John Does of Connecticut and Florida v Raemisch et al

This is by far the oddest case, start with its Title, then this case is Both UNFAVORABLE and FAVORABLE (Fees), really wild, must read to understand.

1-3-2013 Wisconsin:

John Does of Connecticut and Florida v Raemisch et al
Case No. 10-C-0911.

Plaintiffs, both individuals who had previously been convicted of sexual assault in Wisconsin, brought this action challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin's sex offender registration and notification statute, Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45, 301.46 (2009-10), as applied to individuals whose convictions preceded the statute's effective date. Although constitutional challenges to the retroactivity of similar statutes had been previously been rejected by other courts, including the United States Supreme Court, plaintiffs brought a broad-based challenge against the entire statutory framework. Plaintiffs claimed that the statutes impose punishment in violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions, and that the laws violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. On August 28, 2012, the Court issued an order rejecting in full all but one of plaintiffs' claims. On the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part, finding the § 301.45(10) requirement that plaintiffs pay a $100 annual assessment constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto fine. In all other respects, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion and granted defendants' motion. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), both parties have now filed motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision as to the ex post facto and equal protection issues. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be denied.

Plaintiffs move the Court for reconsideration on several grounds, contending first that the Court erred in failing to find that Wisconsin imposes in-person reporting requirements that make Wisconsin's sex offender registration law materially different than the Alaska law considered in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), and as a result Smith is not controlling. Rather, plaintiffs argue the in-person reporting requirements amount to physical restraints similar to criminal sanctions. Plaintiffs contend that the Court relied on an erroneous characterization of plaintiffs' Statement of Proposed Findings of Fact in concluding that plaintiffs failed to put forth proof of physical restraints on their liberty such that the law's execution is punitive. Second, plaintiffs argue the Court "misapprehended the arbitrariness" of Wisconsin's sex offender registration law with regard to its application to offenders based on the statute's effective date. (Pls.' Recons. Br. 7, ECF No. 61.) As such, plaintiffs contend the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to the favored class and that plaintiffs failed to establish there was no rational basis for disparate treatment under the law was erroneous.

In addition, defendants seek reconsideration of the Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs as to the unconstitutionality of the $100 annual assessment. Defendants contend that the "specific fee issue addressed by the court was not squarely raised prior to the summary judgment decision" and is therefore appropriate for reconsideration. (Defs.' Recons. Br. 2, ECF No. 59.) Defendants assert that the Court incorrectly applied the law in concluding the $100 annual assessment imposed under § 301.45(10) constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto fine.

... ... ...

Defendants also contend that the Court misapplied the law in analyzing Taylor v. State of Rhode Island, 101 F.3d 780 (1st Cir. 1996). Defendants suggest that Taylor counsels in their favor, arguing that the Court should follow Taylor in holding that retroactively imposing a "modest" fee in order to recoup the costs of a supervisory program is reasonable and nonpunitive. However, as already discussed, Taylor assessed a fee imposed to offset costs of services provided to offenders serving parole and probation sentences. 101 F.3d at 783-84. Defendants insist that the principles applied in Taylor are relevant here. However, here, the fee applies even after registrants have completed their sentences, and the registrants receive no benefits from their payment. Rather, the payment of the annual assessment is intended solely to benefit the public by funding a public safety regulatory regime. As such, I remain convinced that the $100 annual fee can only be seen as punitive.

CONCLUSION
In sum, I remain convinced that the $100 annual assessment imposed by Wis. Stat. § 301.45(10) constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto fine, but that the other constitutional defects plaintiffs allege are without merit. The parties' motions for reconsideration fail to show a need to correct manifest errors of law or fact. While the parties generally re-argue their original positions on the constitutional issues and raise several points of disagreement with the Court's analysis, they have not established errors requiring reconsideration.

Accordingly, both plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 60) and defendants' motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 58) are DENIED.