Starkey v Oklahoma DOC

This case can be presented in any court of any state as persuasive authority. Underlying facts would have to be spot on or similar enough to persuade a court to a favorable ruling.

6-25-2013 Oklahoma:

Starkey v Oklahoma DOC

¶ 1 This matter was assigned to this office on February 6, 2013. According to the Record, Plaintiff/Appellee James M. Starkey, Sr., (hereinafter, "Starkey") pled nolo contendere and received a deferred adjudication on October 12, 1998, to a charge of sexual assault upon a minor child in the District Court of Calhoun County, Texas. The act occurred on January 15, 1997, and the age of the victim(s) was 15 years old.1 Under Texas law the act amounted to a second degree felony.2

The Oklahoma Department of Corrections and Justin Jones as Director (hereinafter, "Department") point out in Defendants Oklahoma Department of Corrections And Justin Jones Combined Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment And Motion For Summary Judgment (hereinafter, "response and motion for summary judgment") the equivalent crime of sexual assault under Oklahoma law is found in § 1123 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes; Lewd or Indecent Proposals or Acts to child Under 16. The deferred adjudication provided as follows:

ADJUDICATION DEFERRED PLACED ON COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR TEN (10) YEARS, $4,000.00 FINE, COURT COSTS, 320 CSR HOURS, 60 DAYS IN THE CALHOUN CO JAIL, RESTITUTION, DEFENDANT WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, SEX OFFENDER RULES.

In paragraph (27) of the document entitled "Additional Conditions of Community Supervision" he was required to register under Article 6252-13c.1 of the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program.3

... ... ...

¶ 51 Some additional legal obligations are predicated on SORA registration. One in particular pertains to a sex offender's driver's license or identification card. A person registered under SORA must renew their driver's license or issued identification card every year as opposed to non-registrants who renew every four years.67 Therefore registrants are required to pay four times the amount of a non-registrant.

¶ 57 Currently, SORA provides dissemination of substantial personal information about a sex offender not otherwise readily available from a single governmental source. We do not make any determination of the constitutionality of any of the individual registration requirements but have reviewed the requirements in their totality to address the cumulative effect on the issue of the first Mendoza-Martinez factor and the punitive effect of the act in its totality. We find SORA's registration and notification provisions impose substantial disabilities on registrants. Therefore, we find the first Mendoza-Martinez factor clearly favors a punitive effect.

CONCLUSION

¶ 80 The trial court's Order found the provisions of SORA were not to be retroactively applied. The trial court held the Oklahoma Department of Corrections was to apply the version of SORA in existence at the time Starkey pled nolo contendere to the charge of sexual assault on October 12, 1998, in Texas. Under the trial court's Order, Starkey would only be required to register for the original ten-year period which he had already completed.

¶ 81 We agree with the result of the trial court's Order which found the level assignments were not to be retroactively applied and Starkey is only required to register for 10 years. We find the legislature necessarily implied the provisions of 57 O.S., § 583 as amended in 2004 were to be applied retroactively. Further, we find this retroactive extension of Starkey's registration period from 10 years to 10 years from the date of completion of the sentence violates the ex post facto clause of the Oklahoma Constitution.104 We also find the Department's retroactive application of the level assignment provisions of 57 O.S. Supp. 2007, §§ 582.1-582.5, as amended, violates the ex post facto clause. These level assignments are only to be applied prospectively. We need not address Starkey's due process violation claims because our holding that the level assignments do not apply retroactively is dispositive.

¶ 82 We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding that the date when Starkey pled nolo contendere in Calhoun County Texas, October 12, 1998, is the correct date to determine what Oklahoma law is applicable to him. The Order only indicates he has resided in Oklahoma since 1998. The correct date to apply is when Starkey became subject to SORA registration by entering and intending to be in Oklahoma after his conviction.105 Starkey voluntarily came to Oklahoma and therefore voluntarily subjected himself to SORA after his conviction. Following his conviction, the exact date he entered Oklahoma with the intent to "be in the state" for the requisite period is relevant in determining what version of SORA is applicable. The requirements of the registry to which he must comply would be established upon his entry and intent "to be in" Oklahoma. However in Starkey's case, the applicable provisions of both versions of 57 O.S., § 582 effective during 1998 were the same and the applicable provisions of 57 O.S. Supp. 1997, § 583 were not amended in 1998. Therefore, the exact date when Starkey entered Oklahoma in 1998 does not matter for our analysis. We find the trial court's order is affirmed as modified to apply the date of Starkey's entry with the intent to be in this State following his conviction rather than the actual date of conviction in Texas as the critical point to determine which provisions of SORA would apply to him.

¶ 83 We point out that this decision does not address the requirements of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (SORNA).

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Oklahoma Supreme Court finds state's new sex offender registration requirements punitive and thus limited by ex post facto doctrine

6-28-2013 Oklahoma:

From Sentencing Law and Policy:

As reported in this local article, headlined "Attorney says up to 3,000 registered Oklahoma sex offenders could benefit from ruling," the top court in Oklahoma handed down a major ruling this week limiting the reach of the state's sex offender registration law. Here are the basics:

[T]he court ruling said Corrections Department officials have been violating the Oklahoma Constitution by retroactively applying state sex offender laws, thereby dramatically increasing the time many convicted sex offenders must remain listed on the registry.

Rejoicing in Tuesday's ruling was convicted sex offender Brad Crawford, 58, of Oklahoma City. “It means a lot to me. It gives me freedom. It takes a monkey off my back,” said Crawford, who was convicted in 1998 in Canadian County on a charge of lewd or indecent proposals/acts to a child. “I'm tired of dealing with them and their harassment.”

Crawford lamented that being listed on the registry limits offenders from living where they want and watching their grandkids' baseball games. Registered sex offenders are not allowed to live close to schools, playgrounds or licensed child care centers....

Crawford's crime was peeking over the top of a tanning booth. He said Crawford thought he was sneaking a peek at a woman, which might have brought misdemeanor peeping Tom charges. The “woman” turned out to be a 15-year-old girl who was a day shy of her 16th birthday, so Crawford was convicted of the more severe felony charge of lewd acts with a child....

Crawford originally received a five-year suspended sentence, except for 30 days in the Canadian County jail. He also was placed on the sex offender registry for 10 years....

However, before the 10 years was over, the Oklahoma Legislature passed new laws in 2007 that created a three-tiered risk level assessment system. The law required convicted sex offenders to be placed on the sex offender registry for 15 years, 25 years, or life, depending on their assessment levels....

Jerry Massie, spokesman for the Corrections Department, said department officials are discussing the Court's ruling and expect to post something on the agency's website within the next day or two, explaining how the department will comply with the decision. Preliminary discussions have centered on department officials reviewing the registry and removing the names of sex offenders who appear to qualify under the court's ruling.

Massie said no time frame has been established for such a review, but it “might take a month or so.” At the end of the process, sex offenders who believe they were wrongfully kept on the registry could ask to have their cases reviewed, he said.

The full Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling is available at this link, and here are a few paragraphs from its closing sections:

Here we are not balancing the rights of sex offenders against the rights of their victims. We are making a determination as to whether the means chosen to protect the public have exceeded the state's valid interest in public safety and infringed on the Oklahoma constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Out of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors we have reviewed herein, five favor a punitive effect. It is not the number that is important but the weight of these factors that leads us to our conclusion. SORA's obligations have become increasingly broad and onerous. We find there is clear proof that the effect of the retroactive application of SORA's registration is punitive and outweighs its non-punitive purpose. The retroactive extension of SORA's registration is inconsistent with the ex post facto clause in the Oklahoma Constitution.

This is not to say that Oklahoma's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) is unconstitutional on its face. A sex offender registry is a valid tool for the state to use for public safety. The State may impose registration duties and may publish registration information as part of its punishment of this category of defendants. The Oklahoma Constitution prohibits the addition of sanctions imposed on those who were already convicted before the legislation increasing sanctions and requirements of registration were enacted.

...

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Doe I et al v Williams

This case, or should I say, cases, took place over 6-7 years in court. During that time, to complicate matters, the legislature made other changes in laws. Please read carefully esp. the highlighted parts below.

3-5-2013 Maine:

Doe I et al v Williams
2013 ME 24

John Does [litigants] I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and XLIII, joined by John Does XIX1 and XXIII, appeal from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in favor of numerous State officials on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Does challenge the constitutionality of Maine's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11201-11256 (2012). We affirm the trial court's judgment, concluding that SORNA of 1999 as amended following our decision in State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, does not violate the constitutional rights of the litigants before us.

Given the time it took to resolve this case (6-7 years) the only litigants left at the time of the decision were: John Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII. None of these were eligible for the relief provided by the 2009 Letalien decision. There is no doubt this is a confusing case.

I. BACKGROUND2
[¶ 2] John Doe I was previously before us in Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, 932 A.2d 552. John Doe I pleaded guilty to and was convicted of unlawful sexual contact with a family member, id. ¶ 2, and in 1985 was sentenced to five years' imprisonment with all but sixty days suspended and two years' probation. He has not been convicted of any sex offenses since.

[¶ 3] In 2005, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 to apply retroactively to all sex offenders sentenced on or after January 1, 1982. P.L. 2005, ch. 423, § 1 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202(1) (2012)); see Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 14, 932 A.2d 552.

John Doe I sued several State officials in their official capacities, arguing that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 violated his rights to procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and a civil jury trial, pursuant to the Maine and United States Constitutions. Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 5, 932 A.2d 552. Upon the State officials' motion to dismiss, the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) dismissed John Doe I's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. ¶ 1.

John Doe I appealed, and we concluded that (1) further factual development was required to determine whether SORNA of 1999 was an unconstitutional ex post facto law3 as applied to him,4 and (2) he should not have been foreclosed from pursuing his other theories of relief. Id. ¶¶ 1, 36-37.

We then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on those issues. Id. ¶ 37. On remand, John Doe I's case was consolidated with cases brought by other convicted sex offenders who were also challenging the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999.

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[¶ 4] In 2009, the Legislature created an exception from the duty to register for sex offenders meeting certain criteria who were sentenced on or after January 1, 1982, and before June 30, 1992. P.L. 2009, ch. 365, § B-3 (effective Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) (2009)).5 Sex offenders fall within the exception if, among other criteria, their underlying convictions did not include more than one Class A sex offense or sexually violent offense, they had no prior sex offense convictions, and they had no subsequent convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment of one year or more. 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1)(A)-(F). Because of the newly enacted exception, many of the John Does became eligible for relief from the duty to register and withdrew from the litigation. Some Does who were eligible for relief, however, chose to continue with the litigation along with the Does who were ineligible for relief.

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[¶ 5] We decided Letalien shortly after 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) became effective. Pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1995, Letalien's sentence included a requirement that he register for fifteen years on the State's sex offender registry; the sentence provided that after five years Letalien could seek a waiver "upon a finding that [he] `ha[d] shown a reasonable likelihood that registration is no longer necessary and waiver of the registration requirement is appropriate.'" Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 5, 985 A.2d 4 (quoting 34-A M.R.S.A § 11121(6)(C) (Supp. 1996)). While Letalien was on probation, the Legislature enacted SORNA of 1999, which required him to register for life, prevented him from seeking a waiver, and established additional reporting requirements. Id. ¶¶ 6-8 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (Pamph. 1999))). Letalien challenged SORNA of 1999 as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. Id. ¶ 1. We concluded that SORNA of 1999 "impose[d] an ex post facto punishment as to offenders sentenced in the years before the effective date of [the statute] for whom registration was a required part of their sentence and who were subsequently made subject to the more burdensome requirements." Id.

[¶ 6] In response to the Letalien decision, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 by enacting P.L. 2009, ch. 570 (effective Mar. 30, 2010) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11202-A, 11222, 11225-A (2012)). The amendments extended the exception from registration provided by P.L. 2009, ch. 365, § B-3, making it available to qualifying offenders sentenced through September 18, 1999, the effective date of SORNA of 1999.6 See P.L. 2004, ch. 570, § 1. The amendments also changed the reporting requirements for offenders' registration information, such as residence and place of employment. P.L. 2004, ch. 570, § 4. Ten-year registrants are now subject to annual verification in writing and in-person verification once every five years. 34-A M.R.S. § 11222(4-A). Lifetime registrants are now subject to quarterly verification in writing and in-person verification once every five years. Id. § 11222(4-B). Additionally, if a law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over a registrant or the State Bureau of Identification has "reason to believe the [registrant's] appearance has changed significantly," the agency or Bureau may instruct the registrant to appear in person with a current photograph or to allow a new photograph to be taken, or may instruct the registrant to submit a new photograph without appearing in person. Id. § 11222(4-A)(C)(1)-(2), (4-B)(C)(1)-(2).

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[¶ 7] John Does I, IV, V,7 VI, VIII, and XVI were initially required to register, but successfully petitioned to be removed. John Doe XXIV was also required to register, but he obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his information from being publicly posted; he later successfully petitioned for removal from the registry. John Does VII, XIII, and XVIII obtained temporary restraining orders relieving them from registering, and they were also statutorily relieved of the registration requirement. John Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII8 remain on the registry and have viable claims.

Here we see the various group of litigants (registrants).

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... ... ...

[¶ 21] The two remaining exceptions to mootness, for issues of great public concern and issues capable of repetition, are also unavailable to the Does who have been removed from the registry. Although it is true that the application of SORNA of 1999 is an issue of great public concern that is capable of repetition, the issue will not evade review because the cases of Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII, who remain on the registry, are decided today. Therefore, the claims of the Does who had been removed from the registry are moot.

... ... ...

IV. CONCLUSION

[¶ 84] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision that SORNA of 1999 is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. The Does' other constitutional and statutory challenges are unpersuasive.

The court's decision only applies these Does, that is the key: John Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII remain on the registry and have viable claims. AND, as to them the registry is NOT an ex post facto violation.

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See Article: Court upholds sex offender registration for those convicted before 1999

State copy of decision.

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Important notes made by court during decision:

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I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
[¶ 87] There are several reasons why SORNA of 1999 is punishment and violates the United States Constitution. A look at some of the Mendoza-Martinez factors shows that many of them weigh in favor of finding the statute punitive.

A. Affirmative Disability or Restraint

[¶ 88] We determined in State v. Letalien that "SORNA of 1999 [prior to the ch. 570 amendment] impose[d] a disability or restraint that is neither minor nor indirect" because "quarterly, in-person verification of identity and location of home, school, and employment at a local police station, including fingerprinting and the submission of a photograph, for the remainder of one's life, is undoubtedly a form of significant supervision by the state." 2009 ME 130, ¶ 37, 985 A.2d 4. Now, a lifetime registrant who was sentenced prior to September 18, 1999, is only required to report in writing every ninety days and report in person every five years, unless there has been a change in address or appearance. 34-A M.R.S. § 11222(4-B) (2012). Admittedly, this is a lower physical burden on the offender than predecessor acts' requirements that the offender report every ninety days in person. The level of state supervision, however, has not changed in a material way because the State still maintains and distributes the same amount of highly personal information about the offender.

[¶ 89] The effect of the registration and reporting requirements of SORNA of 1999 is substantially more burdensome than renewing a driver's license. Most notably, if the offender fails to comply with the reporting provisions in SORNA of 1999, he exposes himself to criminal liability, which reflects the punitive effect of the statute. See 34-A M.R.S. § 11227(1) (2012) (providing that the first offense is a Class D crime). In comparison, if an individual chooses not to renew his driver's license he is simply not permitted to drive. Although the changes to SORNA of 1999 have reduced the physical burdens on the offender, the State's supervision and control over the offender have not been reduced. This supervision and control, as we recognized in Letalien, signifies the punitive effect of SORNA of 1999.

B. Historically Regarded as Punishment

[¶ 90] Labeling a law's burden as civil instead of criminal does not reduce the level of punishment attached to the burden, nor should it reduce the constitutional protection connected to the burden.15 Likewise, a burden that was imposed as part of a sentence does not become less punitive if it is later imposed as part of a regulatory requirement that parallels sentencing.
[¶ 91] In Letalien, we provided a detailed description of the evolution of the sex offender registry in Maine. 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 4-12, 985 A.2d 4. One aspect of the registry that has evolved is its relation to sentencing procedures. Beginning in 1996, the registration requirements of SORNA of 1995 were imposed as part of a sentence. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4. Subsequently, the statute was amended to instruct the court to order convicted offenders to register at the time it imposed a sentence, but it was no longer "part of a sentence." P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-13. Although the statutory language removed the registry from the direct realm of sentencing, this change "did not, in itself, make the registration requirements less punitive or otherwise remove the constitutional infirmity." Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 74, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring).

[¶ 92] The stigma associated with publication on the Internet is demonstrative of SORNA of 1999's role as punishment and its punitive effects. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115-16 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the public notification regimen of the registry "calls to mind shaming punishments once used to mark an offender as someone to be shunned"); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1012 & n.98 (Alaska 2008) (noting that the act of registering is not analogous to shaming, but the dissemination provision is analogous). The public does not have access to the pictures, home addresses, and work places of those convicted of robbery, arson, embezzlement, or any other crime. We acknowledge that there is a stigma connected to any criminal behavior and there often is retribution by the public against those who have committed crimes. However, in no other area of the criminal law do we allow the public to have access to such personal information. Because these Does have not committed additional sex crimes since they completed their sentences, they were not required to be on a registry when the registry system was first created. Placing them on the registry now forces them to face additional public ridicule. See Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf (discussing the serious impact the dissemination of registration information has on the registrants).

[¶ 93] In State v. Freeman we found that the civil proceeding by which some OUI laws were enforced had punitive consequences of the type that characterize criminal prosecution. 487 A.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Me. 1985) (finding the statute void because its purpose was frustrated). In our analysis of the civil OUI proceeding, we considered, in part, the effect that the pre-charging mechanism for OUI defendants had on one's reputation. Id. at 1178.16 In this consideration, we noted that the stigma from the pre-charging mechanism associated with the civil proceeding for the OUI offense paralleled the stigma associated with the criminal proceeding. Id. As a result, we found that the stigma was "highly suggestive of the true criminal nature of the procedure." Id.; see also State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703, 708 (Me. 1983) (noting the lack of criminal stigma regarding the decriminalization of traffic offenses).

[¶ 94] Sex offenders who are required to register are subjected to stigma in part due to the underlying offense, but also in part due to the dissemination of information. The registry makes significant personal information readily available to the public.17 The impact of this dissemination is heightened by the use of the Internet, thus correlating the dissemination "to the shaming and branding punishments used in colonial times." Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 55, 932 A.2d 552 (Alexander and Silver, JJ., concurring). As discussed below in relation to the traditional aims of punishment, the stigma associated with Internet publication has the potential to cause "retributive and vigilante violence against registrants." Id. The historic connection to criminal sentencing and shaming, along with the retribution and deterrence discussed below, demonstrate SORNA of 1999's punitive effect.

C. Traditional Aims of Punishment

[¶ 95] SORNA of 1999 promotes retribution and deterrence, especially as it relates to Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII. Such characteristics are present regardless of the intent of the Legislature. As the Indiana Supreme Court said in its discussion of that state's sex offender registration act:

It is true that to some extent the deterrent effect of the registration and notification provisions of the Act is merely incidental to its regulatory function. And we have no reason to believe the Legislature passed the Act for purposes of retribution—vengeance for its own sake. Nonetheless it strains credulity to suppose that the Act's deterrent effect is not substantial, or that the Act does not promote community condemnation of the offender, both of which are included in the traditional aims of punishment.

Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 382 (Ind. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Although we accept that SORNA of 1999 is not intended as retribution for sex offenders' crimes, it has that effect, due, in part, to its tendency to stigmatize the registrant. As a result, "[i]t promotes community condemnation in its most extreme form: vigilantism." Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 75, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring).

[¶ 96] As discussed in prior SORNA cases, and cited with concern by the Does in this case, acts of violence against those registered on the Maine Sex Offender Registry are not unknown. In 2006, "a Canadian man targeted and murdered two Maine sex offenders, who[m] he had located on Maine's registry website." Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 56 n.21, 932 A.2d 552 (Alexander and Silver, JJ., concurring); see also Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 75, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring). More recent iterations of SORNA continue to invite the possibility of vigilantism by providing access to the registry via Maine's registry website. The use of the Internet registries allows anyone, anywhere in the world, to have unlimited access to the information.

[¶ 97] In addition to exposing the offenders to acts of vigilantism, there is evidence that registries do not achieve their primary objective of protecting the public. See 34-A M.R.S. § 11201 (2012) ("The purpose of this chapter is to protect the public from potentially dangerous registrants and offenders by enhancing access to information concerning those registrants and offenders."). See also Kristen M. Zgoba & Karen Bachar, National Institute of Justice, Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Limited Effect in New Jersey 2 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225402.pdf (finding that the sex offender registry did not reduce the number of rearrests for sex offenses or the number of victims of sexual offenses). Instead, the registry may promote criminally deviant behavior by socially isolating offenders. See J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make us Less Safe?, Regulation, Summer 2012, at 50 (discussing the "negative collateral consequences" for registrants, including loss of social ties, that may cause an increase in criminal behavior). As Justice Brennan noted in Trop v. Dulles, "I can think of no more certain way in which to make a man in whom, perhaps, rest the seeds of serious antisocial behavior more likely to pursue further a career of unlawful activity than to place on him the stigma of the derelict, uncertain of many of his basic rights." 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring). SORNA of 1999 clearly promotes retribution and deterrence by inadvertently creating an environment where the Does are stigmatized in a way that may invite violent attacks and stall rehabilitation.

Doe v Keathley

6-16-2009 Missouri:

Doe v Keathley
290 S.W.3d 719 (2009)

Note 1-27-2013: There is a good possibility this case was wrongly decided, however until someone challenges it, it will stand a precedent for Missouri sex offenders. AWA has a provision which effectively says: If the state has a Supreme court decision allowing certain registrants to NOT REGISTER because of a conflict with the state's constitution, then they do not have to under AWA. 42 USC 16925(b). It seems Keathley missed that AWA provision:

Doe v. Keathley, 2009 - Missouri Supreme Court held that the federal SORNA imposes an independent obligation on sex offenders living in Missouri to register, even if they would not been required to register under state law. As a result of the Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion in Keathley, all sex offenders living in Missouri must register. For those individuals convicted of sex offenses prior to 1995, the retrospective law argument has been rendered moot.

From Doe v Keathley:

In this case, respondents are subject to the independent, federally mandated registration requirements under the Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA provides, inter alia, that "[a] sex offender shall register... in each jurisdiction where the offender resides." 42 U.S.C. section 16913. A "sex offender" is "an individual who was convicted of a sex offense." 42 U.S.C. section 16911(1). A "sex offense" includes a "criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." 42 U.S.C. section 16911(6). SORNA applies to individuals who committed a sex offense prior to July 20, 2006. 42 U.S.C. section 16913(d); 28 C.F.R., section 72.3. Therefore, SORNA imposes an independent obligation requiring respondents to register as sex offenders in Missouri. The independent registration requirement under SORNA operates irrespective of any allegedly retrospective state law that has been enacted and may be subject to the article I, section 13 ban on the enactment of retrospective state laws. Consequently, the circuit court erred in concluding that respondents are exempt from registration by virtue of article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. The judgment is reversed.

All concur.

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Now see a 2011 decision Doe (A different Doe) v Keathley. Especially the conclusion:

... Indeed, the sentence of the Attorney General's statement immediately preceding the sentence on which Doe relies states categorically that "SORNA's requirements apply to all sex offenders, regardless of when they were convicted," 76 Fed.Reg. at 1639, recognizing the distinction between an offender's statutory obligation to register, on the one hand, and a State's efforts to ensure that offenders in fact comply, on the other. Second, Doe's petition only sought relief on the basis that he had not been "convicted" of a sex offense within the meaning of the statute. He did not allege that he should be exempted from SORNA's registration requirements because he had completed his involvement in Missouri's criminal justice system at the time the statute became effective. Doe is not entitled to relief on a ground he did not assert in the circuit court.

Make sure your petition alleges the correct issues, the outcome may control whether or not you must register under SORNA.

State v Hough

12-3-2012 Indiana:

State v Hough
No. 64A05-1203-MI-113.

Terry Hough ("Hough") filed a petition in Porter Superior Court requesting that his name be removed from Indiana's sex offender registry. Specifically, Hough, who was convicted of rape in Pennsylvania in 1993, argued that his name should be removed from the registry pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009). The trial court granted Hough's petition and the State appeals.

Specifically, the State argues that Hough should not be removed from the sex offender registry because he would still be required to register under Pennsylvania's registry law, and he has an independent duty to register as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
In 1993, Hough was convicted of rape in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. He was ordered to serve two to five years incarceration. Hough was released to parole in 1997, and he completed his parole in 1998. Shortly after completing his parole, Hough moved to Indiana.

Pennsylvania enacted its first sex offender registry law, known as Megan's law, in 1996, while Hough was incarcerated in that jurisdiction. But Pennsylvania officials did not require Hough to register as a sex offender upon release from incarceration and/or parole because he notified Pennsylvania officials of his move to Indiana. Hough was told that he would be subject to Indiana's registration requirement, and he did register in Indiana. Appellant's App. p. 32. Hough also registered in Illinois because he was employed in that state. However, in 2007, Hough received a notice from the State of Illinois that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. Appellant's App. p. 34.

On August 19, 2010, Hough filed a petition to remove himself from the Indiana sex offender registry. Hough claimed that he should be removed because his conviction occurred before Indiana and Pennsylvania enacted their sex offender registry laws, and argued that, pursuant to Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009), his petition should be granted. In response, the State argued that under Pennsylvania's current sex offender registry law, Hough would be required to register for life, and therefore, Wallace is inapplicable to Hough's situation. The State also claimed that Hough has an independent duty to register under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.

After holding a hearing on Hough's petition, the trial court issued an order granting Hough's petition to remove his name from the Indiana sex offender registry. The State filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied on February 10, 2012. The State now appeals.

....

Likewise, in the case before us, Indiana is the only state that currently requires Hough to register as a sex offender, and he has resided in our state since 1998. Pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Wallace, to continue to require that Hough register as a sex offender for a conviction pre-dating the enactment of INSORA would violate Indiana's constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. See Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 24; 905 N.E.2d at 384. For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order granting Hough's petition to remove his name from the Indiana sex offender registry. Affirmed.

State -v- Letalein

This decision ONLY applies to CERTAIN Maine registrants (See highlights below)

12-22-2009 Maine:

State -v- Letalein
(985 A.2d 4 (2009))

The State of Maine appeals from a judgment dismissing a criminal complaint charging Eric S. Letalien with failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999) (Class D), 34-A M.R.S. § 11227(1) (2008). The District Court (Lewiston, Stanfill, J.) concluded that the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999, as applied to Letalien, violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws contained in both the United States and Maine Constitutions.

The State asserts, among other things, that the trial court erred in conducting its ex post facto analysis of SORNA of 1999 on an as-applied basis and that a proper facial examination of SORNA of 1999 demonstrates that because the statute is civil in intent and effect, it may be applied retroactively without violating ex post facto principles.

We agree that the determination of the constitutionality of the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 depends on a facial examination of the statute, and not on an as-applied analysis as we previously suggested in Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, 932 A.2d 552.

We conclude that the statute imposes an ex post facto punishment as to offenders sentenced in the years before the effective date of SORNA of 1999 for whom registration was a required part of their sentence and who were subsequently made subject to the more burdensome requirements of SORNA of 1999 after its effective date of September 18, 1999. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Note: It appears that Maine allows its judges to -sentence- a defendant to the registry. This is rather unique!