Gautier v Jones

Personally I feel the better way to attack is to show how the state's scheme places the registrant, in a false light before the public eye (certain info -for certain registrants- on registries is protected by federal privacy laws), an actionable tort, and seek millions of dollars damages. Can you imagine if over 700,000 registrants clogged courts with such claims?

2-2-2010 Oklahoma:

Gautier v Jones
No. 09-6123.

Justin Jones, the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, appeals from the district court's summary-judgment ruling that Oklahoma's Sex Offenders Registration Act (OSORA) violates Leland J. Gautier's procedural-due-process rights and may not be enforced unless there is a hearing regarding his current dangerousness. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, and we reverse.

... ... ...

In other words, a convicted sex offender who challenges a registration requirement on the ground that he was not given a hearing to determine whether he is currently dangerous, must at least show that current dangerousness is relevant to the registration requirement. See id. (holding that Connecticut's Megan's Law did not violate procedural due process because "the law's [registration] requirements turn on an offender's conviction alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest").

Here, the OSORA directed the development and use of a three-level screening tool that assigned a "minimum numeric risk level" based on the offense of conviction. 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 2007, ch. 261, § 26 (codified at 57 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 582.5(C) (Supp. 2009)) (emphasis added) (amended 2009).

The tool that was ultimately developed and used in Gautier's case identified his crime as an offense warranting the highest risk level, three. Thus, Gautier's conviction alone was sufficient to place him in the highest level, without regard to any extraneous circumstances bearing on his proclivity to re-offend.

Consequently, even if Gautier could prove he is not currently dangerous, it would not change his risk level, which, at a minimum, is level three. "[D]ue process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme." Conn. Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 4.3

Note: Here I feel the court has erred, "dangerousness" is material to the state's scheme, as that is exactly what the state wants the public to know, how dangerous is this registrant. But as folks can see the court dances around that issue.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court, to the extent of its procedural-due-process ruling, is REVERSED.4