New Jersey Supreme Court: Sex offenders who served their time can't face penalities under new laws

9-22-2014 New Jersey:

Riley -v- NJ Parole Board

Sex offenders can not be subjected to punishments under newly created laws if they committed their offense and served their time before the legislation was passed, the state Supreme Court ruled in a 4-3 decision Monday.

In 1986, George Riley was convicted of aggravated sexual assault on a minor and given a 20-year sentence. About six months after his release in 2009, when Riley was under no form of parole, the parole board said he would have to comply with the 2007 Sex Offender Monitoring Act meaning that he would have to wear an ankle bracelet form the rest of his life. He appealed the requirement of what he said was a new punishment constituting life time parole imposed after he had committed his act and after he served his prison term.

“A well established principle of ancient origin is that the Legislature cannot increase the punishment for a crime after it has been committed,” wrote Justice Barry Albin.

“Parole is a form of punishment under the constitution,” Albin wrote. “When applied to Riley, [the monitoring act] violates both the federal and state constitutional guarantees.”

The decision affirms an appeals court ruling that sided with Riley. The parole board argued that Riley should be subject to the ankle bracelet because the law mandated that someone in his risk category, which was determined to be high, must be subject to a monitoring bracelet.

A.A. v New Jersey

Research into this 2001 case is ongoing, so be aware of that until further notice which we will post here when research is done.

12-6-2001 New Jersey:

A.A. v New Jersey

The litigation before the Court is the most recent constitutional challenge to New Jersey's "Megan's Law." Plaintiffs, all of whom have been convicted of sex offenses in New Jersey and are subject to registration and community notification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 et seq. (collectively referred to as "Megan's Law"), instituted this suit on October 15, 2001 challenging the constitutionality of Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution and recent amendments to Megan's Law authorizing the development and maintenance of "a system for making certain information in the central registry ... publicly available by means of electronic Internet technology." P.L.2001, Ch. 167 (codified at N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:7-12 to - 19) (hereinafter referred to as the "Internet Registry Act").

Soon after filing an initial complaint, Plaintiffs submitted an application for preliminary injunctive relief seeking to prevent the implementation of New Jersey's Internet sex offender registry, which is statutorily authorized to become effective on January 1, 2002. P.L. 2001, c. 167 § 10.1

For purposes of this motion, Plaintiffs' claims can be divided into two categories.

• First, Plaintiffs allege that the Internet Registry Act, by allowing unlimited public access to certain information collected pursuant to Megan's Law's registration provisions, violates their constitutional right to privacy in: (1) their home addresses; and (2) the totality of the information assembled and posted in the Internet sex offender registry.
• Second, Plaintiffs contend that the retroactive application of the Internet Registry Act to those members of the plaintiff class whose underlying sex offense was committed prior to the law's enactment violates the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution.2

For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant, in part, and deny, in part, Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

... ... ...

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OF THE INTERNET REGISTRY ACT, N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:7-12 — 19

This matter having appeared before the Court upon Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Court having reviews the submissions of the parties and having heard oral arguments, for the reasons set forth in an opinion issued by this Court, which findings of fact and conclusions of law are incorporated herein by reference, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS on this 6th day of December, 2001,

ORDERED THAT: Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the implementation of P.L. 2001, ch. 167 (codified at N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:7-12 to -19) is DENIED provided that the Internet Registry MUST EXCLUDE information identifying the home or apartment number, street, zip code, and municipality in which Plaintiffs' reside.

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As to "Home Addresses" see also Schiller v INS

JB et al v New Jersey State Parole Board

Does this decision violate a person's right to NOT CARRY the government's message?

To Commenter: Burglary data and parole data is not part of this discussion, nor do I even mention anything similar.

11-26-2013 New Jersey:

JB et al v New Jersey State Parole Board

Appellants J.B., L.A., B.M., and W.M. are individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses, have completed their respective prison terms, and are now being monitored by respondent New Jersey State Parole Board (the "Parole Board") as offenders who are subject to either parole supervision for life ("PSL") or its statutory predecessor, community supervision for life ("CSL"). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Represented by the same attorney, appellants challenge the constitutionality of certain terms of supervision the Parole Board has imposed upon them. Similar conditions have been imposed on other offenders subject to CSL or PSL, although appellants have not filed a class action.

The terms of supervision mainly being challenged in these related appeals1 are (1) the Parole Board's restrictions on appellants' access to social media or other comparable web sites on the Internet; and (2) the Parole Board's authority to compel them to submit to periodic polygraph examinations. One of the appellants, L.A. , also contests the Parole Board's imposition upon him of a Halloween curfew and an electronic monitoring condition.

For the reasons that follow, we reject appellants' facial challenges to the Internet access restrictions, subject to their right to bring future "as-applied" challenges should they avail themselves of the Parole Board's procedures for requesting specific permission for more expanded Internet access and are then denied such permission.

We do not decide at this time the merits of appellants' constitutional attack upon the polygraph requirements. Instead, we refer that subject matter to the trial court for supplemental proceedings, pursuant to Rule 2:5-5(b), for the development of an appropriate record, including scientific or other expert proofs, and for fact-finding. Such proofs and fact-finding shall focus upon the alleged therapeutic, rehabilitative, and risk management benefits of polygraph testing when it is conducted within the specific context of post-release oversight of sex offenders.

Williams v New Jersey Dept of Corrections

12-2-2011 New Jersey:

Williams v New Jersey Dept of Corrections

Charles Williams, an inmate at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center (ADTC), appeals the denial of his administrative action challenging the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections (DOC) to transfer inmates from the general prison population to the ADTC. We reverse.

In summary, we hold that the Commissioner does not have the authority or discretion to assign inmates to the ADTC who are not eligible for such an assignment under the SOA. We do not hold that he cannot transfer ADTC-eligible inmates from other facilities to the ADTC earlier than five years prior to the end of their sentence if they can be accommodated there. We reject Williams's argument to the contrary. We also do not hold that he cannot provide treatment to sex offenders who are not ADTC-eligible at another facility, or even through a distinct program in a separate section of the ADTC if that is feasible.We hold only that the SOA, as it currently exists, precludes the Commissioner from assigning ADTC-ineligible sex-offender inmates to the ADTC for treatment and housing with ADTC-eligible inmates.
Reversed.

Riley v New Jersey State Parole Board

9-22-2011 New Jersey:

Riley v New Jersey State Parole Board

The issue presented by this appeal is whether retroactive application of the intensive monitoring and supervision of sex offenders provided under the Sex Offender Monitoring Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.89 to -123.95, to persons who committed sex offenses before its enactment is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. We conclude that such retroactive application of the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Therefore, we reverse the final decision of the Chairman of the Parole Board subjecting appellant to monitoring and supervision under the Act.

GH v Township of Galloway

7-15-2008 and 5-7-2009 New Jersey:

G.H. v. TOWNSHIP OF GALLOWAY (951 A.2d 221 (2008))

G.H. v. TOWNSHIP OF GALLOWAY (971 A.2d 401 (2009))

From 2009 case: We granted certification in this consolidated appeal to review an Appellate Division determination that Megan's Law, see N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -19, preempted and required the invalidation of municipal ordinances enacted by Cherry Hill Township and Galloway Township. The challenged ordinances each operated to prohibit convicted sex offenders from living within a designated distance of any school, park, playground, public library, or daycare center in its respective municipal jurisdiction. We now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Lisa's comprehensive opinion. G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway,401 N.J.Super. 392, 951 A.2d 221 (2008). Accordingly, we hold that Cherry Hill Township's and Galloway Township's ordinances, establishing residency restrictions that formed buffer zones for convicted sex offenders living within their communities, are precluded by the present, stark language of Megan's Law. It is that language which controls.

That said, we add the following. At oral argument, this Court was urged to provide guidance about the limits to Megan's Law's preemption of municipal action in respect of convicted sex offenders. Cherry [ 971 A.2d 402 ]

Hill also sought to have this Court address hypothetical variations of its present ordinance, presumably to glean advice that might salvage an ordinance to replace the one invalidated. We cannot answer abstract questions or give advisory opinions. See Crescent Pk. Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Eg. Corp. of N.Y.,58 N.J. 98, 107, 275 A.2d 433 (1971); N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Parsons,3 N.J. 235, 240, 69 A.2d 875 (1949). The judicial function operates best when a concrete dispute is presented to the courts. All that is before us is the viability of the challenged ordinances. That was all that was before the Appellate Division and that is all we can address. Accordingly, we decline the municipalities' requests that we answer hypothetical questions about unenacted ordinances or that we provide advisory opinions to function in the abstract.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

Articles: (After first decision) N.J. high court nullifies sex offender residency restrictions (After second decision) N.J. high court nullifies sex offender residency restrictions

State v Reid

1-22-2007 New Jersey:

State v Reid (Interesting, ISP herein had nothing to do w/FSO)

The State appeals, pursuant to leave granted, from an order suppressing evidence obtained from Comcast Internet Service, the internet service provider (ISP) for defendant Shirley Reid. The evidence consisted of information on file with Comcast that identified defendant as the user of a coded screen name.1 Addressing an issue of first impression, we conclude that defendant had an expectation of privacy under our State Constitution with respect to this identifying information that permitted her to challenge the manner in which it was obtained by the police. Since we also conclude that the method used by the police was unlawful, we affirm the order of suppression. Article: Supreme Court rules Internet user has right to privacy