Shepard v Houston

11-7-2014 Nebraska:

Shepard v Houston

Nature of Case:
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-4106(2) (Cum.Supp. 2012) provides for retroactive application of its requirement that all inmates convicted of a felony sex offense or other specified offense submit a DNA sample before being discharged from confinement.

Section 29-4106(2) also specifically provides that those inmates convicted before the passage of § 29-4106 "shall not be released prior to the expiration of his or her maximum term of confinement or revocation or discharge from his or her probation unless and until a DNA sample has been collected." In effect, § 29-4106(2) provides that an inmate will forfeit his or her past and future good time credit if the inmate refuses to submit a DNA sample.

The issue is whether § 29-4106(2), as applied to an inmate who was convicted before its passage, violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, and Neb. Const. art. I, § 16.

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In conclusion, we agree with the district court that insomuch as § 29-4106(2) forfeits Shepard's past and future good time and recalculates his parole eligibility and mandatory discharge dates without regard to any good time, it violates the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.

Shepard, at the time of his crimes, expected to automatically incur good time simply through good conduct, and he expected to have his mandatory discharge date calculated upon his maximum sentence minus good time. Section 29-4106(2), by allowing for forfeiture of more good time than could have been forfeited before and by allowing for forfeiture based on conduct that is something less than flagrant and serious misconduct — indeed, conduct not even contemplated at the time of Shepard's crimes — substantially altered the punitive consequences attached to his crimes.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.