See also: ACLU of Massachusetts article. And the legal documents HERE Note: RSOL joined in Amicus brief)
8-28-15 Massachusetts:
Doe v City of Lynn
BOSTON (AP) — The highest court in Massachusetts upheld a judge’s decision Friday to throw out a local law that severely restricts where sex offenders can live in the city of Lynn, a ruling that could have broad implications for about 40 other communities.
In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court agreed that Lynn had no legal authority to adopt the ordinance in 2011 because it is inconsistent with state laws governing the oversight of sex offenders.
The Lynn ordinance prohibits Level Two and Level Three sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of parks or public, private or church schools, effectively banning offenders from about 95 percent of the city’s residential properties.
The high court said a package of laws passed by the state Legislature in 1999 establishes clear policies for monitoring sex offenders and notifying the public where they live. The court said there are “grave societal and constitutional implications” of segregating sex offenders.
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Showing posts with label (# Residency Laws - Pre-empted by State Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label (# Residency Laws - Pre-empted by State Law. Show all posts
Top court strikes down Nassau County sex offender residency law
2-17-2015 New York:Local governments cannot impose their own conditions on where sex offenders may live, New York’s highest court ruled Tuesday, striking down a Nassau County law.
The Court of Appeals said that state law covering sex offenders supersedes any local laws and, therefore ... ... .....Sub Req.. by YANCEY ROY
Judge Rules Some Sex Offender Laws Too Restrictive
In most cases, local governments are given the freedom to enact legislation intended to enhance state laws to better serve their local communities. But when it comes to restricting where sex offenders can live, a state Appellate Court judge has ruled the state restrictions are enough and the rest should be thrown out. Cara Thomas explains how this ruling could affect local communities.
The appellate case was The People versus Michael Diack, a Level 1 sex offender who was charged with violating a local law in Nassau County, which restricts all sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school.
Judges ruled in his favor saying the local law was too restrictive and needed to be thrown out.
State law said only the most dangerous sex offenders, Level 3, and those on probation or parole are restricted from living within 1,000 feet of a school.
Wallace v. State
9-26-2014 New York:
Wallace -v- State
In this case ("Wallace"),1 nine individuals ("Plaintiffs") claim that New York State sex offender registration requirements and residency restrictions punish them retroactively for offenses they already committed and, thus, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3); and that similar residency restrictions under County and Town laws are not only unconstitutional, but preempted by state law. (Dkt. No. 5 ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 1-3.)
Plaintiffs also claim that, as a result of the County residency restrictions, they are, or have been, homeless and relegated to County-run trailers, subject to living conditions that infringe upon their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.)
Defendants—the State of New York (the "State")2; the County of Suffolk (the "County") and Susan Westergaard, in her official capacity on behalf of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services3 (the "County DSS") (collectively, the "County Defendants")4; Mark Epley, in his official capacity as Mayor on behalf of the Town of Southampton5 (the "Town")6; and Alexander Roberts, in his official capacity as Executive Director of Community Housing Innovations, Inc. ("CHI")—move the Court to dismiss the claims against them in the Wallace Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 68-70; 79.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motions in their entirety and dismisses the Wallace Complaint with prejudice, except Plaintiffs' state law preemption claims as to which the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses without prejudice.
See also: Judge Rejects Sex Offenders' Challenge to Residency Laws....NY Law Journal
Wallace -v- State
In this case ("Wallace"),1 nine individuals ("Plaintiffs") claim that New York State sex offender registration requirements and residency restrictions punish them retroactively for offenses they already committed and, thus, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, Clause 3); and that similar residency restrictions under County and Town laws are not only unconstitutional, but preempted by state law. (Dkt. No. 5 ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 1-3.)
Plaintiffs also claim that, as a result of the County residency restrictions, they are, or have been, homeless and relegated to County-run trailers, subject to living conditions that infringe upon their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.)
Defendants—the State of New York (the "State")2; the County of Suffolk (the "County") and Susan Westergaard, in her official capacity on behalf of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services3 (the "County DSS") (collectively, the "County Defendants")4; Mark Epley, in his official capacity as Mayor on behalf of the Town of Southampton5 (the "Town")6; and Alexander Roberts, in his official capacity as Executive Director of Community Housing Innovations, Inc. ("CHI")—move the Court to dismiss the claims against them in the Wallace Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 68-70; 79.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motions in their entirety and dismisses the Wallace Complaint with prejudice, except Plaintiffs' state law preemption claims as to which the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses without prejudice.
See also: Judge Rejects Sex Offenders' Challenge to Residency Laws....NY Law Journal
Judge strikes down Warren County sex offender residence restrictions
4-26-2013 New York:A state Supreme Court judge has tossed Warren County’s sex offender law, concluding that the restrictions on where convicted sex offenders can live and work ran counter to state law.
The county Board of Supervisors in 2006 passed the local law that banned sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of playgrounds, schools and public parks for their entire lives.
State law bans sex offenders from living in proximity of places frequented by children only until they’ve completed parole.
Warren County state Supreme Court Justice Robert Muller ruled Wednesday in favor of an unidentified Queensbury man who was told last year he couldn’t move in with his mother in Queensbury.
“While they may be well-intended, statistics show they don’t make anyone safer and they further stigmatize former offenders,” said Kathy Manley, “John Doe’s” Albany-based attorney.
Manley’s client was convicted in 2010 of sexual acts with a minor who was under 16, and he served two years in prison, according to court documents.
Local laws like Warren County’s were adopted over the past decade in places throughout the state and have since repeatedly been struck down when challenged in court, because they are superseded by state law.
Warren County opted to not contest the lawsuit and send it to a lengthy, and potentially costly, court battle because similar local laws had fared poorly in state court.
“The decision is consistent with many court decisions from other counties,” said County Attorney Martin Auffredou. “The decision sort of speaks for itself.”
The laws keep sex offenders from finding work and medical and psychological treatment, essentially subjugating them to poverty and a lack of treatment, Manley said.
Auffredou suspended enforcement of the law in February after “John Doe’s” lawsuit was filed.
The county Board of Supervisors has taken no steps to override the local sex offender law, instead allowing the Supreme Court ruling to uphold or strike down the proximity ban. ..Source. by JON ALEXANDER
Doe v County of Rensselaer
12-22-2009 New York:Doe v County of Rensselaer
2009 NY Slip Op 51456(U)
In this proceeding, plaintiffs, registered sex offenders, are seeking to enjoin defendant Rensselaer County from enforcing sex offender residency restrictions contained in a local law. Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Defendant opposes the motion.
Rensselaer County Local Law 6 of 2006 became effective in July 2006 and it provides for residency restrictions for certain sex offenders. The local law defines the term "sex offender" as "a person who has been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor and has received a level 2 or 3 designation as defined under Article 6-C of the New York State Correction Law." The restriction provided for in the law is that "[a] sex offender as herein defined shall not reside within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility." The following exceptions are provided for within the law:
... ... ...
The Court notes that this issue has been comprehensively addressed and analyzed by courts in Rockland County and Albany County (People v Oberlander, 2009 WL 415558[Sup. Ct. Rockland County January 22, 2009]; People v Blair, 23 Misc3rd 902 [Albany City Ct. February 18, 2009]). The opinions in those cases reference New York's detailed legislative scheme relating to the community management of sex offenders and concluded that the State has impliedly and expressly preempted the regulation and management of sex offenders, including sex offender residency restrictions (see id.). Specifically, New York has the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), also known as Megan's Law, the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act, which created Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, and also has statewide sex offender residency restrictions enforceable as a condition of parole or probation, detailed above.
As noted by plaintiffs, and as cited in the above two opinions, additional compelling proof is found in the Approval Memorandum to Chapter 568 of the Laws of 2008, which enacted changes to the Executive Law and the Social Services Law relating to prior approval by probation departments for sex offender housing. The Approval Memorandum states in relevant part that "the placement of these offenders in the community has been and will continue to be a matter that is properly addressed by the State." After considering New York's comprehensive legislative scheme, this Court concurs with the analysis in the recent court opinions addressing similar local laws.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that sex offender residency restrictions are an area preempted by the State and therefore Rensselaer County Local Law No. 6 of 2006 is preempted and cannot be given effect.
People v Oberlander
1-22-2009 New York:People v Oberlander
2009 NY Slip Op 50274(U)
Following a Violation of Probation hearing in this matter, the defendant moved for an Order dismissing the violation. The defendant claimed Local Law No. 1 of 2007 was preempted by New York State Law.
The Violation of Probation alleges that the defendant violated the conditions of probation in that he "moved to a residence within 1,000 feet of a Rockland County pedophile-free child safety zone' in violation of Local Law No. 1 of 2007." Local Law No. 1 of 2007 provides that a sex offender shall not reside, work or loiter within a child safety zone. "The term child safety zone shall mean one thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or private, elementary, middle or high school, child care facility, park playground, public or private youth center or public swimming pool." Id.
The Court previously considered a pre-hearing motion to dismiss based upon the Constitutionality of the local law. In a decision and Order dated June 18, 2008, this Court held that Local Law No. 1 of 2007 was not Unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant.
The defendant's Constitutional challenge was based upon the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant claimed that because he is an observant orthodox Jew, he must live within walking distance of a Schul or temple. As a result he claims that the statute placed a burden on the practice of his religion. However, this Court held that the statute was facially neutral and did not unduly burden the defendant's practice of his religion. In that prior motion, the Court was not presented with the claim that Local Law No.1 of 2007 was preempted by State legislation.
Sex offender residency restrictions are multiplying throughout New York State, as local legislatures scramble to outmaneuver each other with highly restrictive ordinances designed to banish registered offenders from their communities.
"Not in my backyard" residency restrictions are spreading unchecked through county, town and village ordinance books from Suffolk County to Niagara Falls. More than 80 such laws have recently been enacted in New York. Police and prosecutors are now enforcing them, ordering offenders to move from restricted zones and filing criminal charges for non compliance. Even without vigorous enforcement, the ordinances interfere with parole and probation officers' efforts to find suitable housing for offenders. Alfred O'Connor, State Preemption of Local Sex-Offender Residency Laws N.Y.L.J. November 24, 2008 (hereinafter O'Connor).
... ... ...
"Under [the preemption] doctrine, even in the absence of an express conflict, a local law which regulates subject matter in a field which has been preempted by State legislation is deemed inconsistent with the State's transcendent interest.'" Ba Mar, Inc. v. County of Rockland,164 A.D.2d 605 (2nd Dep't 1991)(quoting Albany Area Builder's Assoc. v. Town of Guilderland,74 N.Y.2d 372 (1989)). "On the other hand, the mere fact that both the State and local governments seek to regulate the same subject matter does not, in and of itself, render the local legislation invalid on preemption grounds.
In order for the preemption doctrine to prohibit local legislation in a particular area there must be an intent on the part of the State to occupy the entire field." Id. "The legislative intent to preempt need not be express. It is enough that the Legislature has impliedly evinced its desire to do so and that desire may be inferred from a declaration of State policy by the Legislature or from the legislative enactment of a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a particular area." N.Y.S. Club Assoc. v. City of NY,69 N.Y.2d 211, 217 (1987). Additionally, "that intent may be implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the purpose and scope of the State legislative scheme, including the need for State-wide uniformity in a given area." Albany Area Builder's Assoc. v. Town of Guilderland,74 N.Y.2d 372, 400 (1989).
In nearly factually identical circumstances, a New Jersey Appellate Court struck down local legislation imposing housing restrictions of sex offenders holding that State law preempted local legislation (preempting more than 100 local sex offender ordinances). G.H. v. Township of Galloway,401 N.J.Super. 392 (App. Div. 2008). In doing so, that Court held that New Jersey's version of Megan's Law constituted a comprehensive legislative scheme enacted to protect citizens from sex offenders. Id.
... ... ...
According to his probation officer, the defendant submitted fifteen addresses for approval. Each time, the probation officer rejected the address as it fell within a safety zone. The probation officer conceded that no appropriate addresses existed in the Village of Monsey and that it was likely that none existed in the Town of Ramapo.
It is clear that the defendant tried to comply with the law. The defendant, on approximately fifteen occasions was able to find available housing. Each time, the defendant's proposed residence was rejected, not based upon the Probation Department's assessment of suitability, but, solely because it violated Local Law No.1. There was no resource available that would allow the defendant to determine the suitability of housing prospectively. The cumbersome procedure only exacerbates the central problem facing the defendant, namely, the lack of housing in suitable locations.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion is granted and the Violation of Probation is dismissed.
This Decision shall constitute the Order of the Court.
Terrance -v- City of Geneva
8-31-2011 New York:Terrance -v- City of Geneva
799 F.Supp.2d 250 (2011)
Plaintiff Danny Terrance (“Terrance”) has filed a complaint against Defendant City of Geneva, New York (“the City”), requesting a declaration that the City of Geneva Municipal Code, Part II, General Legislation, Chapter 285 (“Chapter 285") is unconstitutional. Terrance also seeks an injunction against the City’s enforcement of Chapter 285. The City has filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Conclusion: The Court agrees with the cogent and thorough opinions of the New York State courts discussed above that the State's legislative pronouncements to date establish that the regulation and management of sex offenders (including sex offender residency restrictions) is the exclusive province of the State. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the Chapter 285 (City of Geneva Municipal Code, Part II, General Legislation, Chapter 285) is preempted by New York State Law and will not be given effect.
Accordingly, judgment in favor of Plaintiff is granted to the extent that Chapter 285 is declared invalid and will not be given effect. Because of this disposition, the Court need not rule on Plaintiff’s Federal constitutional claims. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby dismissed as moot. SO ORDERED. Article: Geneva can't pre-empt state SORA residency laws, says U.S. District
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