Corey Eason

10-25-2005 Illinois:

When 23-year-old Corey Eason, a small-time central Illinois drug dealer, was paroled from prison for a cocaine dealing conviction in 2002, he was mistakenly classified as a sex offender even though he had never been accused, arrested or convicted of any sex-related offense. As a result, Eason (who was unaware of this error) was listed on Illinois’ sex offender registry, and had his picture posted on the Internet.

Three years later, in March 2005, when Eason was arrested in Bloomington and charged with assault and possession of a controlled substance, his name was found on the sex offender registry. As a result, he was charged with three counts of failing to report a change of address as required by the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act, and convicted at a bench trial.

In September 2005, at the request of Eason’s attorney, the McLean County Probation Department contacted the Illinois State Police, who maintain the sex offender website, and they looked into Eason’s case. They could not explain why Eason was prosecuted since it was evident from his criminal record, which was available to both prosecutors and defense counsel, that he had never been convicted of a sex offense.

The McLean County prosecutors were also notified of the mistake, and, at a hearing on October 25, 2005, they acknowledged the error. McLean County Circuit Court Judge Ronald Dozier vacated the convictions, saying, “I’m glad we got this straightened out before it got too much further down the line.” Eason received probation on the assault and drug possession charges for which he had been arrested in March, 2005.

Eason’s plan to pursue a civil suit over his ordeal never materialized. In April 2011, he was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. ..Source.. by Center on Wrongful Convictions

Simon Angel Rivera

1-26-2005 Texas:

In 1992, Simon Angel Rivera was convicted as a juvenile of sexually assaulting a child when he was a 14 years old. On September 15, 2002, Rivera, 24, was arrested in Austin, Texas on charges of failing to register as a sex offender. On December 16, 2002, Rivera pleaded guilty in Travis County Criminal District Court and was sentenced to two years in prison.

After he was released on February 20, 2004, he filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to set aside his conviction, contending that his attorney had provided inadequate legal defense.

Rivera argued that his lawyer had advised him to plead guilty based on an incorrect understanding of the facts and law applicable to his case. Rivera claimed that at the time when he was charged with failing to register as a sex offender he was no longer required to do so because his juvenile status at the time of his conviction. The law did not require defendants convicted as juveniles to register after the age of 21.

After a hearing in the trial court, the prosecution agreed that Rivera was correct and recommended the writ be granted, and it was.

On January 26, 2005, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the granting of the writ and vacated Rivera’s conviction. The charges were dismissed by the Travis County District Attorney’s Office on March 11, 2005.

In September 2007, the state of Texas awarded Rivera $40,000 in compensation for his wrongful imprisonment. ..Source.. by Maurice Possley

People v Carmony

6-29-2005 California:

People v Carmony
26 Cal.Rptr.3d 365 (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1066

This case raises the question whether there is an offense so minor that it cannot trigger the imposition of a recidivist penalty without violating the cruel and/or unusual punishment prohibitions of the United States and California Constitutions.

Although defendant had registered his correct address as a sex offender with the police one month before his birthday, as required by law (former Pen.Code, § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A))1, he failed to "update" his registration with the same information within five working days of his birthday as also required by law. (Former Pen.Code, § 290, subd. (a)(1)(C).) Defendant's parole agent was aware defendant's registration information had not changed and in fact arrested defendant at the address where he was registered.

Defendant pled guilty to the charge of failing to register within five days of his birthday and admitted he had suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions (Pen.Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (c) and 1192.7, subd. (c))2 and had served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him under the "Three Strikes" law to a prison term of 25-years-to-life (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) plus a one-year consecutive term for the prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

In an earlier opinion we held the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike two of defendant's three prior convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for our consideration of the constitutional issues not reached in our prior decision.

On appeal, defendant claims the application of the Three Strikes law to the offense of failing to duplicate his registration as a sex offender violates the state and federal prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment, double jeopardy and ex post facto laws, and his federal right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 301-302, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536, 159 L.Ed.2d 403, 412 (Blakely.)

It is a rare case that violates the prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment. However, there must be a bottom to that well. If the constitutional prohibition is to have a meaningful application it must prohibit the imposition of a recidivist penalty based on an offense that is no more than a harmless technical violation of a regulatory law.

The state and federal prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment require that the sentence be proportionate to the crime. Accordingly, the current offense must bear the weight of the recidivist penalty imposed. Although the Legislature may impose increased penalties on repeat offenders, recidivism remains a factor in aggravation and may not serve as the reason for imposing increased punishment where the predicate offense serves no rational purpose of the state.

The purpose of the sex offender registration law is to require that the offender identify his present address to law enforcement authorities so that he or she is readily available for police surveillance. In this case the defendant did so one month prior to his birthday and was in fact present at his registered address when the arrest for the present violation was made. The stated purpose of the birthday registration requirement was (and still is) to "update" the existing registration information. (Former § 290, subd. (a)(1)(C).)

Here, there was no new information to update and the state was aware of that fact. Accordingly, the requirement that defendant re-register within five days of his birthday served no stated or rational purpose of the registration law and posed no danger or harm to anyone (Subtle Odd Law Fact).

Because a 25-year recidivist sentence imposed solely for failure to provide duplicate registration information is grossly disproportionate to the offense, shocks the conscience of the court and offends notions of human dignity, it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under both the state and federal Constitutions. We shall remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.3