Del Pino v Dep't of Public Safety

4-1-15 Maryland:

Del Pino v Dep't of Public Safety

In this opinion, we set sail into waters left uncharted by the voyage that the Court of
Appeals undertook in the case of Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional
Services , 430 Md. 535 (2013) (“Doe I”). In Doe I, the Court held that requiring Doe to register as a sex offender as a result of the 2009 and 2010 amendments to the Maryland sex 1 offender registration act (“MSORA”) violated the prohibition against
ex post facto laws contained in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 537 (interpreting Md.2 Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2010 Cum. Supp.), §§ 11-701 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP 2010”)).

There, MSORA did not exist in 1983-84 when Doe committed the sexual offense at issue, nor was Doe required to register when he was convicted in 2006. Doe I, 430 Md. at 537-38. Here, at the time of his conviction in 2001 for a sex crime committed in 2000, appellant, Thomas H. Quispe del Pino, was required to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years.

The 2010 amendment to MSORA, however, classified appellant as a “Tier II” offender and increased the period of registration from ten years to twenty-five years.

The issue thus presented to this Court by the instant case is whether, under Doe I , the retroactive application of MSORA to appellant by the 2010 amendment, which results in the increase of his registration period from ten years to twenty-five years, violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights.

We shall hold that it does.

Judge: Parts of state's sex offender law unconstitutional

see 10-26-15 Bill Would Reinstate Michigan's Ban on Sex Offenders Near Schools. Lawmaker tries to override court decision.

4-7-2015 Michigan:

Doe v Snyder:
(3 Decisions)

A) 9-3-15 JOHN DOE #1-5 and MARY DOE, Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD SNYDER and COL. KRISTE ETUE, Defendants.

B) 3-31-15 JOHN DOES #1-5 and MARY DOE, Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD SNYDER and COL. KRISTE ETUE, Defendants.

C) 3-31-15 JOHN DOES 1-4 and MARY DOE, Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD SNYDER and COL. KRISTE ETUE, Defendants. (Motion in limine Mapping Expert)

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Final Orders from each of the 3 decisions

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A) III. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Rule 52 Motion for Judgment on the Papers (Dkt. # 96) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the court's previous orders.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Rule 52 Motion for Judgment on the Papers (Dkt. # 97) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the court's previous orders.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725a(7) is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined, as applied to John Doe #4.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the retroactive incorporation of the lifetime registration requirement's incorporation of the requirement to report "[a]ll electronic mail addresses and instant message addresses assigned to the individual . . . and all login names or other identifiers used by the individual when using any electronic mail address or instant messaging system," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(i), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined.

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B) For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Rule 52 Motion for Judgment on the Papers (Dkt. # 96) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Rule 52 Motion for Judgment on the Papers (Dkt. # 97) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Sex Offender Registration Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.721 et seq., shall be construed consistently with this opinion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that SORA's geographic exclusion zones provisions, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 28.734, 28.735, are declared unconstitutional and their enforcement is enjoined, as applied to Plaintiffs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requirement "to report in person and notify the registering authority . . . immediately after . . . [t]he individual . . . begins to regularly operate any vehicle," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725(1)(g), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined, as applied to Plaintiffs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requirement "to report in person and notify the registering authority . . . immediately after . . . [t]he individual establishes any electronic mail or instant message address, or any other designations used in internet communications or postings," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725(1)(f), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requirement to report "[a]ll telephone numbers . . . routinely used by the individual," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(h), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requirement to report "[a]ll electronic mail addresses and instant message addresses . . . routinely used by the individual," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(I), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the requirement to report "[t]he license plate number, registration number, and description of any motor vehicle, aircraft, or vessel . . . regularly operated by the individual," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(j), is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement is enjoined, as applied to Plaintiffs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reserves judgment on whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725a(7) is unconstitutional as applied to John Doe #4 and will request additional briefing in a forthcoming order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reserves judgment on whether it is constitutional for the lifetime registration requirement's incorporation of the requirement to report "[a]ll electronic mail addresses and instant message addresses assigned to the individual . . . and all login names or other identifiers used by the individual when using any electronic mail address or instant messaging system," Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.727(1)(i), to be applied retroactively and will request additional briefing in a forthcoming order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reserves judgment on Plaintiffs' request for costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 32, pending the resolution of the remaining issues in this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered in Defendants favor in all other respects.

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C) The court declines to exclude the answers of law enforcement that Poxson and Granzotto collected.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' motion in limine (Dkt. #87) is DENIED.

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News Article:

Michigan's Sex Offender Registry law is so vague that parts of it are unconstitutional, including the requirement that offenders stay at least 1,000 feet from schools, a federal judge has ruled.

U.S. District Judge Robert Cleland, in a 72-page ruling, struck down several reporting requirements of the 1994 law, which has been amended several times by state lawmakers to make requirements stricter.

Regarding the 1,000-foot school safety zone, he said offenders are left to guess where the zones were and are not provided with enough information from the state to abide by the restriction.

And he struck down several other requirements, including a mandate that offenders report in person new e-mail and instant messaging addresses and notify authorities of all telephone numbers "routinely used by the individual."

The vagueness of the law "leaves law enforcement without adequate guidance to enforce the law and leaves registrants of ordinary intelligence unable to determine when the reporting requirements are triggered," Cleland wrote in his ruling.

The lawsuit was filed in 2012 by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan against Gov. Rick Snyder and Michigan State Police Director Kriste Etue, on behalf of six Michigan residents who are convicted sex offenders required to register. The University of Michigan Clinical Law Program also participated.

The residents argued that the law, and its many amendments, are impossible to follow. Regarding the 1,000-foot rule, they said, "the zones are not physically marked and registrants are not provided with maps demarking the boundaries."