legislature chose. ..Source.. by Ted Lothstein.

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NH court says convicted sex offender must register

6-5-2013 New Hampshire:

The New Hampshire Supreme Court says a man convicted of attempted sexual assault must register as a sex offender, rejecting his argument that there wasn’t an actual assault or victim.

Justin Czyzewski, 28, was convicted in October 2009 based on online conversations with an undercover detective he believed to be a 13-year-old girl.

New Hampshire law requires all persons convicted of sex crimes involving victims under age 18 to register as sex offenders wherever they live. Czyzewski now lives in Drexel Hill, Pa., and is listed in that state’s sex offender registry.

Czyzewski appealed the trial judge’s ruling denying his request for a declaration that he does not have to register. The Supreme Court’s unanimously upheld that ruling in its decision released Wednesday.

Czyzewski argued that he doesn’t fall within the registration requirements because his attempt involved a police officer and not an actual child.

The court ruled the law was not intended to give a break to convicts who take ‘‘a substantial step in targeting an ‘actual victim’ but do not complete the crime.’’

‘‘There is no indication in the statute that the legislature intended either to categorize attempt crimes in this way or to benefit a category of manifestly dangerous criminals for no other reason that the fortuitous fact that their intended victims turned out to be undercover police officers,’’ Justice Gary Hicks wrote.

Czyzewski’s lawyer, Philip Desfosses, did not immediately return a call seeking comment. ..Source.. by Boston.com

State v Prine

5-31-2013 Kansas:

State v Prine
No. 103,242.

This appeal returns to this court after retrial.

In 2009, we reversed defendant John Prine's 2004 convictions for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties because the district judge had erred by admitting evidence of Prine's sexual abuse of two victims other than the one making the allegations underlying this case. State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) ("Prine I").

The legislature responded to our decision by amending K.S.A. 60-455, see L. 2009, ch. 103, sec. 12. The district judge ostensibly applied the amended statute to admit the same evidence at Prine's retrial. Prine now challenges his new convictions and his sentence of 387 months' imprisonment.

His primary argument is the same that entitled him to reversal in 2009; it does not carry the day this time around.

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Court's landmark decision closes loophole in child sex crime cases

5-31-2013:

The Kansas Supreme Court has upheld a conviction of a man accused of child sex crimes. It's a landmark decision that will close a loophole in prosecuting sex offenders.

A jury convicted then 38-year-old John Prine of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child in 2004. Investigators said the crimes occurred in December 2003, and involved a 6-year-old girl he was babysat.

Prine appealed the conviction, and was ordered a new trial after the court ruled that the evidence of the prior sex crimes against children was erroneously admitted at Prine's jury trial.

Kansas lawmakers adopted Senate Bill 44 after the Kansas Supreme Court reversed Prine's conviction in April of 2009. The measure was signed into law, allowing evidence of prior sex crimes to be admitted at the trial of someone charged with committing a sex crime against a child. Prine was then retried later that year using the same evidence and was again found guilty of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

Prine appealed his second conviction to the Kansas Court of Appeals. The case was transferred to the Kansas Supreme Court, with oral arguments presented on August 29, 2012.

The court upheld Friday that the amendment did not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Under the new law, the Court recognized that evidence of prior sex crimes committed by a defendant may be admissible at a trial to prove the propensity of a criminal defendant to commit the charged crime or crimes for sex crime prosecutions.

Prine remains jailed on his 32-year prison sentence. He is expected to be released in 2031. ..Source.. by Jessica Reber

Bartlett v Alameida

5-10-2004 California:

Bartlett v Alameida
366 F.3d 1020 (2004)

William Louis Bartlett is a state prisoner serving a 25-year-to-life sentence for failing to re-register as a sex offender pursuant to California's sex offender registration statute, Cal. Pen.Code § 290(a)(1)(A). He contends, in his quest for a writ of habeas corpus, that his conviction violates due process because the state was not required to prove that he had knowledge of the lifelong duty to register. The district court denied Bartlett's petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we reverse and remand.

... ... ...

IV.
Lambert required the state to prove that Bartlett knew or probably knew of his lifelong duty to register as a sex offender. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that actual knowledge was not an element of the crime. Because this error was not harmless, and because the state court of appeal unreasonably determined that no Lambert error occurred, the district court erred by not granting Bartlett's petition for writ of habeas corpus. We reverse that decision and remand to the district court with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state grants Bartlett a new trial within sixty days of the issuance of this Court's mandate.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Dahl v State

5-15-2007 Delaware:

Dahl v State
926 A.2d 1077 (2007)

Defendant-Appellant William S. Dahl appeals his Superior Court conviction of Loitering by a Sex Offender within 500 Feet of a School,1 specifically a dance academy. Dahl was convicted at a bench trial. Dahl raises three arguments on appeal.

• First, Dahl contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to amend the indictment on the day of trial to expand by one month the date parameters of the alleged offense.
• Second, Dahl contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was within 500 feet of a "school."
• Third, Dahl contends that the dance academy described at trial is not a "school" as defined in 11 Del. C. § 1112 and, therefore, his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

We do not find merit to Dahl's first and second arguments. We do find, however, that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to prove an essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; that the dance academy was a "school" as that term has been defined by the General Assembly. Because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Delaware law require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of an offense, we must reverse and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal in this case.