USA v Medina

3-4-2015 Puerto Rico:

USA v Medina

Moisés Medina failed to register as a sex offender when he moved to Puerto Rico in May of 2012, even though he had been convicted of a state sex offense four years earlier. As a result, Medina was arrested for violating the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act, also known as SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250. He then pled guilty and was sentenced to a thirty month prison term, to be followed by a twenty-year term of supervised release.

The supervised release portion of the sentence included various conditions that Medina must follow or face returning to prison. Medina now challenges two of those conditions as well the
length of the supervised release term. One of the two conditions restricts Medina from accessing or possessing a wide range of sexually stimulating material. The other requires Medina to submit to penile plethysmograph testing -- a particularly intrusive procedure -- if the sex offender treatment program in which he must participate as a condition of his supervised release chooses to use such testing.

We hold that the District Court erred in setting the length of the supervised release term. We further hold that the District Court inadequately justified the imposition of the supervised release conditions that Medina challenges. We therefore vacate Medina's supervised release sentence term and the conditions challenged on this appeal, and remand for re-sentencing.

US v Windless

6-12-2013 Mississippi:

US v Windless

A federal district court may not rely on "bare arrest records" when sentencing a defendant. The district court believed that it could rely on those records when crafting conditions of supervised release. We disagree.

... ... ...

We VACATE imposition of the mental-health treatment condition and REMAND for resentencing. We REVERSE imposition of the "no direct or indirect contact" condition, which the district court may not impose (as currently phrased) on remand.

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New sentence ordered for sex offender who failed to register after coming to Miss. from Minn.

JACKSON, Miss. — A convicted sex offender has won a new sentencing hearing for failing to register in Mississippi because a federal judge erred in putting conditions on his supervised release, a federal appeals court panel has ruled.

Calvin Windless pleaded guilty in 2011 to failing to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. He was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison plus 10 years of supervised release.

Windless did not challenge the lengths of the prison sentence and supervised release. He argued the conditions put on his supervised release were unreasonable.

A three-judge panel of the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals earlier this month agreed with Windless.

Court records show Windless was convicted in 1993 in Cook County, Ill. Windless, then 15, kidnapped a 7-year-old girl and twice forced her to perform oral sex. He was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. He was paroled in 1997 and, after a brief return to prison, was released finally in 1999.

At some point after his release, Windless moved to Minnesota, where he was convicted of failing to register in 2008. Court records show he maintained his registration until he failed to notify Minnesota authorities when he moved to Belzoni, Miss., in 2010.

Windless was arrested by U.S. marshals on a warrant from Minnesota and was indicted when he admitted he had not registered in Mississippi. He pleaded guilty in October of 2011 to failing to register and was sentenced in April 2012 in Aberdeen, Miss.

Windless argued failing to register was not a sex crime and conditions on supervised release for one convicted of a sex crime should not apply to him.

U.S. District Judge Sharion Aycock specified Windless could not have direct or indirect contact with anyone younger than 18 unless accompanied and supervised by an adult who has been approved in advance by his probation officer.

"In essence, Mr. Windless could not leave the confines of his home without violating the terms of his supervised release," his attorneys argued in court documents.

Aycock also ordered Windless to undergo mental health treatment. Windless' attorneys argued he would have to live in Mississippi forever because no other state would want to have to provide mental health treatment for him.

Prosecutors said when the judge considered Windless' crime, ongoing criminal history and failure to register, the special conditions on his release "were necessary and did not constitute an unnecessary deprivation of appellant's liberty."

The 5th Circuit panel, in a ruling written by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, threw out the prison term and conditions tied to supervised release.

Higginbotham said the restrictions were overly broad and, for example, would prohibit him from going to a grocery store unaccompanied.

"Circumstances may, of course, permit a sentencing court to limit an offender's access to places where children are likely to be unsupervised or poorly supervised. It may be reasonable to bar an offender from initiating unsupervised or poorly supervised contact with others' children and reasonable to require him to report contact that children initiate," Higginbotham wrote.

"But to forbid all 'indirect' contact works a serious restriction on liberty, making a trip to the grocery store or a place of worship a trip that may end in imprisonment via revocation sentence," the judge wrote. ..Source.. by JACK ELLIOTT JR

US v Myers

12-9-2008 Florida:

US v Myers
591 F.Supp.2d 1312 (2008)

Unfortunately Myers was overturned on appeal see US v Myers (584 F.3d 1349 (2009)) full details below.

And also: US v Powers
544 F.Supp.2d 1331 (2008)

Unfortunately Powers was overturned on appeal see US v Powers (584 F.3d 1349 (2009)) see link.

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Edward Myers's Motion To Dismiss Indictment (DE 18). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

Defendant Edward Myers is charged in a one-count Indictment (DE 7) with failure to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901, et seq. & 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006) (hereinafter "SORNA"). He seeks to dismiss the Indictment on several grounds, the most compelling of which is that both § 2250 and the registration requirements found at § 16913 exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power and are therefore unconstitutional.1

This Order centers upon the constitutionality of two statutes within the Adam Walsh Act. The thrust of the discussion centers on Congress's Commerce Clause power, where the intricacies of the law are divorced from any value judgment as to whether and how society should protect itself from sex offenders. Sex offenders have undermined the decency once assumed in our fellow man and made us think twice before sending our children and grandchildren outside for a day of carefree play; they have paralyzed our families with fear. The crimes the Adam Walsh Act is meant to prevent are among the most heinous anyone can imagine. To that end, no lawful measure is too great and few punishments are too severe to protect society from sex offenders. While this sentiment reflects the undersigned's personal feelings on the matter, it does not alter Congress's inability to bring about a manifold good through means it has been denied by the Founding Fathers. See Keller v. United States,213 U.S. 138, 144, 29 S.Ct. 470, 53 L.Ed. 737 (1909).

... ... ...

With statutes like those at issue here, Congress's desire to aid in the protection of society against sexual predators is understandable and laudable. However, "the powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Specifically, the grant of power made under the Commerce Clause is limited. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-553, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-95).

Therefore, the statutes challenged herein cannot be upheld. Section 16913 transgresses entirely the limits set on Congress by the Commerce Clause. It cannot be defended except by adulteration of the text of the Constitution and controlling caselaw. Section 2250 also exceeds that grant of power made to Congress under the Commerce Clause. It is in no way a regulation of persons in interstate commerce but an exertion of a general police power through an illusory and impermissible jurisdictional nexus. Thus, the Court declares that § 16913 is unconstitutional in that Congress lacks the power to enact the same under the Commerce Clause. Because an unconstitutional law is no law at all, Defendant Edward Myers shall go hence without day.

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Court hereby declares 42 U.S.C. § 16913 and 18 U.S.C. § 2250 as unconstitutional for the reasons expressed above;

2. Defendant Edward Myers's Motion To Dismiss Indictment (DE 17) be and the same is hereby GRANTED; and

3. That Defendant Edward Myers be discharged to go hence without day for return and exonerated of bond, if any, as to the Indictment hereinabove specified.

DONE AND ORDERED.

---

---

On Appeal: US v Myers
The Government appeals the district court's order dismissing an indictment that charged Edward Myers with traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The district court concluded that both § 2250 and SORNA's sex-offender registration requirements found in 42 U.S.C. § 16913 exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Myers,591 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1316 (S.D.Fla.2008).

We recently upheld against a Commerce Clause challenge both the failure-to-register offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and the registration requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 16913. See United States v. Ambert,561 F.3d 1202, 1210-12 (11th Cir.2009). Myers concedes that the district court's order dismissing the indictment is contrary to Ambert but challenges the reasoning of that panel's decision on appeal. We are bound by that decision unless overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. See United States v. Vega-Castillo,540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.2008).1 Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order and remand for reinstatement of the indictment. See United States v. Powers,562 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir.2009).

VACATED AND REMANDED.

US v Davis

6-19-2012 5th Circuit:

US v Davis

Robert A. Davis, III, pleaded guilty, pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, to failure to register as a convicted sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), reserving his right to appeal the challenges to SORNA made in his motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court sentenced Davis to 37 months in prison to be followed by a life term of supervised release.

On appeal, Davis argues that,

• (1) he was never advised of the registration requirements of SORNA, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 16917, in violation of the Due Process Clause;
• (2) the retroactive application of SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause;
• (3) SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment by requiring state officials to administer federal law;
• (4) Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine by giving the Attorney General the power to decide whether SORNA applied retroactively;
• (5) SORNA's registration requirement violates the Commerce Clause by making failure to register a federal crime;
• (6) regulations issued by the Attorney General were given without notice and comment in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); and
• (7) SORNA does not apply to him because Mississippi has not yet adopted it.

Davis's complaints as to the notice and APA deficiencies, as well as his reliance on the holding in Reynolds v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012), are unavailing as he traveled in interstate commerce after the final regulations were issued, which were published with proper notice and comment rulemaking. See 73 Fed. Reg. 38031-01.

His remaining claims are foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 135 (2011). Davis asks us to reconsider the rulings in Johnson, and alternatively, he presents these issues to preserve them for further appellate review. This panel may not reconsider the court's precedent absent an overriding Supreme Court decision, a change in statutory law, or en banc consideration. See United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

US v Madera

5-23-2008 Florida:

US v Madera
528 F.3d 852 (2008)

Wilfredo G. Madera ("Madera") appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him for failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 ("Walsh Act"). On appeal, Madera argues that the Walsh Act is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of the United States Constitution: 1) the Non-Delegation Doctrine, Art. I, § 1; 2) the ex post facto clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; 3) both the procedural and substantive due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and 4) the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The district court denied Madera's motion to dismiss, holding as a matter of law that the Walsh Act was both retroactive and constitutional. We reverse.

Factual Background

Madera was convicted in New York in November 2005 of sexual abuse in the second degree, a misdemeanor under New York Penal Code § 130.60. He was sentenced to six years of probation for this conviction, but was not incarcerated. Madera signed a sexual offender registration form in New York, dated May 1, 2006, which stated, "If you move to another state you must register as a sex offender within 10 days of establishing residence."

Madera subsequently moved to Florida, and was issued a driver's license on June 1, 2006 with an address in West Palm Beach, Florida. He was arrested on October 23, 2006 for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, and was thereafter indicted by a grand jury for "knowingly and unlawfully fail[ing] to register and update a registration as required by [the Walsh Act]."

After the district court denied Madera's motion to dismiss, Madera entered a conditional plea of guilty to the failure to register charge, permitting him to appeal that motion. The district court then sentenced Madera to time served, four years of probation, and a $500 fine. As of March 8, 2007, Madera has been registered with the State of Florida Sexual Offender Registration database. This appeal followed.

... ... ...

Given our finding that the Attorney General had sole discretion to determine whether or not SORNA was to be retroactively applied to sex offenders convicted before its enactment date, it only stands to reason that SORNA's scope was undefined prior to that determination.7 Because Madera's indictment concerns his failure to register during the gap period between SORNA's enactment and the Attorney General's retroactivity determination, he cannot be prosecuted for violating SORNA during that time. Thus, his indictment is due to be dismissed, and the judgment of the district court is reversed.8

Having decided the case on this basis, we need not reach the important constitutional questions raised in Madera's appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel,529 U.S. 473, 485, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (recognizing "[c]ourts will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented in the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of") (citing Ashwander v. TVA,297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.

USA v Mattix

9-17-2012 Oregon:

USA v Mattix
(694 F.3d 1082 (2012)

Kenneth Theodore Mattix appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). We affirm the conviction and clarify that the outcome of this case is controlled by United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2010).

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Mattix's motion to dismiss the indictment and AFFIRM Mattix's conviction. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Carr v US

6-1-2010 Indiana:

Carr v. U.S.
No. 08-1301.

Since 1994, federal law has required States, as a condition for the receipt of certain law enforcement funds, to maintain federally compliant systems for sex-offender registration and community notification. In an effort to make these state schemes more comprehensive, uniform, and effective, Congress in 2006 enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA or Act) as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. 109-248, Tit. I, 120 Stat. 590. Among its provisions, the Act established a federal criminal offense covering, inter alia, any person who (1) "is required to register under [SORNA]," (2) "travels in interstate or foreign commerce," and (3) "knowingly fails to register or update a registration." 18 U. S. C. §2250(a).

At issue in this case is whether §2250 applies to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA's effective date and, if so, whether the statute runs afoul of the Constitution's prohibition on ex post facto laws. See Art. I, §9, cl. 3. Liability under §2250, we hold, cannot be predicated on pre-SORNA travel. We therefore do not address the ex post facto question.

Note: How does one say it is an ex post facto violation without actually saying that? Isn't law wonderful and creative?

US v Springston

8-18-2011 Arkansas:

U.S. v. Springston
(650 F.3d 1153 (2011)

Bobby Lynn Springston entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. The district court sentenced him to 36 months' imprisonment and 10 years' supervised release. Springston appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, and three special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. We affirm Springston's conviction, vacate the challenged special conditions of supervised release, and remand for further proceedings.

Springston also renews challenges to three of the special conditions of his supervised release: special condition 2, which prohibits him from having unsupervised contact with minors; special condition 3, which provides that he may not access the Internet without prior approval from the probation office and may not have Internet access at his residence; and special condition 6, which requires that he submit to mental health testing or treatment with an emphasis on sex offender treatment, as deemed necessary and directed by a probation officer. We review the special conditions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 933 (8th Cir. 2010).

Springston argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing special conditions 2, 3, and 6, because they do not comply with any of the requirements in § 3583 and are not supported by particularized findings. The government concedes that the district court erred by imposing special condition 3, and we agree. The record, as the government describes it, is "devoid of evidence that [Springston] has ever used a computer for any purpose." We therefore vacate special condition 3.

We likewise conclude that the district court abused its discretion by imposing special conditions 2 and 6 without adequate explanation. The court's only statement regarding the need for those special conditions came in response to Springston's objections at the sentencing hearing. At that point, the court said that "Mr. Springston's history as a sex offender justifies all of those conditions."

Our cases say that a court may impose a special condition on the ground that it is related to a defendant's prior offense, see United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 2006), but that a court "may not impose a special condition on all those found guilty of a particular offense." Davis, 452 F.3d at 995. The court must "conduct an inquiry `on an individualized basis,' looking at the specific facts of the defendant's criminal history and his particular offenses," and make "a particularized showing of the need for the condition in each case." United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Davis, 452 F.3d at 995). We applied this proposition in United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2009), where the district court explained that it imposed a special condition barring the defendant from possessing sexually stimulating material because "sex offenders need to have a very tight rein," and because "a sex offender doesn't have any business looking at Playboy magazine." Id. at 752. This court held that because the district court considered the defendant as "part of a class" of persons convicted of sex offenses, its findings in support of the special condition were "not sufficiently particularized to the defendant." Id.

At some point, there must be a limit to the need for an individualized inquiry, because certain characteristics may justify corresponding conditions for virtually all offenders with such characteristics, but the court's discussion here was insufficient. The court said during the sentencing hearing that there was "no indication" that Springston will "get into any further sex-related offenses," and then made no findings particular to Springston regarding the need for the conditions. Springston's prior offense did not involve a minor, and there was nothing in the record suggesting that Springston was a risk to reoffend against adults. The court simply did not explain why it believed that Springston's twenty-five-year-old conviction justified the conditions. See United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632, 634, 636 (8th Cir. 2001). It may be that similar special conditions could be justified in a case involving failure to register as a sex offender, such as when there is reason to believe that the failure to register evidences recalcitrance and an ongoing proclivity to commit sexual crimes, but the district court expressly stated that this is not such a case. We therefore vacate special conditions 2 and 6.

We affirm the judgment of conviction, vacate special conditions 2, 3, and 6, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

US v Trent

8-5-2011 Ohio:

USv Trent

US v Trent: Roger Dale Trent was indicted on December 11, 2007 in the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The one-count indictment charged that between on or about November 2, 2007, and November 25, 2007, Trent, an individual required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., traveled in interstate commerce to the Southern District of Ohio and knowingly failed to register and update a registration as required by SORNA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), which creates criminal penalties for failing to register under SORNA. .....

Trent now files his appeal in this Court, reasserting each of the constitutional and statutory challenges rejected by the district court, arguing that the district judge erred in each of his rulings on Trent's motion to dismiss the indictment, and further asserting that his prosecution under SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment, an argument that Trent did not present in the district court. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the decision of the district court and DISMISS the indictment because Trent was not required to register under SORNA at the time of his indicted failure to register.

USA v Nam Van Hoang

2-23-2011 Louisiana:

USA v Nam Van Hoang

Appellant Nam Van Hoang (“Hoang”) appeals from his conviction for failure to register pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Hoang was convicted of a sex offense and registered as a sex offender under state law prior to the enactment of SORNA, which requires a sex offender to register in each jurisdiction where he resides and to keep his registration current. Section 2250 of Title 18 prohibits sex offenders who are required to register under SORNA from traveling in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to register.

Hoang’s interstate travel took place after SORNA’s enactment but before the Attorney General issued an Interim Rule declaring SORNA applicable to all sex offenders whose underlying sex-offense convictions predate SORNA’s enactment.

There is a split of authority among the courts of appeals as to whether SORNA’s registration requirements became effective to already-registered, pre-SORNA sex offenders (1) on the date SORNA was enacted, or (2) when the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule declaring SORNA retroactive. We hold that Hoang did not become subject to SORNA’s registration requirements until the Attorney General issued the Interim Rule. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order of dismissal.

US v Crowder

9-1-2011 Washington:

US v Crowder
(656 F.3d 870 (2011)

In June 2007, Kevin Leroy Crowder was convicted of child molestation in Washington state court and sentenced to two years confinement, followed by three to four years community custody (i.e., probation). On June 22, 2007, he received and signed a certified copy of his judgment and sentence form, which informed him that as a sex offender, he was "required to register with the sheriff of the county of the state of Washington" where he resides, and that if he moved "out of Washington State," he had to "send written notice within 10 days of moving to the county sheriff with whom [he] last registered in Washington State," and then "register a new address, fingerprints, and photograph with the new state within 10 days."

Upon his release from prison, on May 28, 2008, Crowder completed a Washington state sexual offender registration form, registering at the King County Sheriff's Office. The registration form stated that if Crowder "move[d] out of Washington State," he had to "send signed written notice within ten days of moving to the new state or foreign country, to the county sheriff with whom [he] last registered." And if he "knowingly fail[ed] to comply with these registration requirements, [he would be] guilty of a . . . felony." One week later, he filed a change of address form.

In March or April 2009, Crowder left Washington for Montana without advising either state to that effect. After a short stay with a woman he met at a bus stop, Crowder set up a campsite in a national forest. He was arrested on September 29, 2009, at a convenience store in Bozeman.

In October 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Crowder for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The indictment stated: "KEVIN LEROY CROWDER, a sex offender by reason of a conviction under Washington law for Child Molestation in the Second Degree, a Felony, and a person required to register under [SORNA], traveled in interstate commerce to Montana, and did knowingly fail to register and/or update a registration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)."

He entered a not guilty plea and opted for a bench trial. The district court rejected Crowder's argument that he did not receive "actual notice" of the federal sex registration requirements, relying on the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Baccam, 562 F.3d 1197 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 432 (2009), and found him guilty. Crowder timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Most important to note here is, that once a registrant signs ANY state form, which indicates that if they move to another state they must register there, ALL Courts (State and Federal) ignore the boundaries between state and federal law.

Here federal law (SORNA) commands that the USAG use a form to notify registrants of their registration requirements (Sec. 117(a) 42 USC 16917(a)) and to prescribe RULES to notify registrants convicted before SORNA of their registration requirements (Sec 117(b) 42 USC 16917(b)).

However, the USAG has FAILED to prescribe any RULE for the notification of registrants convicted before SORNA of their registration requirements. Courts are IGNORING that federal mandate (42 USC 16917(b)), if their is a signed state form which says something similar, and the registrant has signed the state form. In this writer's opinion that is clear trickery, and does not satisfy due process, but I am one person and not a lawyer or a court. It is what it is, be forewarned!

In Crowder's case all his dates are after SORNA was enacted, so this note is not applicable to him, except to show how the SIGNED FORMS are used years after they were signed. (Someday I'll find a case showing how courts are convicting some quite illegally)

We now apply this interpretation of § 2250 to Crowder's case. Although Crowder did not receive notice of the requirement to register under SORNA, the government did not have to prove that Crowder knew of this requirement in order to convict him of an offense under § 2250.

Crowder was required by the terms of his judgment to register in Washington as well as in any new state to which he moved. Indeed, his registration form advised him that he needed to update his registration in Washington before he moved to another state.

In short, there was ample evidence on which the district court could base its determination that Crowder knew that he was required to register and failed to do so. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Accordingly, we reject Crowder's sufficiency of the evidence challenge.

USA v Valverde

12-27-2010 California:

USA v Valverde

UPDATE: Valverde has been appealed to the US Sup ct and they have denied the appeal, therefore this is a good decision to rely on as to the effective date of SORNA

The Government appeals a decision of the district court dismissing the indictment of Mark Anthony Valverde (“Valverde”) under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., on the ground that the registration and penalty provisions of the statute under which Valverde was charged, 42 U.S.C. § 16913; 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B), are invalid exercises of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. We stayed this matter pending a decision on that issue in United States v. George, ___ F.3d ___, No. 08-30339, 2010 WL 4291497 (9th Cir. 2010). Valverde contends in addition that no valid statute or properly promulgated rule made SORNA’s registration requirements applicable to him as of the time that he is charged with failing to register, specifically in January 2008.

We lift the stay issued pending the panel’s decision in George and reject Valverde’s Commerce Clause argument in light of that decision. We AFFIRM, however, the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. We do so on the separate ground that the Attorney General’s interim regulation of February 28, 2007 — applying SORNA’s registration requirements retroactively to sex offenders, such as Valverde, who were convicted before the statute’s enactment — did not comply with the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and did not qualify for the “good cause” exemption under 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3). As a result, the retroactivity provision did not become effective until August 1, 2008 —30 days after its publication in the final SMART guidelines along with the Attorney General’s response to related public comments. Article: Sex Offender Registration Act Not Fully Retroactive

US -v- Clements

8-24-2011 Oregon:

U.S. v. CLEMENTS
(655 F.3d 1028 (2011)

Christopher Matthew Clements appeals his conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. 18 U.S.C. § 2250. On July 27, 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 1-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). Title I of the Adam Walsh Act established the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16913. SORNA basically requires that sex offenders register their whereabouts within three business days after their release from imprisonment, and keep their registrations current by updating their registrations within three business days of moving to a new residence, gaining new employment, or entering a new school. Id. Failure to register pursuant to SORNA, or to keep one's registration current, is a continuing offense. See United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010).

The criminal penalties for failing to register pursuant to SORNA in 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) do "not apply to sex offenders whose interstate travel occurred prior to SORNA's effective date." United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Clements was convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual penetration with a foreign object, in violation of Oregon Revised Statute § 163.411, in Oregon state court on June 3, 1998. SORNA was not enacted until July 27, 2006. On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General promulgated an interim regulation that applied the registration requirements of SORNA to defendants convicted of certain sexual offenses prior to the enactment of SORNA, thus making SORNA retroactive. 72 Fed. Reg. 8894. The superseding indictment charged that Clements failed to comply with the requirements of SORNA on or about February 15, 2008, when he "knowingly failed to register and update a registration" as a sex offender within three business days of relocating and traveling in interstate commerce to Arizona on or about October 5, 2007. Clements challenges the legality of the Attorney General's interim regulation for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA").

[1] In United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2010), we held that for persons such as Clements, who were convicted of sex offenses prior to SORNA's enactment, SORNA's registration requirements did not become effective until August 1, 2008,1 because the Attorney General's interim regulation did not comply with the APA.

[2] Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for dismissal of the indictment. Upon his release from imprisonment, Clements will be subject to the provisions of SORNA and will then need to register. In light of our disposition, we need not reach Clements's other challenges to his conviction.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.