Carbondale approves settlement in lawsuit

3-17-15 Pennsylvania:

CARBONDALE — A lawsuit against Carbondale moved one step closer to settlement after city council approved a $50,000 payment.

In a suit filed last year, Leo Conway of Archbald claimed his son, Patrick, was among 15 sex offenders registered under Megan’s Law in the city but the only one forced to move under an ordinance that precluded registered sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school, park or other areas where children might gather.

In July 2012, Mayor Justin Taylor contacted the Conways’ landlord and advised him that Patrick Conway’s presence violated the city’s ordinance and directed him to evict the men, according to the lawsuit. Mr. Conway argued a 2011 state Supreme Court decision in another case made Carbondale’s law unconstitutional.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstates child porn charges in Lehigh County sexting case

1-25-2014 Pennsylvania:

Top state court says county judge erred in dismissing porn charges against girl.

A video of a teenage girl and boy engaged in a sex act circulated among Allentown youths for at least a year before another girl was charged with possession and distribution of child pornography for posting it on Facebook.

Although a Lehigh County judge agreed with the girl's attorneys that the charges were "an overreaction by law enforcement" and dismissed them in 2012, the state Supreme Court on Thursday reversed his decision.

The girl, identified in court papers only as C.S., must return to Lehigh County juvenile court to face felony charges in a case that raises new questions about where poor judgment by sexting teens ends and criminal exploitation by child pornographers begins.

Lehigh County Assistant District Attorney Heather Gallagher said police and prosecutors do not believe what C.S. did was sexting, the term used to describe the practice of sending sexually explicit photos, videos or messages using cellphones or computers.

Juvenile Law Center Wins Second Ruling Declaring Pennsylvania's Juvenile Sex Offender Registration Requirements Unconstitutional

1-17-2014 Pennsylvania:

For the second time in the last three months, a Pennsylvania judge has ruled that Pennsylvania’s juvenile sex offender registration requirements are unconstitutional. On January 16, 2014, Monroe County Court of Common Pleas President Judge Margherita Patti-Worthington ruled that Pennsylvania's law requiring juveniles convicted of sexual offenses be subjected to lifetime sex offender registration violates their rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Read Judge Patti-Worthington’s opinion here.)

In 2012, the General Assembly enacted new legislation (SORNA) requiring children convicted of certain sexual offenses to register for life on a sex offender registry. Shortly after the law went into effect, Juvenile Law Center, along with local counsel, Syzane Arifaj of the Monroe County Public Defender’s Office, filed motions on behalf of five youth adjudicated delinquent for offenses committed prior to the law’s effective date. The motions challenged SORNA under several provisions of the Pennsylvania and Federal constitutions as well as the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.

In a well-reasoned decision, the Monroe County Court held that registration is unconstitutional because it infringes on the youths’ fundamental right to reputation and creates an irrebuttable presumption of dangerousness in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s guarantee of due process. The Court based its decision on a historical analysis of the right to reputation and due process in Pennsylvania, as well as a review of SORNA’s impact on youth as compared to previous versions of Megan’s Law.

The Court drew upon recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence to find that the label of “sex offender” creates harm to a youth’s reputation because it connotes a degree of dangerousness not typically present among youthful offenders. “Being a child implies a unique reputation in our society … Children’s habits are not solidified and this is contemplated in the law ... Where a child’s serious transgressions might have been looked on with a more lenient eye, especially as time passed and wounds were healed, [SORNA] will remind us that this person is a sexual offender and this reminder will persist for the rest of the juvenile’s life.”

The Court also considered the rate of recidivism among youth who commit sexual offenses to determine that the statute is not narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest in protecting the community. The extremely low rate of recidivism indicates that children are not dangerous and therefore do not require costly and burdensome monitoring and registration well into their adulthoods. The lack of any individualized inquiry prior to the imposition of registration further renders SORNA problematic. This presumption that the youth are dangerous without an opportunity to be heard until twenty-five years have passed does not provide meaningful due process.

Juvenile Law Center also challenged SORNA on behalf of juveniles subject to registration in Lancaster County, PA. We are awaiting a decision in that case.

In November 2013, Juvenile Court Judge John C. Uhler of York County, PA ruled SORNA unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions (In the Interest of J.B. et al.). This case is currently on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Petitioners were represented by Marsha L. Levick and Riya Saha Shah of Juvenile Law Center, and Syzane Arifaj of the Monroe County Public Defender’s Office. The Defender Association of Philadelphia also contributed assistance to the briefing. ..Source.. by Juvenile Law Center

Appeals court reinstates indictment against McKeesport man who failed to register as sex offender

1-15-2014 Pennsylvania:

USA V Blake Brown Jr

When it comes to an exemption in the federal sex offender registration law, “not more than four years” means no more than 1,461 days, a federal appeals court ruled Wednesday in a precedential ruling.

A three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court of Appeals ordered U.S. District Judge Joy Flowers Conti to reinstate the indictment of Blake Brown, 28, of McKeesport, who is charged with failing to register after he moved to Pennsylvania from New York. He was arrested in 2011 during a regional sweep by law enforcement of unregistered sex offenders.

Brown was convicted in 2003 in Florida for lewd molestation of a 13 year old when he was 17 years old, the ruling says. The registration law exempts people convicted of consensual acts when the victim was at least 13 and they were “not more than four years older.”

Brown was four years and four months older than his victim. Conti ruled that the federal law was ambiguous about whether the calculation should include only whole years or include months or days. The appeals court said anything past 1,461 days is more than four years. ..Source.. by Tribune-Review

Sex offender disputes claim he moved

We wonder, as to the vehicle address, under Pennsylvania DMV code, is anyone who fails to change addresses -on vehicle registrations- likewise prosecuted? Or whether vehicles towed or otherwise impounded are checked and prosecuted likewise if addresses are different between licensed owners and registered vehicle addresses. In addition, does MV code charge a felony for incorrect motor vehicle addresses?

1-8-2014 Pennsylvania:

WILKES-BARRE — Police say convicted sex offender Cyrus Spencer moved without informing authorities, as required under Megan’s Law, and that he admitted as much to officers.

Spencer’s response? Prove it.

Defense attorney Allyson Kacmarski has filed a motion on Spencer’s behalf in Luzerne County Court, seeking a hearing in connection with the allegations against her client, arguing the prosecution does not have enough evidence to prove its case.

Luzerne County Judge Michael T. Vough on Monday scheduled the hearing to take place at 2 p.m. Feb. 7.

According to an affidavit filed by state police, Newport Township Police Chief Jeremy Blank told Trooper Martin Connors that on Jan. 4, 2013, he went to a home on Miner Avenue, Wanamie, in connection with an unrelated incident.

While there, Blank told Connors, he encountered Spencer, who told the chief he was living at the address, according to the affidavit. A records check revealed that Spencer was a Megan’s Law offender listed as living on Essex Lane in Wilkes-Barre.

In March 2000, a Luzerne County jury Wednesday found Spencer, then of Hunlock Township, guilty of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl. The following month, county Judge Mark Ciavarella sentenced Spencer to a state prison term of six to 12 years.

State records show that Spencer, 48, is a Tier 3 offender and must register for life. State police must be notified of any change of address within three days.

Newport police said they returned to the Miner Avenue residence the following week and took statements from Spencer and his girlfriend indicating that they had moved into the apartment on Jan. 1, 2013. Police said they also obtained a written statement from the landlord — the girlfriend’s father — who said the couple moved in on Jan. 1.

On Jan. 18, 2013, Spencer’s girlfriend was cited with a traffic violation while driving his car, which was then towed, police said. Spencer called Blank a short time later to ask where the vehicle was, and the chief told him “he could be towed for numerous violations including failure to change his address and his motor vehicle registration,” the affidavit says.

Later that day, according to police, Spencer arrived at the police station to drop off a change of address form for his license and vehicle registration, which indicated he had moved on Jan. 1.

Spencer is facing two counts of failure to address/be photographed, a felony.

According to the motion filed by Kacmarski, the defense does not believe the prosecution can establish a case. ..Source.. by Roger DuPuis

Megan's Law offender granted new trial

1-8-2014 Pennsylvania:

A man awaiting trial on homicide charges can have a new trial on his alleged failure to register as a sex offender, the state Superior Court ruled Tuesday.

Joseph Walter Derhammer, 43, is entitled to a new trial because he was apparently not informed he could waive the right to a jury trial, the panel of three state judges determined.

Derhammer is also awaiting trial on criminal homicide charges related to the April 13, 2009 arson fire that caused the death of his ex-girlfriend Nancy Kostelnick, 48, and her daughter Carolyn "C.J." Kostelnick, 23.

Police said the porch of the Kostelnicks' house at 46 Chester St., Wilkes-Barre, was set alight using combustible materials, which created a fast-moving fire. The Kostelnicks died from carbon monoxide poisoning.

While investigating the fire, law enforcement officials discovered Derhammer's alleged failure to register as a sex offender. He committed involuntary deviate sexual intercourse in 1995, records show.

Derhammer had moved out of the Kostelnicks' house on April 1, 2009, but did not register until five days later. Megan's Law requires sex offenders to register within two days of changing addresses.

After a 90-minute trial on March 3, 2011, former Luzerne County judge Lewis Wetzel found Derhammer guilty of the Megan's Law violation. Derhammer appealed, and the commonwealth and superior courts reversed the sentence on the grounds that the record is "devoid of any indication that anyone informed Derhammer of his waiver rights." ..Source.. by CitizensVoice.com

Pennsylvania Supreme Court throws out parts of Megan's Law

This problem may be short lived, but correcting the mess caused by this -Legislative Error-, will be a disaster. Some folks may have to be released from prison or probation after having certain convictions overturned. All Lawmakers need to read their State Constitutions. Now if folks remember, Pennsylvania recently became SORNA Compliant according to the SMART Office. Welcome to the world of Chaos.

UPDATE: Just so folks know, this decision did not say "Megan's Law" is invalid, it said, the way CERTAIN provisions of "Megan's Law" was enacted in Pennsylvania ONLY was incorrect. Their state constitution says "enact laws ___this way__" and they failed to follow that way; a procedural legislative error, nothing more. However, correcting anything that was done pursuant to the resulting law (i.e., FTR charges, and other things) will be a disaster undoing (correcting) them.

12-17-2013 Pennsylvania:

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court threw out portions of the state's sex-offender registration law on Monday, telling lawmakers they violated the constitution's requirement that bills that become law must be confined to a single subject.

The justices ruled that a set of changes made to Megan's Law in 2004 was not constitutional, noting that the legislation also included such measures as a two-year statute of limitations on asbestos actions, the jurisdictional parameters of park police, and revisions to real estate law.

Pennsylvania's Constitution
Article III
Form of BillsSection 3.
No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.

The court then put its decision on hold for three months to allow the Legislature to find a remedy.

"We will stay our decision, as we have done under similar circumstances, in order to provide a reasonable amount of time for the General Assembly to consider appropriate remedial remedies, and to allow for a smooth transition period," wrote Justice Debra Todd for the five-justice majority.

As revised in 2004, Megan's law created a searchable online database of offenders, set new punishments for offenders who did not register, and added luring and institutional sexual assault to the list of offenses that require 10-year registration.

It also set notification rules for out-of-state offenders who move to Pennsylvania, altered duties of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, and established community notification about sexually violent offenders.

Todd said the single-subject rule, which dates to 1864 and has recently been a factor in several high-profile cases, gives people confidence they can weigh in before a bill is passed, and helps lawmakers know what they are voting on ahead of time.

"When an act of the Legislature violates the single-subject rule, all of its provisions are equally repugnant to the constitution, and, thus, equally void," Todd said.

Chief Justice Ronald Castille filed a lone dissent, saying it was a close question but that he would have upheld the law.

"Any law passing through the enactment process is the result of salutary legislative compromise and the single-subject rule is not intended to completely discourage such compromise," Castille wrote.

Steve Miskin, a spokesman for the House Republican caucus, noted that revisions to Megan's Law enacted two years ago that brought Pennsylvania into compliance with the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act were drafted with an eye toward the case the court just decided.

Com v Hainesworth

12-13-2013 Pennsylvania:

Com v Hainesworth

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from an order entered on December 19, 2012, by the Honorable John Blahovec of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.

That order states that Appellee, Deono Terrell Hainesworth, is not required to register as a sex offender under Act 111 of 2011, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10, et. seq., also known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).

The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in determining that Hainesworth is not subject to the registration requirements of SORNA.

After careful review, we conclude that the court did not err when it ordered specific enforcement of the parties’ plea bargain. Accordingly, we affirm.

Lifetime registration unconstitutional for sex offenders

This case is being appealed, see lower paragraph.

11-28-2013 Pennsylvania:

York County judge orders state police to remove seven teens from sex offender registry

Seven local teens facing lifetime registration as sex offenders just got a pass.

A local judge has found the lifetime registration requirement for juveniles to be unconstitutional.

Drawing heavily on last year's U.S. Supreme Court ruling that found mandatory life sentences for juvenile killers unconstitutional, Senior Judge John C. Uhler has held that lifetime registration for juvenile sex offenders also is unconstitutional for many of the same reasons.

In a 41-page analysis and opinion issued Nov. 4, Uhler ruled that the recently implemented Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violates the constitutional rights of juveniles because, while it also conflicts with the purposes of the state's Juvenile Act, it has created the same "one size fits all" feature that the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional in juvenile murder sentencing.

District Attorney Tom Kearney said he will appeal Uhler's decision.

"We have to," Kearney said Monday. "It puts us in a position where one county is handling matters differently from other counties. The appellate courts will have to decide this."

Uhler noted there was little debate on how the law, which came into effect on Dec. 20, 2012, would affect juvenile offenders.

At the time, he stated, legislators seemed more keen on closing a Megan's Law loophole as it pertained to adult transient and homeless sex offenders.

The law was passed pursuant to federal requirements.

Under SORNA, juveniles adjudicated guilty or who admitted to rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse or aggravated indecent assault, are required to register with the state police for life.

The seven juveniles whose cases were considered by Uhler all had been adjudicated or made admissions before SORNA was enacted.

In his opinion, Uhler agreed that Pennsylvania's juvenile courts were created "to provide guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to affix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment."

Referring to the U.S. Supreme Court rulings that banned mandatory life without parole for juveniles, Uhler agreed that "children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes ... (because of their) diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform."

Uhler also took into account the wealth of research that shows recidivism among juvenile sex offenders is extremely low.

And although the legislature intended SORNA to be non-punitive, Uhler found the opposite.

SORNA's registration requirements are significantly more stringent than Megan's Law, Uhler held. Uhler also agreed that the "law is not reasonably designed to fulfill its purported function" and that it constitutes additional punishment.

"This court finds the SORNA provisions pertaining to juveniles are punitive and violate the ex post facto (retroactivity) clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions," Uhler wrote.

In acknowledging Uhler's decision, the Philadelphia-based Juvenile Law Center called it a "landmark ruling." Deputy director and chief counsel Marsha Levick said on the center's website, "Kids are different. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and as dictated by research, children may not be punished like adults in our justice system.

"As a court of second chances, juvenile court cannot impose lifetime penalties on children who we know are uniquely capable of turning their lives around and contributing to their communities."

Registration requirements for sex offenders

Following is the required information juvenile sex offenders must provide Pennsylvania State Police for the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act.

• Names and aliases
• All addresses and residences
• Employment
• School enrollment
• All phone numbers
• Plate numbers and registration numbers for motor vehicles, including boats and planes
• Any temporary lodging
• Information on all Internet and social media accounts
• Occupational and professional licenses

Under SORNA, Tier III juvenile offenders -- those adjudicated or who have admitted to committing or attempting rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault and other specified crimes -- are to report in person to a designated authority every 90 days.

The juvenile also must report in person to notify authorities of any changes in registration information within three business days.

There is a mandatory minimum three-year prison sentence for the first failure to report and a five-year prison sentence for the first failure to provide accurate information.

On Nov. 4, York County Senior John C. Uhler ruled the lifetime registration requirement is unconstitutional.

On Monday, York County District Attorney Tom Kearney said he will appeal Uhler's ruling. ..Source.. by Rick Lee

Man disputes Megan’s Law registration

9-24-2012 Pennsylvania:

WILKES-BARRE – A man who says he should be excluded from registering under Megan’s Law after pleading guilty to a corruption of minors charge will not have to – for now — a county senior judge said Tuesday.

Traian Jovanov, 28, with a last known address of Pine Street, Hazleton, said in court papers last month that his plea agreement did not include the specification that he needs to register under Megan’s Law while out of prison, and therefore should not have to.

Jovanov is on probation and residing in Luzerne County, according to court papers.

In March 2007, Jovanov was sentenced to 40 to 80 months in prison on an unrelated escape charge and two years house arrest on the corruption of minors charge.

Police said Jovanov had inappropriate contact with a juvenile female in April 2006. He was originally charged with a number of crimes, include rape and indecent assault.

In the escape case, investigators say Jovanov was serving a sentence on drug and receiving stolen property charges at the Luzerne County Correctional Facility in March 2006 and was on work release.

Investigators said Jovanov did not return to the prison after completing a work shift.

Jovanov’s attorney, Tom Marsilio, said in court papers that nothing at the time required his client to register under Megan’s Law, but that now the county probation office is requiring Jovanov to do so.

After a hearing Tuesday, county Senior Judge Chester Muroski said Jovanov’s requirement to register is put on hold until the outcome of an appeal determining those specific issues in the case. ..Source.. by Sheena DeLazio

Commonwealth v Wilgus

Since this case the legislature has changed the law..

6-26-2009 Pennsylvania:

Commonwealth v Wilgus

¶ 1 We are called on to decide whether the Legislature, in requiring a Megan's Law offender to register his “residence,” included within the requirement the circumstances of this case in which the defendant is a homeless and transient person.

¶ 2 The defendant William Howard Wilgus (Wilgus) was released from prison and, after being turned away from various housing programs, lived on the streets of downtown Harrisburg for 30 days before being arrested for not registering his “residence” as required by Megan's Law.   He was convicted in a non-jury trial, but the trial judge set aside his conviction and dismissed the charges.   The trial judge concluded Wilgus did not have a “residence” to register and, therefore, had not violated Megan's Law.

¶ 3 We conclude the Legislature could have drafted the Megan's Law registration requirement to require a homeless and transient person to register, but it did not, and, consequently, we agree the conviction must be set aside.

---

6-27-2009 Pennsylvania:

A state Superior Court panel ruled Friday that convicted sexual offenders cannot be held subject to Megan's Law registration requirements if they are homeless.

In upholding a Dauphin County judge, the state appellate court found that William H. Wilgus should not have been prosecuted for violating the requirements to register his address with state police since after being released from prison in 2007 on sexual assault charges, he could not find a home.

The court said Wilgus unsuccessfully tried to find housing at Bethesda Mission and several other shelters and ended up living in alleys around Second and Market streets near the county courthouse.

The court said the definition of residence in the law and its purpose to inform neighbors makes it clear that the law cannot apply to transients. The three-judge panel suggested the state Legislature could amend the law to address the situation. ..Source.. by PETE SHELLEM, Of The Patriot-News

Miller v Skumanick

3-30-2009 Pennsylvania:

Miller v Skumanick
605 F.Supp.2d 634 (2009)

Before the court is plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Having been briefed and a hearing having been held, the matter is ripe for disposition.

Background
At issue in this case is the practice of "sexting," which has become popular among teenagers in recent years. (Complaint (Doc. 1) (hereinafter "Complt.") at ¶ 7). According to the plaintiffs, this is "the practice of sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over the Internet." (Id.). Typically, the subject takes a picture of him- or herself with a digital camera or cell phone camera, or asks someone else to take that picture. (Id. at ¶ 8). That picture is stored as a digitized image and then sent via the text-message or photo-send function on a cell phone, transmitted by computer through electronic mail, or posted to an internet website like Facebook or MySpace. (Id. ¶ 9). This practice is widespread among American teenagers; studies show approximately 20% of Americans age 13-19 have done it. (Id. ¶ 10).

Images and Threatened Prosecutions
In October 2008, Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania School District officials confiscated several students' cell phones, examined them and discovered photographs of "scantily clad, semi-nude and nude teenage girls." (Id. at ¶ 12). Many of these girls were enrolled in the district. (Id.). The School District reported that male students had been trading these images over their cell phones. (Id. at ¶ 13).

The School District turned the phones over to Defendant Skumanick, the District Attorney of Wyoming County, Pennsylvania. (Id. at ¶ 13). Skumanick began a criminal investigation. (Id.). In November 2008, Skumanick stated publically to local newspaper reporters and a district assembly at Tunkhannock High School that students who possess inappropriate images of minors could be prosecuted under Pennsylvania law for possessing or distributing child pornography, 18 PENN. STAT. § 6312, or criminal use of a communication facility, 18 PENN. STAT. § 7512. (Id. at ¶ 15). Skumanick pointed out that these charges were felonies that could result in long prison terms and would give even juveniles a permanent record. (Id. at ¶ 16). Defendant contends that if found guilty of these crimes, the three minor plaintiffs would probably be subject to registration as sex offenders under Pennsylvania's Registration of Sexual Offenders Act ("Meghan's Law"), 42 P.S. § 9791, for at least ten years and have their names and pictures displayed on the state's sex-offender website. (Id. at ¶ 17).

... ... ...

The court agrees with the plaintiffs that the public interest would be served by issuing a TRO in this matter as the public interest is on the side of protecting constitutional rights. This factor too supports issuing a TRO.

Conclusion
Upon balancing the TRO factors, we find that each factor weighs in favor of granting the TRO. Accordingly, we will grant the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. An appropriate order follows.

ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 30th day of March 2009, the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 2) is hereby GRANTED. The defendant, Wyoming County District Attorney George Skumanick, and his officials, employees, agents and assigns, are hereby ENJOINED from initiating criminal charges against plaintiffs Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly and Nancy Doe for the two photographs at issue. This order shall be effective immediately.

A hearing on plaintiffs' request for a Preliminary Injunction will be held on June 2, 2009. A scheduling order will follow.

Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file the original complaint and proceed under pseudonyms and for a protective order (Doc. 3) is hereby GRANTED.

Plaintiffs' motion to compel the defendant to produce the photographs in question (Doc. 4) is hereby DENIED as moot. The defendant has supplied plaintiffs with the photographs.

Article: 3rd Circuit Panel Mulls if Teen 'Sexting' Is Child Pornography

US v Miller

2-5-2010 Pennsylvania:

US v Miller
594 F.3d 172 (2010)

Appellant Donald R. Miller was sentenced to thirty months' imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release following his conviction for possession of child pornography and possession of marijuana. The District Court imposed eight special conditions of supervised release, including a restriction on internet access, mandatory computer monitoring, and a limitation on association with minors. On appeal, Miller challenges the duration of his term of supervised release and four of the eight special conditions.

We agree with Miller that the lifetime limitation on internet use is a greater restraint of liberty than is reasonably necessary and that the restriction on his association with minors is overbroad. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

US v Heckman

1-11-2010 Pennsylvania:

US v Heckman
592 F.3d 400 (2010)

Arthur William Heckman was indicted and pled guilty to one count of transporting child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1).1 He was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. On appeal, Heckman challenges three "Special Conditions of Supervision" imposed by the District Court for the remainder of Heckman's life:

• 1) an unconditional ban on Internet access;
• 2) a requirement that he participate in a mental health program; and
• 3) a restriction on any interaction with minors.

While we affirm the mental health condition, we vacate the other challenged conditions and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

... ... ...

Cases involving child pornography are among the most troubling we encounter. The victims are innocent and defenseless, the materials illicit and timeless.16 Heckman emailed 18 images of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct to a stranger in an Internet chat room. This was only the latest offense by a lifelong sexual predator, and it was appropriate for the District Court to sentence him to 15 years' imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release.

Yet the Court's discretion in these matters (though justifiably broad) is not unlimited. When imposing special conditions of supervised release, it is limited to those conditions that "involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Furthermore, the Court may not delegate to a probation officer the authority to "decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer." Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250. In vacating certain of the District Court's special conditions in this case, we do not mean to question the need for release supervision responsive to Heckman's specific offense and his lifetime of misdeeds. To do so, however, requires a balancing of considerations that affect not only this case, but those that follow.

For these reasons, we affirm the mental health condition imposed by the District Court as one of the conditions of supervised release. However, we vacate the special conditions pertaining to Internet access and interaction with minors. Thus we remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Reynolds v US

11-2-2009 Pennsylvania:

Reynolds v US
132 S.Ct. 975 (2012)
181 L. Ed. 2d 935

Third Circuit Decision Appealed From:
US v Reynolds

On Remand from the US Sup court see below where it says ON REMAND:

The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Act), 120 Stat. 590, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. III), requires those convicted of certain sex crimes to provide state governments with (and to update) information, such as names and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender registries. §§ 16912(a), 16913-16914, 16919(a) (2006 ed.). The Act makes it a crime for a person who is "required to register" under the Act and who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce" knowingly to "fai[l] to register or update a registration...." 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The question before us concerns the date on which this federal registration requirement took effect with respect to sex offenders convicted before the Act became law.

The Act defines the term "sex offender" as including these pre-Act offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1); see Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2235-2236, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). It says that "[a] sex offender shall register." § 16913(a). And it further says that "[t]he Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the [registration] requirements ... to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter...." § 16913(d) (emphasis added). In our view, these provisions, read together, mean that the Act's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General specifies that they do apply. We reverse a Court of Appeals determination that, in effect, holds the contrary.

... ... ...

Finally, we note that some lower courts have read the Attorney General's specification authority as applying only to those pre-Act sex offenders unable to comply with the statute's "initial registration" requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b). That, however, is not what the statute says. Rather, its Fourth Statement, § 16913(d), says that the Attorney General has the authority (1) to specify the applicability of the registration requirements to pre-Act (and preimplementation) offenders, "and" (2) to prescribe rules for their registration, "and" (3) to prescribe registration rules for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with the initial registration requirements. See supra, at 979. The word "and" means that the Attorney General's authority extends beyond those pre-Act "sex offenders who are unable to comply" with the initial registration requirements.

III
For these reasons, we conclude that the Act's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specifies. Whether the Attorney General's Interim Rule sets forth a valid specification consequently matters in the case before us. And we reverse the Third Circuit's judgment to the contrary.

We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.

---

From here down is on remand from the US Sup Court:
This case returns to us after the Supreme Court's review in Reynolds v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012). Remand requires that we reach the merits of Reynolds's claim that the regulatory rule upon which his indictment was based was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). This claim gives rise to three questions: (1) What is the appropriate standard of review of an agency's assertion of good cause in waiving the APA's notice and comment requirements? (2) Did the Attorney General have good cause to waive these requirements in promulgating a rule governing the retroactivity of the Sex Offender and Registration Notification Act's ("SORNA") registration requirements? (3) If the Attorney General lacked good cause to waive the requirements, was Reynolds prejudiced by the failure to comply with the APA's notice and comment requirements?

The courts of appeals are divided on each of these questions. On the first question, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the arbitrary and capricious standard is the appropriate standard for reviewing the Attorney General's actions, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have not stated a standard but appear to use de novo review, and the Ninth Circuit has explicitly avoided the question.1 On the second question, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Attorney General had good cause to waive notice and comment, while the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that he did not.2 On the final question, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Attorney General's lack of good cause does not prejudice defendants, while the Sixth Circuit has held that it is prejudicial.3

We conclude that we need not decide the appropriate standard of review today because the Attorney General's assertion of good cause cannot withstand review even under the most deferential standard available. We also conclude that the Attorney General's lack of good cause is prejudicial to Reynolds. Accordingly, we will vacate Reynolds' conviction.

USA v Paul Shenandoah

2-9-2010:

USA v Paul Shenandoah
(595 F.3d 151 (2010)

See also lower US Dist court case:
572 F.Supp.2d 566 (2008)

Paul Shenandoah (was on 10 most wanted list) was indicted in December of 2007 for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), [ 595 F.3d 154 ] 18 U.S.C. § 2250(1) and (2) and 42 U.S.C. § 14072(i)(1). He was also charged with two counts of knowingly and willfully providing false information to law enforcement officials regarding his federal sex offender registration offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1512(b)(3).

He pleaded not guilty and asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment, arguing that SORNA violated the Non-Delegation Doctrine, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment and his right to travel. The District Court denied the motion. United States v. Shenandoah, 572 F.Supp.2d 566 (M.D.Pa.2008). Shenandoah then pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, but reserved his right to appeal the order refusing to dismiss the indictment. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(a)(2); United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir.1975).
I.
The factual and procedural background of this appeal is straightforward and undisputed. An abbreviated recitation will suffice. Shenandoah, a New York resident, was convicted of third degree rape in February of 1996.1 He executed a New York state sexual offender registration form when he was paroled in February of 2002. This form requires, among other things, that he apprise New York of any changes in his home address and place of employment. Some time in August of 2007, Shenandoah's employment as an iron worker required that he travel to, and relocate in, York County, Pennsylvania. He failed, however, either to register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania, or to modify his New York registration to reflect his change of residence and employment, leading to his indictment.

KEY STATEMENT:
Furthermore, the directive found in 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) applies to sex offenders — not to states. When combined with SORNA’s enforcement provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), an independent and federally enforceable duty is placed on sex offenders to register. New York and Pennsylvania may never implement SORNA, choosing, for whatever reason, to forego a portion of their federal funding. This failure to implement a federal law, however, does not give sex offenders a reason to disregard their federal obligation to update their state registrations. When a sex offender travels in interstate commerce and disobeys the federal command to keep his or her registration current, as required by SORNA, he or she is subject to prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a); see also May, 535 F.3d at 921.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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Courts continually ignore that there is no way for folks to know about the federal requirements:

See: US v Heth 2-4-2010

Fross v. County Of Allegheny

5-25-2011 Pennsylvania:

Fross v. County Of Allegheny
20 A.3d 1193 (2011)
(Good decision, eliminates local residency laws. Only affects folks on parole or probation though)

Lower court decision 2009:
Fross v. County Of Allegheny
Civil Action No. 08-1405.

Upon certification by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, we accepted for review the issue of whether Allegheny County Ordinance No. 39-07-OR (the "Ordinance"), which imposes residency restrictions on certain offenders, is preempted by the Pennsylvania Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq., ("Parole Code") and/or by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9701 et seq. ("Sentencing Code").

The Ordinance applies to offenders subject to the registration requirements of those provisions of the Sentencing Code collectively known as Megan's Law. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9792; 9795.1-9799.4; 9979.4-9979.9.1 For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Ordinance impedes the accomplishment of the full objectives of the General Assembly, as expressed in the Sentencing and Parole Codes, and is, therefore, invalid pursuant to our conflict preemption doctrine.